Lipkis v. Pikus

122 Misc. 2d 833, 473 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1983 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4154
CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York
DecidedNovember 28, 1983
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 122 Misc. 2d 833 (Lipkis v. Pikus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lipkis v. Pikus, 122 Misc. 2d 833, 473 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1983 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4154 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order entered May 9, 1983 affirmed, with $10 costs, for the reasons stated in the opinion of Judge Evens, at the Civil Court.

In addition to the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Evens, we briefly note the following. Chapter 349 of the Laws of 1982, which has particular relevance to this early loft case and which may be lawfully applied to cases where the warrant remains unexecuted (Whitmarsh v Farnell, 298 NY 336), permits residential tenants of “interim multiple dwellings” to remain in possession notwithstanding the fact that such buildings do not have residential certificates of occupancy or that such occupancy is in violation of the lease agreement. Owners may recover rents from occupants qualified for protection only to the extent they are in compliance with the registration and other requirements of chapter 349; as found below, landlord has yet to comply. We cannot condone the tenants, prior ill-advised violation of our original order with respect to use and occupancy for the period June, 1980 through January, 1982 (see Lipkis v

[834]*834Pikus, 99 Misc 2d 518, affd 72 AD2d 697; Lipkis v Pikus, NYLJ, Jan. 20,1982, p 11, col 1). However, the Civil Court has determined that those arrears were deposited long ago and that tenants have continued to make their monthly payments. At this late date, execution of the warrants is not called for, and ample “good cause” has been demonstrated for vacatur (RPAPL 749, subd 3). The parties should now proceed to resolve their differences within the framework of the regulatory scheme specifically enacted by the Legislature to address the subject of converted lofts, so that this vexatious litigation may be put to rest.

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Related

City of New York v. Castro
143 Misc. 2d 766 (New York Supreme Court, 1989)
Lenario v. Ward
129 Misc. 2d 326 (New York Supreme Court, 1985)
Enki Properties, N. V. v. Loft Board
128 Misc. 2d 485 (New York Supreme Court, 1985)
Spring Realty Co. v. New York City Loft Board
127 Misc. 2d 1090 (New York Supreme Court, 1985)
Lipkis v. Pikus
103 A.D.2d 682 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
122 Misc. 2d 833, 473 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1983 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lipkis-v-pikus-nyappterm-1983.