Lisby v. PACCAR, Inc.

316 P.3d 1097, 178 Wash. App. 516
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedDecember 23, 2013
DocketNo. 69008-6-I
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 316 P.3d 1097 (Lisby v. PACCAR, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lisby v. PACCAR, Inc., 316 P.3d 1097, 178 Wash. App. 516 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

Becker, J.

¶1 A Washington trial court that dismisses an action on the ground that another state is a more convenient forum may not require the defendant to stipulate that Washington’s statute of repose will govern the case. Deciding what state’s statute of repose will apply to the action is a choice of law issue that does not determine the adequacy or convenience of the alternative forum. We reverse.

FACTS

¶2 Clayton Lisby was killed in a rollover accident at his workplace in Fort Worth, Texas, in January 2011. The truck he was driving was designed in Washington by engineers of the Kenworth Truck Company. Kenworth manufactured the truck in Ohio in 1990, and it was likely delivered shortly thereafter. The Kenworth Truck Company is an unincorporated division of PACCAR Inc. PACCAR is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington. Cassie Lisby, Clayton’s widow, sued PACCAR for wrongful death in Washington. She asserted claims of product liability and negligence. PACCAR moved to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds, asserting that the case properly belonged in Texas.

¶3 Washington recognized the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn.2d 360, 371, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). “Forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary power of a court to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if the action were brought and tried in another forum.” Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wn.2d 577, 579, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).

¶4 The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes that there are at least two forums in which the defendant is [520]*520amenable to process, Werner, 84 Wn.2d at 370, and so the court must first determine whether there is an adequate alternative forum. If so, the court then balances the private and public interest factors articulated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947). Spider Staging, 87 Wn.2d at 579. Unless the balance of factors strongly favors the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum will seldom be disturbed. Spider Staging, 87 Wn.2d at 579-80.

¶5 Here, the trial court found that the Gulf Oil factors “strongly favor trial in the State of Texas and strongly disfavor trial in Washington .’’The court granted the motion to dismiss the action with prejudice, conditioned on PACCAR’s agreement to waive the Texas statute of limitations, a condition that PACCAR accepted.

¶6 Lisby remained concerned that in Texas, PACCAR would be able to have the suit promptly thrown out on statute of repose grounds when it reaches Texas. The Texas statute of repose cuts off all claims that accrue more than 15 years after the original sale. The exceptions are few and narrow. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012. The Washington statute of repose is more favorable to Lisby’s chances of prevailing, given the fact that the truck accident occurred more than 20 years after the truck was manufactured. Under Washington law, a product is presumed to be past its useful safe life when it causes injury more than 12 years after delivery to its first purchaser, but the claimant may rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 7.72.060.

¶7 At Lisby’s request, the court amended the order of dismissal to add a condition requiring PACCAR to stipulate to application of the Washington statute of repose, chapter 7.72 RCW, in the Texas proceeding. The court order stated, “All other choice of law issues will be addressed to the Texas court.”

¶8 PACCAR did not consent to the new condition. PACCAR claims the court exceeded its discretionary powers [521]*521by requiring a stipulation to a choice of law as a condition of dismissal. That issue is before us on discretionary review.

¶9 Forum non conveniens dismissals are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sales v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 163 Wn.2d 14, 19, 177 P.3d 1122 (2008). An untenable legal conclusion is an abuse of discretion. Sales, 163 Wn.2d at 19.

¶10 Deciding which statute of repose will apply to Lisby’s claim requires a choice of law analysis. Ordinarily, it is the alternative forum that determines the applicable law after assuming jurisdiction. Spider Staging, 87 Wn.2d at 579; Myers v. Boeing Co., 115 Wn.2d 123, 136, 794 P.2d 1272 (1990). Choice of law is “not a necessary element of forum non conveniens doctrine.” Hill v. Jawanda Transp., Ltd., 96 Wn. App. 537, 546, 983 P.2d 666 (1999). “At most, resolution of a choice of law question informs, but does not govern a trial court’s forum non conveniens dismissal.” Hill, 96 Wn. App. at 546, citing Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509.

¶11 Preliminary consideration of a choice of law issue may be informative because one of the Gulf Oil factors is the appropriateness of having the trial “in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case.” Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509. For example, in a case involving a Boeing aircraft that crashed in Japan, the court recognized that at least some of the damages issues would be governed by Japanese law. Myers, 115 Wn.2d at 130. “ ‘The Japanese courts’ expertise in applying their own law, while not a factor of paramount importance, favors dismissal.’ ” Myers, 115 Wn.2d at 130.

¶12 Unlike Myers, this is not a case where a preliminary determination of choice of law allowed the trial court to weigh the relative expertise of Texas and Washington courts in applying the law that would govern. Neither PACCAR nor Lisby asked the trial court to engage in a choice of law analysis, and there is no indication that the trial court did so.

¶13 “The general authority is that statutes of repose are to be treated not as statutes of limitation, but as part of [522]*522the body of a state’s substantive law in making choice-of-law determinations.” Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 124 Wn.2d 205, 212, 875 P.2d 1213 (1994). Washington will apply the statute of repose of a nonforum state when appropriate, “even where such application would bar plaintiff’s claim from accruing and where plaintiff’s claim would not have been barred under forum law.” Rice, 124 Wn.2d at 216. Therefore, if choice of law analysis dictates application of the Texas statute of repose to this dispute, presumably the Texas statute will be applied whether the case is tried in Texas or Washington.

¶14 Lisby thus does not defend the condition on the basis that the Washington statute of repose represents the correct choice of law. Her position, fundamentally, is that trial courts have the discretion to impose a particular choice of substantive law as a condition of dismissal.

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316 P.3d 1097, 178 Wash. App. 516, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lisby-v-paccar-inc-washctapp-2013.