1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 LISA H., CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05916-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING AND 9 REMANDING COMMISSIONER’S v. DECISION 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 11 SECURITY,
12 Defendant. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Lisa H. seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability 15 Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI of 16 the Social Security Act. She contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 17 erred in evaluating the medical opinions of Drs. Melinda C. Losee, Ph.D., Andrew 18 Weir, M.D., and David Morgan, Ph.D. She also asserts that the ALJ erred by 19 discrediting her testimony. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition 20 for Judicial Review and REVERSES AND REMANDS Commissioner’s denial of 21 benefits. 22 23 1 2. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may overturn the Commissioner’s
3 denial of social security benefits if the ALJ’s decision rests on legal error or is not 4 supported by substantial evidence.” Elizabeth G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 5 C24-2025-MLP, 2025 WL 1519230, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2025) (citing Smartt 6 v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022)). Substantial evidence is “such 7 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 8 conclusion.” Id. (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (citation
9 modified)). “In applying this standard, the Court must consider the record as a 10 whole to determine whether it contains sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s 11 findings.” Id. 12 The ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence, and 13 if the evidence can be interpreted in more than one rational way, the ALJ’s decision 14 must be upheld. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494; Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 15 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When evidence reasonably supports either confirming
16 or reversing the ALJ’s decision, [the reviewing court] may not substitute [its] 17 judgment for that of the ALJ.”). Reversal is warranted only if the ALJ erred, and 18 the error affected the outcome of the disability determination. Ford v. Saul, 950 19 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). The party challenging the ALJ’s decision bears the 20 burden of demonstrating harmful error. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 21 (2009).
22 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must employ a five-step 23 sequential analysis, examining: (1) whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial 1 gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable 2 physical or mental impairment” or combination of impairments that has lasted for
3 more than 12 months; (3) whether the impairment “meets or equals” one of the 4 listings in the regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s residual functional 5 capacity (“RFC”), she can still do her “past relevant work”; and (5) whether the 6 claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 7 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by regulation on other grounds; see 8 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
9 3. BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiff first applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 11 social security income in September 2019, alleging disability since May 15, 2019. 12 AR1338. After her applications were denied, Plaintiff requested a hearing, which 13 occurred in November 2021. Id. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 4, 14 2022, which Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 15 Washington. Id. U.S. Magistrate Judge Grady J. Leupold reversed and remanded,
16 finding the ALJ had erred in discrediting the medical opinions of Dr. Melinda C. 17 Losee, Ph.D. Lisa H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-05911-GJL, Dkt. No. 20 at 18 5–8. The court also directed the ALJ to reconsider the weight afforded to Plaintiff’s 19 testimony on remand. Id. at 8. 20 In June 2024, the ALJ heard Plaintiff’s case again and subsequently denied 21 benefits. At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments of
22 “depressive/ bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder (includ[ing] panic disorder).” 23 AR1341. At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have “an impairment or 1 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 2 the listed impairments.” AR1342. Then, at Step 5, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has
3 the following RFC: 4 [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 5 nonexertional limitations: she can understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks with no collaborative tasks with coworkers. She can have 6 no more than occasional interaction with the public in a routine work environment. She cannot work in a job requiring a production rate pace, 7 such as assembly line work or work with hourly production quotas.
8 AR1344. 9 Based in this RFC, the ALJ concluded that “there are jobs that exist in 10 significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform” and that 11 she was therefore not disabled. AR1356. Plaintiff again seeks judicial review. 12 4. DISCUSSION 13 Plaintiff seeks review of the ALJ’s decision. She argues that the ALJ erred 14 by: (1) improperly discrediting the opinions of Dr. Losee, Dr. Andrew Weir, M.D., 15 and Dr. David Morgan, Ph.D.; and (2) improperly evaluating her testimony. 16 Plaintiff asserts that these errors caused the ALJ to inaccurately assess her RFC. 17 4.1 Legal standard for weighing medical opinions. 18 “For nearly 40 years, [courts] have weighed medical opinions based on the 19 extent of the doctor’s relationship with the claimant.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 20 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). The opinions of treating physicians are “entitled to 21 substantial weight,” and courts generally give them more weight than any other 22 medical opinions in the record. Id. (citation modified). Below treating physicians, 23 1 “[i]n the middle tier[,] are doctors who examine the claimant but do not have an 2 ongoing relationship with her.” Id. “To reject either a treating or an examining
3 physician’s opinion, an ALJ must provide ‘clear and convincing reasons,’” that are 4 “supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 5 654 (9th Cir. 2017)). 6 “The lowest-weighted tier comprises ‘physicians who only review the 7 record.’” Id. (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th 8 Cir. 2003)). “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute
9 substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 10 examining physician or a treating physician.” Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 11 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995)). 12 For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Administration has 13 directed ALJs to not defer to medical opinions from treating or examining sources. 14 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). The Ninth Circuit recently held that these “revised social 15 security regulations are clearly irreconcilable with [its] caselaw according special
16 deference to the opinions of treating and examining physicians on account of their 17 relationship with the claimant.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. Therefore, for applications 18 filed after March 27, 2017, “an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit 19 any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 787. 20 4.1.1 The ALJ erred in weighing Dr. Melinda Losee’s opinions. 21 Dr. Melinda Losee completed a medical opinion on Plaintiff’s mental 22 workplace limitations in November 2021, as requested by the State of Washington 23 1 Division of Disability Determination Services. AR1064–68, 1074–77. Dr. Losee 2 reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records from January–July 2020, interviewed Plaintiff,
3 and performed a mental status examination. AR1062. During the mental status 4 examination, Dr. Losee found that Plaintiff was experiencing a manic episode, 5 “despite reported regular use of psychotropic medications.” AR1067. While Dr. 6 Losee made findings related to the manic episode Plaintiff was experiencing during 7 the examination, she also made broader findings. For instance, she concluded that 8 Plaintiff “suffer[s] from recurrent manic and depressive episodes that are severe at
9 times and significantly impair her ability to maintain stable employment, housing, 10 relationships, etc.” Id. Based on observing Plaintiff’s manic episode, Dr. Losee found 11 that Plaintiff’s “ability to complete work-related tasks is significantly affected by 12 her bipolar episodes which preclude her from maintaining sustained efforts.” Id. 13 Likewise, she found that Plaintiff was “not currently capable of understanding, 14 remembering, and carrying out simple or detailed instructions,” or “capable of 15 making work-related decisions.” Id. She also concluded that Plaintiff’s bipolar
16 episodes “affect her ability to complete daily activities (e.g., completing chores, 17 staying on task, remembering to shower) and her social functioning (e.g., too 18 intense, irritable, and impulsive during mania, and emotionally withdrawn and 19 isolating during depression.).” Id. 20 The ALJ discounted Dr. Losee’s opinions, first by stating that they are 21 inconsistent with the longitudinal record. AR1351. The ALJ explains that Plaintiff’s
22 “presentation was unremarkable in most records,” and that most providers 23 “typically noted that [the Plaintiff] presented as pleasant and cooperative, with no 1 significant abnormality in speech, behavior, concentration, psychomotor activity, 2 affect, thought processes, or thought content.” AR1352. But the fact that Plaintiff
3 appeared unremarkable in other records fails to acknowledge the nature of Bipolar 4 Disorder—a condition that causes recurring episodes of mania and depression. The 5 Ninth Circuit has recognized that some conditions, including mental health 6 conditions like Bipolar Disorder, cause symptoms that “wax and wane,” and that 7 ALJs must consider this reality when crediting testimony. Nielson v. Colvin, No. 23- 8 35619, 2024 WL 5200174, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) (ALJ improperly singled out
9 periods of improvement to discredit doctor’s opinion, even though there was also “a 10 significant volume of medical evidence corroborating [the doctor’s] opinions.”); cf. 11 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As we have emphasized 12 while discussing mental health issues, it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony 13 merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment.”). 14 The Commissioner relies on Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th 15 Cir. 2017), for the proposition that evidence of successful treatment can undermine
16 a disability claim even when symptoms wax and wane. But Wellington involved 17 symptoms that fluctuated between periods of wellness and mild symptoms—not, as 18 here, cycling between relative stability and full manic episodes lasting days at a 19 time. Plaintiff testified she is manic about half of each month. AR57. That is not the 20 gradual waxing and waning at issue in Wellington; it is an episodic condition that, 21 by its nature, presents differently on different days.
22 Moreover, an ALJ may not simply list normal findings throughout the record 23 to discount a doctor’s diagnoses and opinions when there are also abnormal findings 1 in the record; that tactic is insufficient because it fails to explain why the normal 2 findings are more significant than the abnormal ones. Alexander M. v. Comm’r of
3 Soc. Sec., Case No. C21-254-BAT, 2021 WL 3758145, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 4 2021) (citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). 5 Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has severe impairments of 6 “depressive/ bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder (include[ing] panic disorder).” 7 AR1341. He also found that Dr. Losee observed Plaintiff during a manic episode and 8 believes that her opinion is consistent with her examination findings. AR1351.
9 Thus, the ALJ accepts that Plaintiff has manic episodes and accepts Dr. Losee’s 10 description of their debilitating effects. Nevertheless, the ALJ discredited Dr. 11 Losee’s opinions because Plaintiff appears normal and states that she is doing well 12 in other records. This reasoning ignores the waxing and waning symptoms of 13 Bipolar Disorder to discredit the medical opinion of an examining doctor. Indeed, as 14 Magistrate Judge Leupold already found, there is evidence in the medical record 15 supporting Dr. Losee’s opinions.
16 The ALJ attempts to distinguish the normal findings upon which he relies 17 from the abnormal findings in the record by explaining that: (1) “the treatment 18 notes showing a normal or mostly normal mental status presentation include notes 19 contemporaneous to Dr. Losee’s examination [on October 19, 2021]”; and (2) “[n]otes 20 around the same time as Dr. Losee . . . show that the claimant essentially denied 21 mental symptoms or stated that her symptoms were controlled with medication.”
22 AR1352 (citing records). But on review, the records cited as being contemporaneous 23 to Dr. Losee’s examination are not. See e.g., AR528–33 (includes cited 2F/26–27) 1 (date of service is October 3, 2019); AR624 (4F/16) (September 2019 note); AR626 2 (4F/18) (September 2019 note); AR630 (4F/22) (September 2019 note); AR636
3 (4F/28) (October 2019 note); AR638 (4F/30) (October 2019 note); AR 640 (4F/32) 4 (October 2019 note); AR665 (4F/57) (part of an evaluation from August 2019); 5 AR686–89 (5F/8–11) (2019 notes); AR737–38 (8F/17–18) (November 2019 notes); 6 AR2001–02 (22F/4–5) (December 2019 notes). 7 Some of the records cited earlier in the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Losee’s opinion 8 are closer in time to Dr. Losee’s examination. See, e.g., AR528–33 (includes cited
9 2F/26–27) (AR1782 (20F/25) (telephonic session on November 8, 2021); AR 1785 10 (20F/28) (telephonic session on November 30, 2021); AR2092 (23F/78) (telephonic 11 session on December 28, 2021). But the ALJ does not explain how normal findings 12 between Plaintiff’s manic episodes discredit medical opinions about the severity and 13 impact of her manic episodes—especially when it is undisputed that Plaintiff suffers 14 manic episodes due to her Bipolar Disorder. 15 Second, the ALJ found that the claimant’s activities are inconsistent with the
16 extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Losee. But Magistrate Judge Leupold found 17 that Plaintiffs’ daily activities do not contradict Dr. Losee’s opinion, holding, “The 18 ALJ should not have relied upon cherry-picked daily activities, that may have 19 occurred during a non-manic period, as a global rejection of Dr. Losee’s opinions.” 20 Lisa H., No. 3:22-cv-05911-GJL, Dkt. No. 20 at 6. The ALJ committed the same 21 error here.
22 Finally, the ALJ discredited Dr. Losee’s opinions by stating that she “had 23 little understanding of the overall diagnostic picture” because she only saw Plaintiff 1 one time and because she “reviewed few, if any, treatment notes or other records.” 2 AR1351. This reasoning is illogical and unsupported. The ALJ discredits Dr. Losee
3 because she only saw Plaintiff once. But the Commissioner cites no precedent to 4 support discrediting an examining physician in favor of records-review physicians 5 on the basis that the examining physician only saw the plaintiff one time. And such 6 an argument would be contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent confirming that 7 examining physicians should generally receive more deference than non-examining 8 physicians. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 789. Moreover, the finding that Dr. Losee
9 reviewed “few, if any” treatment records is factually incorrect; Dr. Losee reviewed 10 seven months’ worth of records in addition to performing her examination. AR1064. 11 Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s reasons for 12 discrediting Dr. Losee’s opinions. 13 4.1.2 The ALJ erred in weighing Dr. Andrew Weir’s opinions. 14 Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision to discount 15 Dr. Andrew Weir’s opinion. Dr. Weir performed a consultative examination of 16 Plaintiff in November 2021 for the “chief complaint” of arthritis. AR1070. He 17 concluded that—as a functional restriction— Plaintiff cannot stand or walk for more 18 than six hours a day and can only stand or walk for two hours at a time without 19 interruption. AR1073, 1080. He also found that Plaintiff was “[r]estricted to [lifting] 20 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.” AR1073. 21 The ALJ rejected these limitations for several reasons. First, the ALJ asserts 22 that Dr. Weir failed to “point to specific findings or . . . other rationale to 23 1 substantiate the limitations.” AR1342. But Dr. Weir’s report includes information 2 that supports his findings. It notes that Plaintiff has “[a]rthritic pain in her right
3 hip and right knee [that] limits her ability to stand for prolonged periods of time.” 4 AR1070. It also notes that she has difficulty with stairs, that she had unsuccessfully 5 attempted physical therapy, and that she was prescribed Meloxicam for her 6 arthritic pain. Id. Dr. Weir also reviewed medical records showing imaging with 7 arthritic changes in the knee and hip; the record also showed an objective finding 8 for positive joint pain and inability to fully extend or bend the knee due to
9 discomfort. AR769. And ultimately, Dr. Weir diagnosed Plaintiff with mild 10 osteoarthritis. AR1073. Substantial evidence thus does not support the ALJ’s 11 conclusion that Dr. Weir failed to provide any support for his opinions. 12 Second, the ALJ asserts that Dr. Weir’s “normal examination findings, which 13 include[e] normal gait, and normal strength and range of motion in all areas,” are 14 inconsistent with the found limitations. AR1342. But these findings are not 15 contradictory. That Plaintiff has a normal gait, strength, and range of motion
16 during an examination does not mean that she can walk or stand for more than six 17 hours or that she can regularly lift more than 20 pounds given her osteoarthritis— 18 especially when she reports difficulty standing for long periods of time and is 19 treating her osteoarthritis with prescribed medication. 20 Third, the ALJ found that Dr. Weir’s opinions are inconsistent with the 21 longitudinal treatment record. Id. But as the ALJ notes, “[i]maging from 2019
22 showed mild to moderate arthritic changes in the claimant’s knee and hip.” AR1341. 23 Plaintiff also cites medical records and findings consistent with Dr. Weir’s opinions. 1 See AR700, 708, 714, 768–69. Given the supportive record and the episodic nature of 2 Plaintiff’s impairment, the ALJ’s analysis was insufficient. See Lisa H., Case No.
3 3:22-cv-05911-GJL, Dkt. No. 20 at 7 (citing Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725)). 4 Fourth, the ALJ found that Dr. Weir’s opinions are inconsistent with 5 Plaintiff’s “allegations in her disability reports and her most recent hearing 6 testimony, which reflect no mention of significant physical symptoms or 7 limitations.” AR1342. While Plaintiff did not mention physical limitations in her 8 most recent hearing testimony, she has stated physical limitations in disability
9 reports. See AR410 (2019 third-party function report noting a need to stop and rest 10 during walks); AR432 (2020 function report noting inability to walk more than eight 11 blocks before resting for 20 minutes); AR1722 (2022 function report noting inability 12 to walk more than six blocks without “about [a] 10–15 minute rest”). Thus, the 13 ALJ’s finding that the allegations in Plaintiff’s disability reports “reflect no mention 14 of significant physical symptoms or limitations” that would support Dr. Weir’s 15 opinions is not supported by substantial evidence.
16 Fifth, the ALJ states that Dr. Weir’s opinion is “inconsistent with the state 17 agency consultants’ opinions.” AR1342. But because these consultants were not 18 examining physicians, this reason cannot provide the sole basis to discount Dr. 19 Weir’s opinions, as a matter of law. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 789 (“The opinion of a 20 nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that 21 justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating
22 physician.” (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 831)). 23 1 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Weir’s opinion 2 that Plaintiff can only stand and walk for two hours at one time without
3 interruption. Dkt. No. 13 at 14; AR1080. Plaintiff is correct. The ALJ’s discussion of 4 Dr. Weir’s opinion addresses the lifting limitation but says nothing about the 5 standing/walking limitation. AR1342. This failure to address a portion of Dr. Weir’s 6 opinion constitutes legal error. See Nadon v. Saul, 851 F. App’x 24, 26 (9th Cir. 7 2021) (“If the ALJ ignores a medical opinion, we review that omission for harmless 8 error.”). This error was not harmless, as the RFC found no physical limitations, but
9 all three jobs identified at Step Five require standing or walking for most of the 10 workday. AR1353–54 (listing janitor, kitchen helper, and hand packager). The 11 vocational expert was never asked whether those jobs would remain available with 12 a two-hour standing/walking limitation. 13 Accordingly, without further explanation from the ALJ, substantial evidence 14 does not support his decision to discredit Dr. Weir’s opinions. See Reddick, 157 F.3d 15 at 725 (The ALJ must “set forth [their] own interpretations and explain why they,
16 rather than the doctors’ [interpretations] are correct.”). 17 4.2 The ALJ erred in weighing Dr. David Morgan’s opinions. 18 Next, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ decision to discredit Dr. David Morgan, 19 Ph.D.’s opinions. After performing a consultative, psychological examination on 20 behalf of the State of Washington in 2019, Dr. Morgan found that Plaintiff suffers 21 from moderate depression and moderate to marked anxiety on a daily basis. AR499. 22 He diagnosed her with “Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent Episode, Moderate 23 1 and Generalized Anxiety Disorder” and found that these diagnoses impact her 2 ability to work. Id. For example, Dr. Weir concluded that because of these
3 diagnoses, Plaintiff has moderate limitations in understanding and remembering 4 instructions, marked limitations in adapting to changes in a routine work setting, 5 and moderate limitations in her ability to ask simple questions and request 6 assistance. AR500. After listing many similar limitations, he rated the “overall 7 severity” of Plaintiffs combined limitations based on her diagnoses as “moderate.” 8 Id.
9 The ALJ discounted Dr. Morgan’s testimony for several reasons. First, he 10 concluded that Dr. Morgan had a limited understanding of the medical record. That 11 finding is not supported by substantial evidence because Dr. Morgan states that he 12 reviewed Plaintiffs’ “DSHS records,” AR498, and because the ALJ acknowledges 13 that he does not know which records Dr. Morgan reviewed, AR1352. 14 Second, the ALJ discounted Dr. Morgan’s opinion as “generally inconsistent 15 with the longitudinal record, as discussed above at finding #5.” AR1352. But the
16 portion of the opinion to which the ALJ refers is eight pages long, and the ALJ fails 17 to cite a contradiction between the record and Dr. Morgan’s opinions. 18 Third, the ALJ found that Dr. Morgan’s report contradicts itself because “his 19 examination shows that he found that the claimant had no deficits in concentration, 20 memory, fund of knowledge, thought processes, or perception” and because Plaintiff 21 “presented as cooperative with normal speech” during the examination. AR1352.
22 But the ALJ disregards the portions of the mental status examination that support 23 Dr. Morgan’s findings. For instance, Dr. Morgan notes that Plaintiff’s appearance 1 during the mental status examination was unkempt and that she had 2 “inappropriate dress.” AR501. Moreover, he charted that Plaintiff’s “[m]ood” was
3 “[a]nxious” during the examination. Additionally, Dr. Morgan conducted a clinical 4 interview and described Plaintiff’s symptoms affecting her ability to work. AR499. 5 He noted that her description of her “manic symptoms appears to be . . . accounted 6 for by chronic anxiety.” Id. He also charted her depression symptoms, including 7 suicidal thinking, fatigue, lack of motivation, and hopelessness. Id. Again, the ALJ 8 may not simply list normal findings to discount a doctor’s diagnoses and opinions;
9 instead, they must explain why the normal findings are more significant than the 10 abnormal ones, in light of the plaintiff’s diagnosis. Alexander M., 2021 WL 3758145, 11 at *3 (citing Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725). 12 4.3 The ALJ’s errors require reversal and remand. 13 The ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Losee’s, Dr. Weir’s and Dr. Morgan’s 14 opinions for the reasons above. None of these errors were harmless because if the 15 ALJ credits any of these doctors’ opinions, that decision will impact the ALJ’s RFC 16 analysis. 17 In general, courts should remand social security cases when additional 18 proceedings can remedy the defects in the Commissioner’s decision. Garrison, 759 19 F.3d at 1019. However, in appropriate circumstances, “courts are free to reverse and 20 remand a determination by the Commissioner with instructions to calculate and 21 award benefits.” Id. Typically, courts only exercise this power “when it is clear from 22 the record that a claimant is entitled to benefits.” Id. In the Ninth Circuit, courts 23 1 remand with instructions to award benefits “where there are no outstanding issues 2 that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made, and
3 where it is clear from the administrative record that the ALJ would be required to 4 award benefits if the . . . [record] testimony were [properly] credited.” Id. (quoting 5 Varney v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir.1988)) 6 (applying “credit-as-true” rule); see also id. at 1020 (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 7 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying “credit-as-true” rule to medical opinion 8 testimony). Here, it is unclear from the record that an award of benefits is required.
9 Accordingly, remand is appropriate. 10 4.4 The Court directs the ALJ to reconsider Plaintiff’s testimony on remand. 11 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by discounting her testimony about her 12 symptoms and limitations. Because reconsideration of the medical opinion evidence 13 may impact the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ is further 14 directed to reconsider this evidence on remand. 15 5. CONCLUSION 16 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that this matter be REVERSED and 17 REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner 18 for further consideration consistent with this Order. On remand, the ALJ shall 19 reevaluate Dr. Losee’s, Dr. Weir’s, and Dr. Morgan’s opinions, reevaluate Plaintiff’s 20 testimony, reconsider at Step Three whether Plaintiff’s impairments meet or equal 21 a listed impairment, develop the record and redetermine RFC as needed, and 22 23 1 proceed to Step Five as necessary. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for
9 || Plaintiff and close this case.
3 Dated this 2nd day of February, 2026.
4 5 Co Aamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23