Little Rock School District v. Alexa Armstrong

359 F.3d 957, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3962
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 2, 2004
Docket03-1147
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 359 F.3d 957 (Little Rock School District v. Alexa Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Little Rock School District v. Alexa Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3962 (8th Cir. 2004).

Opinion

359 F.3d 957

LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee,
v.
Alexa ARMSTRONG; Karlos Armstrong; Khayyam Davis; Alvin Hudson, Tatia Hudson, Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; Stacy Joshua; Wayne Joshua; Sarah Facen; Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert Willingham; and Tonya Willingham, Appellants.

No. 02-3867EA.

No. 03-1147EA.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 11, 2003.

Filed: March 2, 2004.

Robert Pressman, argued, Lexington, MA (John W. Walker, rebuttal, Little Rock, AR), for appellant.

Christopher J. Heller, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, HEANEY, and RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

This case consolidates two appeals, both arising from the Little Rock School District's request for unitary status. First, the Joshua Intervenors1 appeal from the District Court's2 denial of their Motion for Recusal of District Judge and Vacating of Orders, Rulings, and Judgments. We review a district court's denial of recusal for abuse of discretion. See In re Hale, 980 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Walker, 920 F.2d 513, 516 (8th Cir.1990). We conclude that Judge Wilson's representation of Judge Henry Woods at a much earlier stage of the case, and on far different issues, did not involve the same "matter in controversy" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2); thus, we affirm the denial of the Joshua Intervenors' Motion for Recusal.

The Joshua Intervenors also appeal from the District Court's judgment granting the Little Rock School District (LRSD) partial unitary status. The Joshua Intervenors assert: (1) that the District Court erred by not requiring and considering additional reports from the Office of Desegregation Monitoring (ODM); and (2) that the District Court's finding of substantial compliance with the Revised Desegregation and Education Plan was erroneous. We hold that the District Court did not err by failing to require new written reports from the ODM, and that the District Court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous; thus, we affirm the grant of partial unitary status.

Because the facts relevant to each issue on appeal are different, we address them separately. In Part I, we address the issue of disqualification. In Part II, we address whether the District Court should have required new written reports from the ODM. Finally, in Part III, we address whether the District Court erred in finding that LRSD substantially complied with the Revised Plan in most respects.

I.

This litigation began in 1982 and has been in and out of this Court and the District Court several times — it is complex to say the least. We briefly highlight the events relevant to the issue of the disqualification of Judge Wilson.

In 1987, LRSD and the Joshua Intervenors sought to disqualify Judge Henry Woods,3 who was then presiding over the case. The parties asserted as grounds for disqualification that during Judge Woods's private law practice, one of his partners had represented parties who participated as amici curiae in a related case, and that Judge Woods's impartiality was called into question by his comments at a meeting with students. Judge Wilson, then in private practice, represented Judge Woods for the limited purpose of the mandamus proceedings, defending Judge Woods's decision not to recuse himself.4

In the current proceeding, begun by LRSD's motion that it be released from court supervision, the Joshua Intervenors sought the recusal of Judge Wilson under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2), which requires a judge to disqualify himself "where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy." After Judge Wilson entered an order on September 13, 2002, granting LRSD partial unitary status, the Intervenors filed a Motion for a Hearing Regarding the Relevance of 28 U.S.C. § 455 to the Present Proceedings. Judge Wilson denied this motion on October 29, 2002. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2002 WL 31465311 (E.D.Ark.2002). Thereafter, on November 25, 2002, the Joshua Intervenors moved for disqualification of Judge Wilson. Judge Wilson denied this motion because, among other reasons, he had never served, in his view, as a lawyer in the "matter in controversy." Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 4:82CV00866 (E.D.Ark. Dec. 20, 2002). The Joshua Intervenors appeal.

We must determine whether Judge Wilson's representation of Judge Woods in the mandamus proceeding in 1987 involved the same "matter in controversy" as the present questions before us for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). Because the mandamus proceeding did not touch upon the merits of the case, we conclude that it was not a part of the same "matter in controversy."

The Joshua Intervenors contend that Judge Wilson's participation was part of the same matter in controversy because it was part of a single case. The language chosen by Congress, "matter in controversy," is not defined by the statute. However, Congress easily could have substituted the word "case" for the words "matter in controversy," but did not do so. This deliberate choice by Congress demonstrates an intent that the words "matter in controversy" mean something other than what we commonly refer to as a "case." In fact, Congress used the words "proceeding," "case in controversy," and "subject matter in controversy" in various other subsections of § 455(b) to describe situations where a judge must disqualify himself. Thus, we must assume that Congress ascribed a particular meaning to the words "matter in controversy," and we must try to discern that meaning.

We note that Judge Wilson represented Judge Woods at the mandamus proceedings, which were given a separate docket number from the rest of the case in this Court. This circumstance, though relevant, is not enough in itself to enable us to conclude that the disqualification proceeding was not the same "matter in controversy" as the present appeal. As we have indicated, the phrase "matter in controversy" must mean something other than the word "case," and so we do not rely on this technical distinction. Instead, we look to the substance of the issues argued and decided in the two proceedings.

In Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 839 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir.1988), we discussed, but did not decide, whether a matter in controversy could extend beyond a single case. Even if a matter in controversy could be more extensive than a single case, we concluded that the facts before us did not support such a conclusion because the cases involved, "to a large extent, different issues and different remedies." Id. at 1302.

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Bluebook (online)
359 F.3d 957, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3962, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/little-rock-school-district-v-alexa-armstrong-ca8-2004.