Lisa Barnes v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 21, 2023
DocketAT-0752-16-0686-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lisa Barnes v. Department of the Navy (Lisa Barnes v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lisa Barnes v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LISA M. BARNES, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-16-0686-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: March 21, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Lisa M. Barnes, Summerville, South Carolina, pro se.

Thomas J. Tangi, Jacksonville, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her removal appeal as settled. Generally, we grant petitions such as

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2 Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure. 2

this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for revie w and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant filed an appeal of the agency’s action removing her base d on a charge of medical inability to perform the essential duties of her position. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, 7-9, 13. During the appeal process, the parties engaged in mediation and, with the assistance of a Board Mediator, they entered into a settlement agreement. IAF, Tabs 14-15. Under the terms of the agreement, the agency was to pay the appellant a lump sum of $30,000, in exchange for which the appellant agreed to a dismissal of her appeal with prejudice. IAF, Tab 15 at 1-2. After finding that the settlement agreement was lawful on its face and the parties entered into it voluntarily, the administrative judge entered the agreement into the record for enforcement purposes and dismissed the appeal as settled. IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. He advised the parties that the deadline for filing a petition for review was January 16, 2017. ID at 3. 3

¶3 The appellant has filed a petition for review, which she submitted on January 18, 2017, arguing that she was pressured into signing the agreement. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4. She also has filed a motion requesting that the Board waive the deadline for filing her petition. PFR File, Tab 4. The agency did not respond to either the petition or the motion.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appellant has shown good cause for her untimely petition for review. ¶4 The appellant admits that her petition for review is untimely. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 4 at 2. Because the January 16, 2017 deadline for filing fell on a holiday, it advanced to the next business day, or January 17, 2017. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.23 (providing that a deadline that falls on a Federal holiday is extended to include the following workday). Thus, the appellant’s January 18, 2017 petition for review was 1 day late. PFR File, Tab 1. ¶5 In a sworn declaration, the appellant, who is pro se, states that between the time she signed the settlement agreement and filed her petition for review, she was bedridden due to medical conditions. PFR File, Tab 4 at 2. She also submits statements from her psychiatrist stating, inter alia, that he has been treating the appellant for some of these conditions and that she has been “unable to manage usual activities and reports.” Id. at 4-5. He indicates that following the mediation that led to the settlement agreement, the appellant’s symptoms worsened. Id. at 5. In light of the appellant’s sworn statement and medical evidence, the shortness of her delay, and her pro se status, we find good cause to waive her 1‑day filing delay. See Lacy v. Department of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 434, 437 (1998) (observing that the Board will find good cause for a filing delay when an appellant demonstrated that he suffered from an illness that affected his ability to file on time); Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995) (reflecting factors relevant to determining if an appellant has shown good cause for his filing delay, including the length of the delay, whether the 4

appellant is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits), aff’d per curiam, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). Further, the agency has not alleged any prejudice resulting from a waiver of the time limit. Moorman, 68 M.S.P.R. at 63.

The appellant has not met her burden to show that the agency engaged in coercion or that she did not voluntarily sign the agreement. ¶6 In her petition for review, the appellant requests the Board to review the “low settlement that [she] felt pressured to sign.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. A party may challenge the validity of a settlement agreement if she believes that the agreement is unlawful, involuntary, or the result of fraud or mutual mistake . Hinton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 4 (2013). To establish that a settlement was fraudulent as a result of coercion or duress, a party must prove that she involuntarily accepted the other party’s terms, that circumstances permitted no alternative, and that such circumstances were the result of the other party’s coercive acts. Id. The party challenging the validity of the settlement agreement bears a “heavy burden.” Asberry v. U.S. Postal Service, 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982). An appellant’s mere post-settlement remorse or change of heart cannot serve as a basis for setting aside a valid settlement agreement. Hinton, 119 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 4. ¶7 The appellant asserts that, since entering into the settlement agreement, her medical conditions have deteriorated. PFR File, Tab 4 at 2. However, she does not claim that her medical conditions caused her to sign the agreement or to not understand what the settlement provided when she signed the agreement . Id.

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Lisa Barnes v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lisa-barnes-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2023.