Lisa Louann Miller v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00396
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 LISA LOUANN MILLER, Case No. 2:22-cv-00396-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Plaintiff Lisa Louann Miller (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 11 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) finding Plaintiff is not 12 disabled under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). ECF No. 24, Administrative Record (“AR”) 39. 13 The Commissioner filed a Response (ECF No. 26), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (ECF No. 29). The 14 Court finds as follows. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 This is not the first time the parties have come before the Court. Plaintiff filed a Complaint 17 in federal court on March 7, 2022 seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. ECF No. 18 5. Months later, the parties stipulated to the Court entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 19 remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. ECF No. 13. The Court granted the 20 stipulation (ECF No. 14), and the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to give “further consideration 21 to the claimant’s maximum residual functional capacity and provide appropriate rationale with 22 specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations.” AR 10. The ALJ 23 held two telephonic hearings (June 28, 2024 and November 8, 2023) and ultimately issued an 24 unfavorable determination on March 25, 2024. AR 10, 39. The Appeals Council declined to assume 25 jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s appeal. AR 1. With the conclusion of post-remand administrative 26 proceedings, the parties jointly stipulated to, and the Court ordered the earlier judgment be vacated 27 and the case reopened for briefing. ECF Nos. 19, 20. 1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the decision is based on 3 correct legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 4 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 5 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla.” More than a scintilla of evidence means “such 6 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ford v. 7 Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103) (2019) 8 further citations omitted)). In reviewing the Commissioner’s alleged errors, the Court must weigh 9 “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Martinez v. 10 Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). 11 “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, … 12 [the court] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198, citing Andrews v. Shalala, 13 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a reviewing court “cannot affirm the decision of an 14 agency on a ground that the agency did not invoke in making its decision.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. 15 Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). And, a court may not 16 reverse an ALJ’s decision based on a harmless error. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 17 2005) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls 18 upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). 19 III. ESTABLISHING DISABILITY UNDER THE ACT 20 To establish whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act, there must be 21 substantial evidence that:

22 1. the claimant suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be 23 expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; and 2. the impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the work that 24 the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 25 26 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). “If a claimant 27 meets both requirements, he or she is disabled.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 1 The ALJ uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is 2 disabled within the meaning of the Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 3 404.1520(a). Each step is potentially dispositive and “if a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not- 4 disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett, 180 5 F.3d at 1098 (internal citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant carries the burden of 6 proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner carries the burden of proof at step five. 7 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. 8 The five steps consider:

9 Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act 10 and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step 11 one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

12 Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s 13 impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 14 Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments 15 described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor 16 equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. 20 C.F.R. 17 § 404.1520(d).

18 Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance 19 benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the 20 fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

21 Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 22 404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy 23 that the claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national 24 economy that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert [(“VE”)], or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 25 subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 26 404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits. Id. 27 1 IV. THE SUMMARY OF ALJ’S DECISION 2 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 3 March 2, 2020. AR 13. At step two, the ALJ identified Plaintiff as having a severe impairment of 4 degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines. Id. The ALJ noted the following 5 nonsevere physical impairments in her analysis: a history of pelvic fracture, hip and knee 6 osteoarthritis, neuropathy, and chronic pain syndrome. AR at 14. The ALJ also considered but 7 found Plaintiff’s mental impairments of post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder to be 8 nonsevere. AR 14. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 9 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any of the severity of the “listed 10 impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 11 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926)” or “12.04, 12.06, and 12.15.” AR 21. 12 Thereafter, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 13 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) with several exceptions. AR 22. Here, the ALJ 14 explained although Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected 15 to cause some of the alleged symptoms, the [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, 16 persistence, and limiting effect of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical 17 evidence and other evidence in the record, including the claimant’s reporting to providers.” AR 33. 18 Based on the above, the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing past relevant work as an 19 Accounting Clerk and Cashier II, as the work did not require any activities precluded by Plaintiff’s 20 RFC. AR 36-37. Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Act from 21 her onset date through the date of his decision. AR 38. 22 V. DISCUSSION 23 a. Issue Before the Court. 24 Plaintiff raises one issue for the Court’s consideration: whether the ALJ provided clear and 25 convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. ECF No. 24 at 5. 26 b. The Parties’ Arguments. 27 Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s reasoning erred in four ways. ECF No. 24 at 5-9. First, the ALJ 1 at 7. Second, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s “routine and conservative” medical treatment. Id. Third, 2 the ALJ erred when considering Plaintiff’s statements about her impairments being stable and 3 improving because the statements were isolated and do not necessarily suggest Plaintiff could 4 function in the workplace. Id. at 8. Fourth, the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff’s complaints 5 based on a lack of objective support in the record. Id. 6 The Commissioner submits substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount 7 Plaintiff’s testimony. ECF No. 26 at 2. The Commissioner cites the inconsistent statements made 8 by Plaintiff noted in the ALJ’s decision. Id. For example, Plaintiff claimed pain throughout her 9 body that prevented her from standing for more than 15 minutes, sitting for more than an hour, or 10 concentrating for any amount of time. ECF No. 26 at 2 (citing AR 652). At the same time, Plaintiff 11 reported no problems with maintaining her personal care, performing housework, running errands, 12 watching television, reading, and attending church. Id. at 2-3 (citing AR 653-56). The ALJ also 13 noted evidence in the record showing Plaintiff’s conditions improved with conservative treatment. 14 Id. at 2 (citing AR 25-29). While Plaintiff repeatedly told treatment providers that medications were 15 helpful, Plaintiff testified that her medications were ineffective. Id. at 3 (noting portions of the 16 record). Finally, the Commissioner notes the ALJ’s decision highlighted record evidence in which 17 Plaintiff’s statements to her doctors did not align with her drug screening results. Id. 18 In Reply, Plaintiff maintains the ALJ did not explain how Plaintiff’s activities contradicted 19 her testimony or could be transferable to the work setting. ECF No. 29 at 3. Despite the record 20 showing Plaintiff reported improvements to her providers, she argues improvement does not equate 21 to an ability to return to full time work. Id. at 4. And to the extent Plaintiff could return to work, 22 the ALJ was required to parse her RFC with respect to the different time periods. Id. In response to 23 the Commissioner’s argument about inconsistent statements about substance use, Plaintiff argues 24 the ALJ was required to further develop the record. Id. at 4-5. 25 c. Analysis. 26 “Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the 27 Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because 1 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ “must provide specific, cogent 2 reasons for the disbelief.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Specifically, “the ALJ 3 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 4 complaints.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). If the ALJ’s credibility determination 5 “is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court may not engage in second-guessing.” 6 Tony G. v. Kijakazi, Case No. 2:22-cv-00312-BNW, 2023 WL 4542132, at *3 (D. Nev. July 14, 7 2023) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002)). 8 The ALJ found although Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably 9 be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms … [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the 10 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the 11 medical evidence and other evidence in the record, including the claimant’s reporting to providers.” 12 AR 33. The Court finds the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial 13 evidence to discount Plaintiff’s testimony. 14 1. Contradictions 15 “Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the [Plaintiff’s] 16 subjective symptom testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 17 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, “an ALJ 18 may reject a claimant’s symptom allegations by referencing ‘contradictions in the claimant’s own 19 testimony about his activities of daily living.’” Stephen M. v. Saul, Case No. 6:19-CV-01776-IM, 20 2021 WL 9748520, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 1, 2021) (quoting Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196). “Even where 21 those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the 22 claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” 23 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Turner v. Comm’r of Sec. Sec., 613 24 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2010)). 25 Here, the ALJ found the daily activities Plaintiff described to her doctors were inconsistent 26 with her allegations of “quite disabling, debilitating symptoms and limitations.” AR 23. The ALJ 27 explained: 1 Regarding her functional limitations, the claimant alleged that her impairments have negatively affected her sleep and her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, 2 walk, sit, kneel, climb stairs, complete tasks, and concentrate. Despite these allegations, the claimant also stated that she had no problems tending to her 3 personal care and grooming needs, cooking, doing household chores, including cleaning and laundry, driving, going out alone, shopping in stores, managing her 4 money … reading, and watching television, spending time with others and going to church. 5

6 AR 22-23. Additionally, Plaintiff:

7 reported to Dr. Mayers that she loves to read, she enjoys TV, music, movies on TV, playing cards, and walking…She was currently in college studying for her 8 bachelor’s in administration and that she works in banking. 9 AR 34. At one point, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s reported activities and her ability to do “fairly well 10 in school” suggest Plaintiff has no sitting limitation. Id. 11 The ALJ also noted contradictions in Plaintiff’s travel. Id. Plaintiff testified she only 12 traveled out of state once to help care for her granddaughter after her son-in-law was paralyzed in 13 an accident. AR 23. However, the medical records reflect numerous entries in which Plaintiff told 14 her providers she was traveling to care for her granddaughter. AR 23, 30-32, 34. In sum, the ALJ 15 found “[n]one of the above” activities were “consistent with debilitating pain” to show disability. 16 AR 34. The Court finds this to be a fair reading of the record. 17 To the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have further explained why Plaintiff’s symptom 18 testimony conflicted with her daily reported activities, the Court finds no error. Plaintiff cites 19 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014), to say an ALJ must provide a logical bridge 20 explaining how noted daily activities are inconsistent with reported symptoms. ECF No. 24 at 7. 21 However, Garrison teaches that while “ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily 22 activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain,” daily activities may have bearing on credibility 23 if the level of activity is inconsistent with the claimant’s claimed limitations. 759 F.3d at 1016, see 24 also James v. Berryhill, Case No. 2:18-cv-00885-BNW, 2019 WL 5576935, at *8 (D. Nev. Oct. 29, 25 2019) (“Plaintiff does not cite any authority, however, for the proposition that an ALJ must inquire 26 into inconsistencies between a claimant’s symptom claims and her daily activities at the hearing 27 and/or that a failure to do so is error). Because the ALJ found contradiction between Plaintiff’s 1 2. Stable and Conservative Treatment 2 In addition to the above, the ALJ relied on evidence showing Plaintiff’s pain had improved 3 or was otherwise controlled. The Ninth Circuit has indicated “evidence of ‘conservative treatment’ 4 is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra v. 5 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1434). While “it is not enough 6 for the ALJ to show that the pain was responsive to treatment,” the Court finds the ALJ showed “the 7 pain was ‘controlled,’ i.e., no longer debilitating.” Lopez v. Colvin, 194 F.Supp.3d 903, 911 (D. 8 Ariz. 2016) (internal citations omitted). The ALJ noted that from Plaintiff’s onset date of disability 9 onward, treatment notes reflected her degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines 10 “remained relatively stable with conservative treatment.” AR 25. Specifically, Plaintiff’s 11 prescriptions were consistently refilled without change and during doctors’ visits Plaintiff reported 12 the medications produced no side effects, her pain was controlled, and the medications improved her 13 quality of life. AR 25-30. Taken together, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s treatment reports showed her 14 medication had been “relatively effective in controlling and/or alleviating [Plaintiff’s] symptoms 15 and has improved her functioning as she has been able to travel back and forth to take care of her 16 son-in-law and her grandchildren.” AR 31. Further, the record reflected that as of mid-2023, 17 Plaintiff no longer took prescribed pain management pills and did not report any disabling pain. AR 18 33. Because of the protracted period in which Plaintiff was prescribed the same level of pain 19 medication, the ALJ provided a clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s symptom 20 testimony supported by substantial evidence in the record. 21 The Court finds no basis for Plaintiff’s argument suggesting the ALJ rejected her symptom 22 testimony based on a lack of objective support. ALJs cannot exclusively rely on a lack of 23 corroborating medical evidence to discredit subjective symptom testimony, see Berry, 622 F.3d at 24 1234, but there may be one factor in “determining the severity of the claimant’s pain.” Rollins v. 25 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff does not cite any specific testimony rejected 26 27 1 based solely on a lack of evidence.1 As discussed above, the ALJ provided reasons other than a lack 2 of objective medical evidence to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 3 The Court need not decide the partes’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s statements to providers 4 about drug use and drug screening results. “Long-standing principles of administrative law require 5 us to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ.” 6 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 7 Despite noting instances where Plaintiff’s drug screens were inconsistent with her prescriptions,2 the 8 ALJ does not base her decision on these grounds. Instead, the ALJ’s finding are based on Plaintiff’s 9 pain being controlled and other noted contradictions in the record. AR 33-34. 10 VI. ORDER 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 24) is DENIED. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is to enter judgment in favor of the 13 Commissioner of Social Security and close this case. 14 Dated this 19th day of December, 2025. 15

17 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 1 At one point, the ALJ found there was no objective or subjective evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s testimony indicating she was “immune” to medication. AR 33. The lack of any corroborating support was one factor 26 the ALJ may consider. However, the ALJ discussed in the following paragraphs Plaintiff told medical personnel the medications improved her function and quality of life, and in turn, she received consistent refills with no changes in 27 dosage. AR 33.