Lisa J. Erazo v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner, Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, W.D. Arkansas
• Decided: October 30, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-05109
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

LISA J. ERAZO PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 25-5109

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Lisa J. Erazo, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background: Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for DIB on January 10, 2022, alleging an inability to work since December 1, 2017, due to diabetes, muscle atrophy in the left upper and lower extremities, anemia, bursitis of the hips, high blood pressure, insomnia, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety and depression. (Tr. 80, 185). For DIB purposes, Plaintiff maintained insured states through March 31, 2020. (Tr. 23, 192). An administrative telephonic hearing was held on February 1, 2024, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 43-73). By written decision dated April 12, 2024, the ALJ found that during the relevant time period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 25). Specifically, the ALJ found that through the date last insured Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a tremor in the dominant right upper extremity, diabetes mellitus, an anxiety

disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found that through the date last insured Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to: [P]erform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except as follows: the claimant can frequently handle, finger, and feels with the dominant right upper extremity. The claimant can perform simple and repetitive tasks with detailed, but not complex, instructions, can use judgment to make simple work related decisions, and no more than occasional changes in a routine work setting. The claimant must work in a facility with a restroom and would require 2 extra unscheduled 5 minutes bathroom breaks during the work day.

(Tr. 29). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured Plaintiff could perform work as a floor waxer, an assembler, and a cleaner. (Tr. 34). Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, who denied that request on March 21, 2025. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (ECF No. 2). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is before the undersigned for report and recommendation. (ECF Nos. 10, 12). The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary. II. Applicable Law: The Court reviews “the ALJ’s decision to deny disability insurance benefits de novo to ensure that there was no legal error that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F. 3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id.

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of her residual functional capacity. Id. III. Discussion: In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: A) The ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record; and B) The ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. The Court will consider each of these arguments.

A. Insured Status and Relevant Time Period: To have insured status under the Act, an individual is required to have twenty quarters of coverage in each forty-quarter period ending with the first quarter of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3)(B). Plaintiff last met this requirement on March 31, 2020. Regarding Plaintiff’s application for DIB, the overreaching issue in this case is the question of whether Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant time period of December 1, 2017, her alleged onset date of disability, through March 31, 2020, the last date she was in insured status under Title II of the Act. In order for Plaintiff to qualify for DIB, she must prove that on or before the expiration of her insured status she was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in death. Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining claimant has the burden of establishing the existence of a disability on or before the expiration of her insured status). Records and medical opinions from outside the insured period can only be used in “helping

to elucidate a medical condition during the time for which benefits might be rewarded.” Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the parties must focus their attention on claimant's condition at the time she last met insured status requirements); Turpin v. Colvin, 750 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining the ALJ need “only consider the applicant's medical condition as of his or her date last insured”). B. Duty to Develop the Record: The ALJ has the duty to fully and fairly develop the record, even where the Plaintiff is represented by counsel. If a physician's report of a claimant's limitations is stated only generally, the ALJ should ask the physician to clarify and explain the stated limitations. See Vaughn v. Heckler, 741 F. 2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1984). Furthermore, the ALJ is required to order medical

examinations and tests if the medical records presented do not provide sufficient medical evidence to determine the nature and extent of a claimant's limitations and impairments. See Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F. 3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 1994). The ALJ must develop the record until the evidence is sufficiently clear to make a fair determination as to whether the claimant is disabled. See Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F. 2d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1974). In addition, a claimant must show not only that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record, but she must also show that she was prejudiced or treated unfairly by the ALJ's failure. See Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to fully and fairly develop the medical record regarding Plaintiff’s alleged impairments and that that ALJ should have ordered additional consultative evaluations. (ECF No. 10, pp. 2-7). Initially, the Court notes Plaintiff has failed to establish that the medical records presented

did not provide sufficient medical evidence to determine the nature and extent of her limitations and impairments prior to the expiration of her insured status. See Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019 at 1023. While the ALJ has an independent duty to develop the record in a social security disability hearing, the ALJ is not required “to seek additional clarifying statements from a treating physician unless a crucial issue is undeveloped.” Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004). Likewise, the ALJ is not required to order a consultative evaluation of every alleged impairment; she simply has the authority to do so if the existing medical sources do not contain sufficient evidence to make an informed decision. See Matthews v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1989). Thus, the proper inquiry for this Court is not whether a consultative examination should have been ordered; rather, it is whether the record contained sufficient evidence for the ALJ to

make an informed decision. See Id. After reviewing the entire 3,562-page administrative record, the Court finds nothing which establishes the record was inadequate for the ALJ to make her decision. The medical record includes treating physician records prior to, during and after the relevant time period; non-examining medical consultant opinions; physical exam reports; objective testing to include laboratory tests results, x-rays and MRIs and case analysis. Further, Plaintiff must not only show the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record, but that she was prejudiced or treated unfairly by the ALJ’s alleged failure to develop the record. Plaintiff has made no demonstration that any further record development would have changed the outcome of the ALJ’s determination. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the record was not fully developed and that she was prejudiced by any perceived failure to develop the record. C. The RFC determination: In this matter, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured, Plaintiff retained the

RFC to perform medium work with limitations. (Tr. 29). Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in this RFC determination. (ECF No. 10, p. 7). However, after review, the Court finds substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's RFC determination. Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). “Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007). However, there is no requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical opinion. See Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming RFC without medical opinion evidence). Furthermore, this Court is required to affirm the ALJ's RFC determination if that determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2000). Based upon this standard and a review of Plaintiff's records and allegations in this case, the Court cannot find Plaintiff has demonstrated having any greater limitations than those found by

the ALJ prior to the expiration of her insured status. While Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s reasoning when discussing the evidence, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the record that the ALJ should have considered, but failed to consider, in calculating Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff's medical records and subjective complaints in this matter. (Tr. 25-32). In her opinion, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's alleged impairments and discounted those she found were not credible. Id. The ALJ considered the results of objective diagnostic tests and examination findings and discussed these in the hearing decision. Id. The ALJ also considered the findings of non-examining medical consultants and considered Plaintiff's testimony and function reports in assessing her RFC. Id. The Court recognizes that medical records dated after the expiration of her insured status reveal Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated for

impairments – to include neuropathy of the lower extremities- that may have resulted in a more limited RFC finding. However, after reviewing the record as a whole, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing a more restrictive RFC through her date last insured. See Perks v. Astrue, 687 F. 3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 2012) (burden of persuasion to demonstrate RFC and prove disability remains on claimant). Accordingly, the Court finds there is substantial evidence of record to support the ALJ’s RFC findings for the time period in question. D. Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert: After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true, and which were supported by the record as a whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a floor waxer, an assembler or a cleaner through her date last insured. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996) (testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence). V. Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends affirming the ALJ's decision, and dismissing Plaintiff's case with prejudice. The parties have fourteen days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court. DATED this 30th day of October 2025.

/s/_( Asst _Cometeck HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE