Lisa Scott v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 3, 2024
DocketDE-0752-19-0221-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lisa Scott v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Lisa Scott v. Department of Housing and Urban Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lisa Scott v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LISA SCOTT, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-0752-19-0221-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND DATE: December 3, 2024 URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Lisa Scott , Thornton, Colorado, pro se.

Colin J. Ratterman , Esquire, and Nicole A. Allard , Esquire, Denver, Colorado, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the appellant’s removal for failure to follow instructions. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The administrative judge properly sustained the charge of failure to follow instructions. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erroneously sustained specifications 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 of the charge of failure to follow instructions. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 4-5. 2 We have considered the appellant’s arguments but find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s explained findings. Regarding specification 1, we find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s explained finding that the appellant was not subjected to a same-day recall from telework, and thus, her legal arguments about a potential violation of the collective bargaining agreement are immaterial. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 33, Initial Decision (ID) at 6, 8. Regarding specification 2, the appellant’s argument about being granted 2 hours of sick leave to complete her workday does not demonstrate material error in the 2 The administrative judge did not sustain specification 3, and the appellant is not raising a cognizable challenge to the administrative judge’s findings sustaining specification 4. Initial Appeal File, Tab 33, Initial Decision at 11-15; PFR File, Tab 3 at 4. 3

administrative judge’s finding that she failed to comply with a valid instruction to report to the office earlier in the day. ID at 9-11. Regarding specification 5, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not engage in, and was not prohibited from engaging in, protected activity opposing harassment or discrimination, as the appellant did not have a reasonable, good-faith belief that she was opposing such harassment or discrimination. ID at 15-19, 29. Regarding specification 6, the appellant briefly reasserts factual arguments considered by the administrative judge, but we find that the administrative judge properly found that the agency proved this specification for the reasons explained in the initial decision. ID at 22-23. Further, the Colorado Department of Labor’s findings are not binding on the Board, and we find that they do not provide a basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s findings, which are supported by the record in this appeal. See Lucas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 52 M.S.P.R. 267, 270 (1992). The administrative judge did not sustain specification 7, so the appellant’s arguments regarding that specification are immaterial to the outcome. ID at 23-24. To the extent that the appellant argues that the agency’s use of adverse action procedures under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 was inappropriate because the charges were based on performance issues that should have been addressed under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43, we disagree. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5; IAF, Tab 28 at 4. The agency had the option to proceed under chapter 75 with its charge of failure to follow instructions. See Lovshin v. Department of the Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1985). To the extent that the appellant argues that her performance record proves that the removal penalty was excessive or retaliatory, we disagree. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5; IAF, Tab 28 at 4. The initial decision shows that her performance ratings were considered but were outweighed by other factors supporting the agency’s penalty. ID at 32; IAF, Tab 11 at 6-7. Further, we find that such evidence is not of sufficient weight to disturb the administrative judge’s findings on her retaliation claims. 4

The appellant’s claims of procedural errors, ex parte communication, and administrative judge bias provide no basis to disturb the initial decision. The appellant raises various allegations of error in the administrative judge’s processing of the appeal, including that the administrative judge “show[ed] great bias,” pressured her to combine her removal appeal with matters she was pursuing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, changed dates for the close of the record, and “removed critical documents [she] had uploaded to support her case.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-5. We find no evidence of any material procedural error, and the appellant’s allegations about the administrative judge’s case-related rulings fail to establish any bias on the part of administrative judge. In making a claim of bias an appellant must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity which accompanies administrative adjudicators. See Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). The Board will not infer bias based on an administrative judge’s case-related rulings. See Vaughn v. Department of the Treasury, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 18 (2013) (citing Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 12 (2000)). The appellant falls well short of demonstrating any bias in this appeal. For instance, she fails to describe or provide evidence of any improper ex parte communications between the administrative judge and agency counsel and/or that her substantive rights were harmed. We find no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s handling of the close of the record, processing of the appeal, or decision to adjudicate the appellant’s affirmative defenses to the removal action. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.28

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Related

Albert J. Lovshin v. Department of the Navy
767 F.2d 826 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Lisa Scott v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lisa-scott-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development-mspb-2024.