Lipscomb v. Carbondale Memorial Hospital

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 11, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-01159
StatusUnknown

This text of Lipscomb v. Carbondale Memorial Hospital (Lipscomb v. Carbondale Memorial Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lipscomb v. Carbondale Memorial Hospital, (S.D. Ill. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KEON V. LIPSCOMB, R25793, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-01159-SMY ) NURSE PRACTITIONER JANE DOE, ) SECURITY GUARD JOHN DOE, ) NURSE JANE DOE, ) DR. JOHN DOE, and ) NURSES JOHN/JANE DOES, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge: This matter is before the Court for preliminary review of Plaintiff Keon Lipscomb’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations stemming from an alleged assault by a prison guard at Carbondale Memorial Hospital on March 28, 2024. The First Amended Complaint is subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires this Court to screen and dismiss any portion that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks money damages from an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). At this juncture, the allegations are liberally construed in favor of the pro se plaintiff. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). First Amended Complaint Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17, pp. 1- 9): While he was a patient at Carbondale Memorial Hospital on March 28, 2024, Plaintiff was assaulted by a prison guard who accompanied him from Menard Correctional Center. Id. at 6-9. Around 6:50 p.m., the officer entered his room and “slam[med]” his partner outside the door. The officer then approached Plaintiff, threatened his life, and beat him for several minutes. Plaintiff was fully restrained in a hospital bed at the time. As the officer choked and beat him, Plaintiff thrashed around loudly, cried out for help, and begged the officer to stop. Afterwards, prison guards carried him outside to a vehicle and transported him from the hospital.1

During the incident, unknown members of the hospital staff gathered outside of his room. When they heard the commotion, they crowded around his door and listened to him scream and thrash. None of them entered the room or intervened to help. They also offered no medical treatment, even after seeing him obviously “beaten [and] defeated [and] weak.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff describes “Nurse Practitioner Jane Doe” who stood and listened to the officer attack him while offering no help and no medical treatment. Id. at 1. “Nurse Jane Doe” worked at a nurse’s station outside Plaintiff’s room and stood beside Nurse Practitioner Jane Doe during the incident. Id. at 2. “Dr. John Doe” treated the plaintiff before the assault and also stood watching with the others. Id. Various other “Nurses John/Jane Does” were aware of the assault. Id. Following the incident, “Security Guard John Doe” spoke with the officer who assaulted

Plaintiff and then shook his hand, as the assaulting officer left the hospital. Id. at 2, 6-7, 9. Plaintiff maintains that each defendant acted under color of state law and was considered a state actor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or, alternatively, a private citizen acting in concert with state actors at the time of Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 6. He seeks monetary relief against Nurse Practitioner Jane Doe, Nurse Jane Doe, Dr. John Doe, Security Guard John Doe, and miscellaneous Nurses John/Jane Does. Id. at 8. The Court designates the following claims in the pro se First Amended Complaint: Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for failing to intervene and

1 These events form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims against Menard officials who were involved in the assault of Plaintiff at Carbondale Memorial Hospital on March 28, 2024 in Lipscomb v. Wills, et al., No. 24-cv-01233-NJR (S.D. Ill. filed May 6, 2024). protect Plaintiff from an assault by a Menard officer while he was at Carbondale Memorial Hospital on or around March 28, 2024.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for failing to treat injuries Plaintiff sustained in the assault by a Menard officer at Carbondale Memorial Hospital on or around March 28, 2024.

Any other claim mentioned in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed herein is considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Preliminary Dismissals Plaintiff describes misconduct by Menard officials, including the officer who allegedly assaulted him, the officer who stood outside his door, and the officers who carried him out of the hospital on March 28, 2024. (Doc. 17). Because he filed a separate lawsuit against these officers, see Lipscomb v. Wills, et al., No. 24-cv-01233-NJR (S.D. Ill.), any claims asserted against them here are considered dismissed. This case involves only claims against the hospital staff. Discussion Section 1983 authorizes claims against persons acting under color of state law to deprive an individual of his or her federally protected rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private citizens are deemed to be “acting under color of state law” in the following situations: (1) where the private citizen conspires with a public employee to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and (2) where the private citizen temporarily operates as a public officer, as in cases where the private citizen is informally “deputized” in an emergency to assist the police and help enforce the law. Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff alleges that all defendants were acting under color of state law when his claims arose. The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on state actors to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To state a claim based on a failure to protect, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the denial of protection posed a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) each defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Nurse Practitioner Jane Doe,

Nurse Jane Doe, Dr. John Doe, and Security Guard John Doe acted under color of state law when they allegedly failed to protect Plaintiff from the officer’s attack. Therefore, Count 1 will receive further review against these defendants. An Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of medical care arises when a state actor- defendant responds to a plaintiff’s objectively serious medical need with deliberate indifference. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). An objectively serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one where the need for treatment would be obvious to a lay person. Id. Deliberate indifference occurs when a defendant “know[s] of and disregard[s] an excessive risk to inmate health.” Id.

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Related

Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Donald F. Greeno v. George Daley
414 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Dale v. Poston
548 F.3d 563 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)

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Lipscomb v. Carbondale Memorial Hospital, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lipscomb-v-carbondale-memorial-hospital-ilsd-2025.