Lisa Louise Woods v. Internal Revenue Service

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided June 11, 2026·No. 4:26-cv-00280·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Lisa Louise Woods, No. CV-26-00280-TUC-RM

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Internal Revenue Service,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Lisa Louise Woods initiated this action on June 1, 2026, by filing a pro se 16 Complaint (Doc. 1), and an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). 17 For the following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to proceed 18 in Forma Pauperis and will dismiss her Complaint with leave to amend. 19 I. Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 20 The Court may authorize the commencement and prosecution of any action without 21 prepayment of fees if a litigant submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay 22 the fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff’s Application indicates that her monthly 23 expenses nearly equal her monthly income, she has no savings, and she has not assets other 24 than her vehicle. (Doc. 2.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated she 25 is unable to pay the filing fees for this action. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s 26 Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. 27 II. Statutory Screening of Complaints 28 The Prison Litigation Reform Act states that a district court “shall dismiss” an in 1 forma pauperis complaint if, at any time, the court determines that the action “is frivolous 2 or malicious” or that it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e) “applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those 4 filed by prisoners.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also 5 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 6 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 7 pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 8 required, but Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 9 me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the 10 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 11 Id. 12 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 13 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic 14 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff 15 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 16 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 17 states a plausible claim for relief [is]… a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 18 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a 19 plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court 20 must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. 21 Id. at 681. 22 The Court must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 23 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant “must be held to less stringent 24 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 25 Nevertheless, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 26 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 27 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 28 If the Court determines that a complaint could be cured by the allegation of other 1 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal 2 of the action. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127-29. 3 III. Plaintiff’s Complaint 4 Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendant Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 5 has failed to issue tax refunds to her since 2019, in an amount totaling $21,000. (Doc. 1 at 6 4.)1 Plaintiff alleges that each year since 2019, she filed taxes with her current and correct 7 address, and that each year the IRS owed but failed to return roughly $3,500 in overpaid 8 taxes. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the IRS has violated her constitutional rights (id. at 3), but she 9 does not allege any specific cause of action. 10 IV. Discussion 11 “[T]he United States may not be sued without its consent,” and the existence of such 12 “consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 13 (1983). “The terms of the United States’ consent to be sued, when granted, circumscribe 14 the court’s jurisdiction.” Danoff v. United States, 324 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 15 2004).2 16 District courts have jurisdiction over civil actions “against the United States for the 17 recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed 18 or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum 19 alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal- 20 revenue laws[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). However, the district court may exercise 21 jurisdiction only if the taxpayer follows the conditions set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), 22 which require a taxpayer to duly file a claim for refund of federal taxes with the IRS prior 23 to filing suit. Danoff, 324 F.Supp.2d at 1092; see also United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn 24 1 All record citations refer to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic filing 25 system. 2 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a cause of action for a violation of her 26 constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, because Congress did not intend “to subject federal agencies to § 1983” 27 liability. Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (“a federal agency is not a ‘person’” subject to liability under § 1983); see also Gibson v. United States, 781 28 F.2d 1334, 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (actionable conduct under § 1983 must be under color of state law). 1 Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008). A refund claim must be filed with the IRS within three 2 years of the date the return was filed or two years after the payment of the tax, whichever 3 period expires last. 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a); Omohundro v.

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Lisa Louise Woods v. Internal Revenue Service, (D. Ariz. 2026).

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