Opinion
ROTH, P. J.
Tom Lipkis (appellant) a student at Van Nuys High School, sought a writ of mandate compelling R. W. Caveney, principal at the high school, and the Board of Education of the Los Angeles Unified School District (respondents) to specifically permit four rallies to take place on that portion of the campus of the school known as the quad during lunch periods
on subjects selected by appellant and generally to “promulgate rules and procedures . . . which will allow on a regular basis peaceable speech and assembly by students at Van Nuys High School. . . .”
The evidence showed that the school did provide facilities at lunch time for speech activities. These activities (Noon Forum, Discussion Club and Forum Club) were open to all students and, like the rallies sought by appellant, take place at lunch time on various days of the week. The trial court reflected these facts in its finding that the school does “. . . provide each student at Van Nuys High School an opportunity to discuss and criticize with propriety any issue the student desires to discuss.”
Appellant does not contest the finding that “any issue” may be discussed by the students at these (authorized) school functions,
and concedes that the students’ right to “First Amendment activities” must be “consonant with the school’s interest in maintaining order and decorum through the establishment of rules reasonably necessary to further the school’s education goals.
(Goldberg
v.
Regents of The University of California
(1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 879 [57 Cal.Rptr. 463].)”
Thus, we do not have before us an instance of the complete prohibition of a protected activity (see e.g.,
Mandel
v.
Municipal Court,
276 Cal.App.2d 649, 662 [81 Cal.Rptr. 173]), nor are we faced with an attempt to censor specifically appellant’s speech.
(Dunbar
v.
Governing Board,
275 Cal.App.2d 14, 17 [79 Cal.Rptr. 662].) Finally, appellant does not contest the findings to the effect that on the immediately preceding March 9th appellant and others did cause disruption by attempting to hold an unauthorized assembly
(infra).
Hemmed in by these significant concessions, appellant predicates his appeal on the claim that the prohibition of the rallies at the time and place in question was in and of itself a violation of the First Amendment. Thus, the sole issue at bench in terms of the very authorities cited by appellant is whether the prohibition of the ralbes was a proper exercise of respondents’ judgment that the rabies would and did “materiahy disrupt[ ] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” and were therefore “not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”
(Tinker
v.
Des Moines Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513 [21 L.Ed.2d 731, 741, 89 S.Ct. 733].) In considering this contention, we are mindful of the basic rule that a person does not have the unfettered right to “address a group at any pubbc place and at anytime.”
(Cox
v.
Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 554 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 484, 85 S.Ct. 453].)
Respondent Caveney’s testimony
reveals that appellant and several other students attempted to address students on March 9, 1970, by means of a battery-powered bull horn in the quad area where many students eat their lunch. Caveney had been forewarned of this rally which appears to have been sponsored by the “Radical Student Union,” a group which had not followed school procedures in establishing itself as an official campus organization and was not recognized as such. Together with the vice-principal, Caveney informed the speakers, of whom appellant was. one, that they were conducting an unauthorized gathering and that they were free to air their views and concerns in the other, recognized campus fora (Noon Forum, Discussion Group, Forum Club). According to appellant’s own statement, “We argued with Mr. Caveney for a while . . . (!)” Their “arguments” having proved to be unavailing even if disruptive and obstreperous,
appellant and his cohorts were suspended from school only to be reinstated two days later.
The four rallies which were to commence on April 27 were requested by a group substantially similar in composition to that involved in an unauthorized meeting on March 9 which had resulted in disorder. Appellant was prominently active in the request for the four rallies to commence on April 27.
Mr. Caveney had 20 years’ experience in the school system. When he denied the request for the rallies in question, he recounted in his statement not only the immediately prior March 9th disturbance but in addition four specific instances, all occurring within three- years prior to April 1970, where unsupervised rallies of high school students resulted in disgraceful episodes and caused disruption of the education process itself. Thus, the basis for Mr. Caveney’s judgment was not only his specific and recent experience with appellant and his associates, but it was also based on solid experience with student gatherings of recent years closely akin to the intended rallies, the first of which was to commence on April 27. Mr. Caveney’s judgment was therefore anything but based on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”
(Tinker
v.
Des Moines Community School Dist., supra,
393 U.S. at p. 508 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 738].) Our mandatorily independent examination of the record
(Zeitlin
v.
Arnebergh,
59 Cal.2d 901, 909 [31 Cal.Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152, 10 A.L.R.3d 707]) reveals that prohibiting appellant from speaking
on the, quad at noon
is the very prototype of a regulation which- this or any court is bound to uphold. It does not prohibit the expression of any viewpoint; it does not prevent specifically appellant or any other designated student from voicing his, or anyone else’s views; it rests on explicitly articulated facts and events which generally mandate the regulation; and, its aim is to protect the educational process and those partaking from it in our public schools from the whims and caprices, in Justice Black’s trenchant words, “. . . of the[ ] loudest-mouthed, but maybe not the[ ] brightest, students.” (
Tinker
v.
Des Moines Community School Dist., supra,
393 U.S. 503 at p. 525 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 749], Black, J., dissenting.)
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Opinion
ROTH, P. J.
Tom Lipkis (appellant) a student at Van Nuys High School, sought a writ of mandate compelling R. W. Caveney, principal at the high school, and the Board of Education of the Los Angeles Unified School District (respondents) to specifically permit four rallies to take place on that portion of the campus of the school known as the quad during lunch periods
on subjects selected by appellant and generally to “promulgate rules and procedures . . . which will allow on a regular basis peaceable speech and assembly by students at Van Nuys High School. . . .”
The evidence showed that the school did provide facilities at lunch time for speech activities. These activities (Noon Forum, Discussion Club and Forum Club) were open to all students and, like the rallies sought by appellant, take place at lunch time on various days of the week. The trial court reflected these facts in its finding that the school does “. . . provide each student at Van Nuys High School an opportunity to discuss and criticize with propriety any issue the student desires to discuss.”
Appellant does not contest the finding that “any issue” may be discussed by the students at these (authorized) school functions,
and concedes that the students’ right to “First Amendment activities” must be “consonant with the school’s interest in maintaining order and decorum through the establishment of rules reasonably necessary to further the school’s education goals.
(Goldberg
v.
Regents of The University of California
(1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 879 [57 Cal.Rptr. 463].)”
Thus, we do not have before us an instance of the complete prohibition of a protected activity (see e.g.,
Mandel
v.
Municipal Court,
276 Cal.App.2d 649, 662 [81 Cal.Rptr. 173]), nor are we faced with an attempt to censor specifically appellant’s speech.
(Dunbar
v.
Governing Board,
275 Cal.App.2d 14, 17 [79 Cal.Rptr. 662].) Finally, appellant does not contest the findings to the effect that on the immediately preceding March 9th appellant and others did cause disruption by attempting to hold an unauthorized assembly
(infra).
Hemmed in by these significant concessions, appellant predicates his appeal on the claim that the prohibition of the rallies at the time and place in question was in and of itself a violation of the First Amendment. Thus, the sole issue at bench in terms of the very authorities cited by appellant is whether the prohibition of the ralbes was a proper exercise of respondents’ judgment that the rabies would and did “materiahy disrupt[ ] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” and were therefore “not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”
(Tinker
v.
Des Moines Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513 [21 L.Ed.2d 731, 741, 89 S.Ct. 733].) In considering this contention, we are mindful of the basic rule that a person does not have the unfettered right to “address a group at any pubbc place and at anytime.”
(Cox
v.
Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 554 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 484, 85 S.Ct. 453].)
Respondent Caveney’s testimony
reveals that appellant and several other students attempted to address students on March 9, 1970, by means of a battery-powered bull horn in the quad area where many students eat their lunch. Caveney had been forewarned of this rally which appears to have been sponsored by the “Radical Student Union,” a group which had not followed school procedures in establishing itself as an official campus organization and was not recognized as such. Together with the vice-principal, Caveney informed the speakers, of whom appellant was. one, that they were conducting an unauthorized gathering and that they were free to air their views and concerns in the other, recognized campus fora (Noon Forum, Discussion Group, Forum Club). According to appellant’s own statement, “We argued with Mr. Caveney for a while . . . (!)” Their “arguments” having proved to be unavailing even if disruptive and obstreperous,
appellant and his cohorts were suspended from school only to be reinstated two days later.
The four rallies which were to commence on April 27 were requested by a group substantially similar in composition to that involved in an unauthorized meeting on March 9 which had resulted in disorder. Appellant was prominently active in the request for the four rallies to commence on April 27.
Mr. Caveney had 20 years’ experience in the school system. When he denied the request for the rallies in question, he recounted in his statement not only the immediately prior March 9th disturbance but in addition four specific instances, all occurring within three- years prior to April 1970, where unsupervised rallies of high school students resulted in disgraceful episodes and caused disruption of the education process itself. Thus, the basis for Mr. Caveney’s judgment was not only his specific and recent experience with appellant and his associates, but it was also based on solid experience with student gatherings of recent years closely akin to the intended rallies, the first of which was to commence on April 27. Mr. Caveney’s judgment was therefore anything but based on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”
(Tinker
v.
Des Moines Community School Dist., supra,
393 U.S. at p. 508 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 738].) Our mandatorily independent examination of the record
(Zeitlin
v.
Arnebergh,
59 Cal.2d 901, 909 [31 Cal.Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152, 10 A.L.R.3d 707]) reveals that prohibiting appellant from speaking
on the, quad at noon
is the very prototype of a regulation which- this or any court is bound to uphold. It does not prohibit the expression of any viewpoint; it does not prevent specifically appellant or any other designated student from voicing his, or anyone else’s views; it rests on explicitly articulated facts and events which generally mandate the regulation; and, its aim is to protect the educational process and those partaking from it in our public schools from the whims and caprices, in Justice Black’s trenchant words, “. . . of the[ ] loudest-mouthed, but maybe not the[ ] brightest, students.” (
Tinker
v.
Des Moines Community School Dist., supra,
393 U.S. 503 at p. 525 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 749], Black, J., dissenting.)
The purpose of Van Nuys High School, as of any school, is to' educate and not, as incisively observed by the trial judge, to provide appellant with a “captive audience for speechmaking,” to wit: an audience composed of students who are having lunch at or about the quad.
We emphasize that appellant had adequate and concededly
readily available
fora in which to exercise his right of free speech and to ventilate views he entertained relative to any problems of his school, his country or the world. Puerile, abrasive and contemptuous behavior cannot be whitewashed by constitutional incantations, which, if we understand them, give appellant the right to espouse in non-obscene language even the most unpopular views but which do not require Van Nuys High School or the school
system to guarantee to him on the school grounds a captive audience at the specific times he elects to address them.
Our Constitution extends no such guarantees to appellant or anyone else.
The judgment is affirmed.
Herndon, J., and Compton, J., concurred.