Lisa Barfield v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 18, 2007
• Docket: 01-06-00903-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued October 18, 2007

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-06-00903-CR

LISA BARFIELD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1347026

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Lisa Barfield, was charged with driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003). The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress all evidence supporting the charge, and appellant pleaded guilty. Pursuant to a plea agreement between appellant and the State, the trial court assessed punishment at 45 days' confinement.

In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence because she was "illegally stopped [i]n traffic without probable cause to believe that [she] had committed a traffic offense," in violation of (1) Article 1, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution and (2) the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 9; U.S. Const. amend. IV, XIV.

We affirm.

Background

Appellant was stopped at approximately 10:00 p.m. on December 25, 2005, and arrested for DWI. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the facts leading up to the traffic stop were in dispute.

According to his testimony, Harris County Sheriff's Department Deputy J. Thomas was driving home at the end of his shift, traveling north on Jones Road in Houston, Texas, when he saw appellant's vehicle, a white Land Rover, four-to-five car lengths ahead of him, stopped at an intersection. ⁽¹⁾ The light was green, but appellant remained stopped at the light. The light turned red as Deputy Thomas drew nearer to the Land Rover and pulled in behind it. When the light turned green again, appellant did not respond, but remained stopped. Deputy Thomas turned on his emergency lights, got out of his car, and approached appellant's car. As he reached the driver's door of the Land Rover, appellant drove forward. Deputy Thomas ran back to his car and activated his siren. Appellant pulled into a parking lot and stopped.

Deputy Thomas parked near appellant and approached the driver's side door. When appellant rolled down the window, Deputy Thomas noticed a strong odor of alcohol emanating from appellant's car. Deputy Thomas characterized appellant as slurring her speech, noticeably upset from a fight she stated she had had with her boyfriend, and unresponsive to simple questions. Deputy Thomas stated that he instructed appellant to get out of the car to perform field sobriety tests and that her balance was poor. Deputy Thomas testified that appellant failed the "one-leg stand" and "walk and turn" tests, but that he did not document either test result because his shift was over and another officer was due to arrive on the scene to take over. Deputy Thomas testified that Deputy Stoffer arrived and performed additional field sobriety tests. Deputy Stoffer did not testify at the hearing. Appellant was transported to the Harris County substation, where she submitted to a breath test that indicated that she had a 0.15 breath alcohol concentration. ⁽²⁾

Appellant, who testified at the suppression hearing, disputed Deputy Thomas's rendition of the facts. Appellant testified that she had been at a neighborhood restaurant and bar, and admitted that she had had "several glasses of wine" with her meal. Appellant purchased a pizza to take home to her children, placed the large box on the passenger seat next to her, and headed home. Appellant contends that she stopped at the red light at issue and began eating some of the pizza out of the box. When she looked up, she noticed that the light had turned green. She paused momentarily to close the lid of the pizza box and then drove forward. She then noticed the flashing lights of the police car behind her and pulled into a parking lot. Appellant contends that Deputy Thomas yelled at her to get out of the car, and she complied. Deputy Thomas administered two field sobriety tests and put her in the back seat of his car. While she sat, Deputy Thomas "went through" her car and then a tow truck arrived.

Appellant moved to suppress all evidence on the grounds that the stop violated the United States and Texas constitutions. Deputy Thomas testified at the suppression hearing that his reason for stopping appellant was that she had committed the following offenses: (1) stopping in a moving line of traffic; (2) impeding traffic; and (3) failure to regard a traffic control device. Deputy Thomas also testified that there was no other traffic in the area at the time, that appellant was not actually impeding traffic, and that appellant had not rendered the intersection impassable.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress and stated that its findings of fact and conclusions of law were as follows:

I find and believe that Officer Thomas was a credible witness. I find that [appellant] was the driver and operator of a motor vehicle on December 25th, 2005, at approximately 9:56 p.m. in Harris County, Texas; and that while operating that motor vehicle, she stopped at an intersection. Officer Thomas drove behind her while the light was green, and [appellant] was still at that intersection. The light thereafter sequenced red, and obviously she was in compliance with the traffic control device at that time. But the light then sequenced green for however many seconds it was, and [appellant] remained at the intersection. She was stopped in a moving lane of traffic in the green sequence of lights. She did impede a moving lane of traffic; and she failed to comply with the traffic-control signal that certainly indicated red, green lights. I heard no mention of yellow. That when Officer Thomas then turned his lights on behind [appellant's] motor vehicle and walked up to the door, [appellant] immediately drove away.

. . . .

As a matter of law, I find specifically that there was probable cause to stop and investigate the motor vehicle driven and operated by [appellant] on December 25, 2005, in Harris County, Texas.

Motion to Suppress

In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence because she was "illegally stopped [i]n traffic without probable cause to believe that [she] had committed a traffic offense," in violation of (1) Article 1, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution and (2) the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As briefed, appellant also contends that Deputy Thomas did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her.

As a preliminary matter, appellant properly stated her state and federal constitutional issues separately; however, she then combined these issues into a single argument, without distinguishing between her state and federal constitutional grounds. Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) (explaining that state and federal issues should be presented in separate grounds and appellant should provide substantive analysis or argument on each ground). Accordingly, we will only address appellant's argument under the United States Constitution. See Arnold v. State, 873 S.W.2d 27, 33 & n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (refusing to examine state constitutional grounds where appellant failed to analyze, argue, or provide authority to establish that his protection under Texas Constitution was different from that provided by United States Constitution); Rauscher v. State, 129 S.W.3d 714, 723-24 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (same).

A. Standard of Review

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence will not be set aside unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Magana v. State, 177 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). We review the trial court's ruling under a bifurcated standard of review. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We review de novo those "mixed questions of law and fact" that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We view the record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the ruling on the suppression motion, and sustain the ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138.

B. Analysis

Because it is undisputed that appellant was stopped without a warrant, the State bears the burden to prove the reasonableness of the warrantless detention. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The State offered, as the justification for the detention, the testimony of Deputy Thomas that he witnessed appellant commit certain traffic violations.

An officer conducts a lawful stop when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Id. A temporary detention is justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead the officer to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)). We disregard any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and look solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The determination of the presence of reasonable suspicion is a factual one and is made and reviewed by considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet ref'd).

A police officer's decision to stop an automobile is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic offense. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When a traffic violation is committed in an officer's presence, the officer has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999); Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

It has been held that the State is not required to show that a traffic violation was actually committed, but only that the facts supported a reasonable suspicion that a violation was in progress or had been committed. McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2001, no pet.); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Bell, 11 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Valencia v. State, 820 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

Here, Deputy Thomas testified that he stopped appellant because she violated, among other things, Texas Transportation Code Section 544.004, "Compliance with Traffic-Control Device," which provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he operator of a vehicle . . . shall comply with an applicable traffic-control device placed as provided by this subtitle," subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.004(a) (Vernon 1999).

Deputy Thomas testified that he first observed appellant stopped in the intersection, and that the traffic light was green. Deputy Thomas came to a stop behind appellant as the light turned red. When the light turned green again, appellant did not respond, but remained stopped. Deputy Thomas turned on his emergency lights and got out of his car. When Deputy Thomas walked up to appellant's vehicle, the light turned green and appellant then drove forward through the intersection. Appellant testified that she did not sit through multiple sequences of the traffic light.

The trial court found that it believed Deputy Thomas and that appellant was stopped in a moving lane of traffic in the green sequence of lights and that she failed to comply with the traffic signal.

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding appellant's detention, we find articulable facts that could have led Deputy Thomas to reasonably suspect that appellant had committed a traffic violation, thereby justifying the stop of appellant's car. We conclude that the trial court's ruling is reasonably supported by the record. See Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first and second issues.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Laura Carter Higley

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Hanks, and Higley.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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