Little v. Georgia Power Company

Supreme Court of Georgia

Little v. Georgia Power Company

52 S.E.2d 322, 205 Ga. 51, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 520

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 16, 1949

Docket16479.

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 52 S.E.2d 322 (Little v. Georgia Power Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Little v. Georgia Power Company, 52 S.E.2d 322, 205 Ga. 51, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 520 (Ga. 1949).

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Opinions

Atkinson, Presiding Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The objection to the first paragraph of the testimony of R. A. Conaway, quoted in the foregoing statement of facts, upon the grounds that the opinion was based on speculation, and was a conclusion, is without merit. The witness was an electrical *54 engineer of 31 years’ experience, his opinions were based on proven facts, and were admissible under the Code, § 38-1710.

To that portion of the testimony of W. D. Maness, to wit, “The easement on which said . . line is located is 50 feet in width,” objections were interposed on the ground that it was a conclusion and no facts were given on which to base such conclusion, which objection was overruled. Inasmuch as there was no evidence of the easement having been acquired by grant or condemnation proceedings designating any particular width, and the evidence showed only a prescriptive right to maintain the line across the premises in question, the evidence objected to should have been excluded, as it. amouñted to no more than a legal opinion or conclusion. Where ownership of property is a material issue, testimony that amounts merely to a conclusion as to the meaning of facts or documents is inadmissible. Bleckley v. White, 98 Ga. 594 (2) (25 S. E. 592); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (20) (51 S. E. 666); Tillman v. Bomar, 134 Ga. 660 (3) (68 S. E. 504); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kitchens, 31 Ga. App. 574 (2) (121 S. E. 583); Downs v. Brandon, 49 Ga. App. 198 (1) (174 S. E. 647).

The width of the right-of-way was a material and controlling question in the instant case, and evidence defining its width having been erroneously admitted, as set forth in the foregoing second division, such evidence may have had considerable weight, or might have been the controlling factor, in affecting the decision of the trial judge, in which case a new trial should be had upon proper evidence. Town of Pelham v. Pelham Telephone Co., 131 Ga. 325 (3) (62 S. E. 186).

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. J., and Head, J., who dissent.

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Atkinson, Presiding Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The objection to the first paragraph of the testimony of R. A. Conaway, quoted in the foregoing statement of facts, upon the grounds that the opinion was based on speculation, and was a conclusion, is without merit. The witness was an electrical *54 engineer of 31 years’ experience, his opinions were based on proven facts, and were admissible under the Code, § 38-1710.

To that portion of the testimony of W. D. Maness, to wit, “The easement on which said . . line is located is 50 feet in width,” objections were interposed on the ground that it was a conclusion and no facts were given on which to base such conclusion, which objection was overruled. Inasmuch as there was no evidence of the easement having been acquired by grant or condemnation proceedings designating any particular width, and the evidence showed only a prescriptive right to maintain the line across the premises in question, the evidence objected to should have been excluded, as it. amouñted to no more than a legal opinion or conclusion. Where ownership of property is a material issue, testimony that amounts merely to a conclusion as to the meaning of facts or documents is inadmissible. Bleckley v. White, 98 Ga. 594 (2) (25 S. E. 592); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (20) (51 S. E. 666); Tillman v. Bomar, 134 Ga. 660 (3) (68 S. E. 504); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kitchens, 31 Ga. App. 574 (2) (121 S. E. 583); Downs v. Brandon, 49 Ga. App. 198 (1) (174 S. E. 647).

The width of the right-of-way was a material and controlling question in the instant case, and evidence defining its width having been erroneously admitted, as set forth in the foregoing second division, such evidence may have had considerable weight, or might have been the controlling factor, in affecting the decision of the trial judge, in which case a new trial should be had upon proper evidence. Town of Pelham v. Pelham Telephone Co., 131 Ga. 325 (3) (62 S. E. 186).

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. J., and Head, J., who dissent.

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52 S.E.2d 322, 205 Ga. 51, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/little-v-georgia-power-company-ga-1949.

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