Lipski v. Lipski

293 A.D.2d 344, 740 N.Y.S.2d 324, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3783
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 16, 2002
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 293 A.D.2d 344 (Lipski v. Lipski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lipski v. Lipski, 293 A.D.2d 344, 740 N.Y.S.2d 324, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3783 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith Gische, J.), entered April 3, 2001, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff should not be collaterally estopped from asserting jurisdiction where it appears that, in his prior action for divorce, the issue of jurisdiction was first raised orally and decided at a conference, the only one held in the case, that neither he nor his attorney attended, and it does not otherwise appear that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue (see, Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 501). Nevertheless, we affirm, since plaintiff fails to show in the instant case any of the bases for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (b). Specifically, the documentary evidence demonstrates that well before the parties separated in 1997 or 1998, the matrimonial domicile had been Vermont, where, among other things, defendant has continuously resided since 1994, the parties have drivers’ licenses and register their cars, plaintiff applied for and became a citizen, and which has been listed as the parties’ residence on federal, Vermont and New York tax returns since at least 1997. The action is not saved by Domestic Relations Law § 230, which does not provide alternative residency grounds for jurisdiction but rather additional residency requirements that “go only to the substance of the divorce cause of action, not to the competence of the court to adjudicate the cause” (Lacks v Lacks, 41 NY2d 71, 73). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Sullivan, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Julien v. Julien
78 A.D.3d 584 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2010)
Casey v. Casey
39 A.D.3d 579 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2007)
Senhart v. Senhart
18 A.D.3d 642 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Senhart v. Senhart
2004 NY Slip Op 24254 (New York Supreme Court, Kings County, 2004)
Senhart v. Senhart
4 Misc. 3d 862 (New York Supreme Court, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
293 A.D.2d 344, 740 N.Y.S.2d 324, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lipski-v-lipski-nyappdiv-2002.