STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, ss CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-07-49 Ki\{- peAl - i / "-1, ~ 0<) 'I
JIMMY LIPHAM, ) ) Petitioner ) ) v. ) Order on Post-Conviction ) Review STATE OF MAINE, ) ) FILED &ENTERED Respondent ) SUPERIOR COURT JAN 14 2008
DECISION PENOBSCOT COUNTY
Under a Post Conviction Assignment Order dated
February 1, 2007, responding to a Petition for Post
Conviction Review, this matter was set for hearing in
Ellsworth, Maine on January 7, 2008. Appointed counsel,
Jeffrey Toothaker, Esq., represented petitioner. Assistant
Attorney General Donald W. Macomber, Esq., represented the
State. Mr. Lipham was present and testified, as did Mrs.
Kerry Lipham (Petitioner's wife) and attorney Bradford S.
Macdonald, Esq. (Petitioner's attorney at trial).
As the Post-Conviction Assignment Order makes clear,
the single ground to be considered on this Petition for
Post-Conviction Review is the ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Law Court has recently confirmed the standard
to be applied in determining whether a defendant has
1 received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
in the case of Francis v. State, 2007 ME 148. In that
case, the Law Court advised:
"To determine whether a petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court conducts a two-prong inquiry./f See Alexandre v. State, 2007 ME 106, ~ 43, 927 A.2d 1155, 1167. First, we examine "whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance . . . below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney . . • . " McGowan v. State, 2006 ME 16, ~ 11, 894 A.2d 493, 496-97 (quotation marks omitted). Second, we determine whether the attorney's performance "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense" or "likely affected the outcome of the [proceeding]." Id. ~~ 11-13, 894 A.2d at 497 (noting that "the federal and state guarantees are virtually identical"); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 u.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"). In applying the test, we may "begin with the second prong regarding prejudice because if it is determined that there was no prejudice, there is no need to address the first prong regarding whether counsel's performance was deficient." McGowan, 2006 ME 16, , 13, 894 A.2d at 497.
Discussion 1. Background
In his Petition, allegations are made with
respect to actions in the form of omissions or failure in
judgment on the part of defense counsel. See Petition for
Post-Conviction Review, § 27A. The salient facts, most of
which were reaffirmed by the witnesses at the Post
2 Conviction Hearing, are as follows and are found in the Law
Court decision on the criminal appeal of State v. Lipham,
2006 ME 137, 910 A.2d 388, 390-391.
On July 31, 2003, Jimmy Lipham and the decedent, David
Langway, acquaintances since 1984, drove to Lipham's home
in Glenburn. Upon arrival, Langway walked to a field behind
the house to pick blueberries, while Lipham went inside to
retrieve his Glock .45 caliber handgun. Lipham testified
that the men intended to poach a deer, and that he hid the
handgun from his wife because she would not approve. The
two men then entered the woods behind the house.
While in the woods, Lipham shot Langway in the back of
the head, killing him. Lipham testified that he tripped and
fell, causing the handgun to accidentally discharge. After
the shooting, Lipham discarded Langway's wallet, shirt, and
lunchbox in a Bangor dumpster. In the days following the
shooting, Lipham dismembered and buried the body in the
woods behind his house. He sought to conceal Langway's
death by using Langway's food stamp card to purchase
groceries, and having Langway's mail forwarded to a private
mailbox opened by Lipham using the alias Jimmy Green.
In September 2003, the police investigating Langway's
disappearance stopped at Lipham's home when Lipham was
visiting his family in Alabama. After speaking with
3 Lipham's wife, the police conducted a search of the woods
behind his house, where they found a skull fragment and a
buried torso that DNA tests later confirmed were the
remains of Langway.
At the request of police, Lipham's wife placed a
secretly recorded phone call to him in Alabama. During the
call, Lipham's wife confronted him about the death of
Langway, making several statements indicating that she
believed Lipham had killed him intentionally. 1 Lipham did
not respond to her allegations, other than to direct her to
file for a legal separation and a restraining order, and to
tell the police nothing. Soon thereafter, Lipham was
arrested in Alabama for the murder of Langway. When members
of the Maine State Police arrived to supervise his
extradition to Maine, Lipham made a voluntary statement
confessing to the shooting, but claiming it was an
accident.
Prior to trial, Lipham filed two motions in limine
seeking to exclude evidence of the recorded phone call as
inadmissible under the husband-wife privilege, and unfairly
prejudicial pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. The Superior Court
1 Mrs. Lipham's more damning statements include: "I'm not stupid. I know what you did . . . "~ "He was harmless. Why? Why did you do that? Why couldn't you just have said 'Go to hell Dave, I quit,' and just gone home"~ and "I'll never understand how you could have stood there and done that, I, I'll just never understand it."
4 denied both motions, but instructed the jury on several
occasions that Mrs. Lipham's statements during the call
were not admissible for any reason other than context.
Following his conviction, the court denied Lipham's motions
for a new trial pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 33 and for
acquittal pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 29(b), and sentenced
Lipham to forty years in prison. This appeal followed."
2. Post-Conviction Review Challenges
Mr. Lipham raises several specific challenges he feels
demonstrate the ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel. They include (1) that counsel did not challenge
his wife's mental condition (at hearing, this was expanded
to not having impeached her credibility at trial when she
testified). Likewise (2) Petitioner challenged his
counsel's failure to impeach the credibility of the State's
other prime witness, Chad Tracy as well as (3) Counsel's
failure to ask for curative instructions regarding the
admission of the substance of the phone call between the
Petitioner and his wife and failure to ask for a mistrial
on the same grounds.
A. Failure to Challenge Kerry Lipham's Mental
Condition
A review by the Court of the trial transcript of Mrs.
Lipham's testimony clearly revealed efforts to impeach Mrs.
5 Lipham as to both her visual acuity and her history of
memory loss. Trial Transcript ("Trans") Vol. 2 at 107-111.
Mrs. Lipham testified before this Court on behalf of Mr.
Lipham. While the substance of her testimony did not add
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, ss CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-07-49 Ki\{- peAl - i / "-1, ~ 0<) 'I
JIMMY LIPHAM, ) ) Petitioner ) ) v. ) Order on Post-Conviction ) Review STATE OF MAINE, ) ) FILED &ENTERED Respondent ) SUPERIOR COURT JAN 14 2008
DECISION PENOBSCOT COUNTY
Under a Post Conviction Assignment Order dated
February 1, 2007, responding to a Petition for Post
Conviction Review, this matter was set for hearing in
Ellsworth, Maine on January 7, 2008. Appointed counsel,
Jeffrey Toothaker, Esq., represented petitioner. Assistant
Attorney General Donald W. Macomber, Esq., represented the
State. Mr. Lipham was present and testified, as did Mrs.
Kerry Lipham (Petitioner's wife) and attorney Bradford S.
Macdonald, Esq. (Petitioner's attorney at trial).
As the Post-Conviction Assignment Order makes clear,
the single ground to be considered on this Petition for
Post-Conviction Review is the ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Law Court has recently confirmed the standard
to be applied in determining whether a defendant has
1 received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
in the case of Francis v. State, 2007 ME 148. In that
case, the Law Court advised:
"To determine whether a petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court conducts a two-prong inquiry./f See Alexandre v. State, 2007 ME 106, ~ 43, 927 A.2d 1155, 1167. First, we examine "whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance . . . below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney . . • . " McGowan v. State, 2006 ME 16, ~ 11, 894 A.2d 493, 496-97 (quotation marks omitted). Second, we determine whether the attorney's performance "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense" or "likely affected the outcome of the [proceeding]." Id. ~~ 11-13, 894 A.2d at 497 (noting that "the federal and state guarantees are virtually identical"); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 u.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"). In applying the test, we may "begin with the second prong regarding prejudice because if it is determined that there was no prejudice, there is no need to address the first prong regarding whether counsel's performance was deficient." McGowan, 2006 ME 16, , 13, 894 A.2d at 497.
Discussion 1. Background
In his Petition, allegations are made with
respect to actions in the form of omissions or failure in
judgment on the part of defense counsel. See Petition for
Post-Conviction Review, § 27A. The salient facts, most of
which were reaffirmed by the witnesses at the Post
2 Conviction Hearing, are as follows and are found in the Law
Court decision on the criminal appeal of State v. Lipham,
2006 ME 137, 910 A.2d 388, 390-391.
On July 31, 2003, Jimmy Lipham and the decedent, David
Langway, acquaintances since 1984, drove to Lipham's home
in Glenburn. Upon arrival, Langway walked to a field behind
the house to pick blueberries, while Lipham went inside to
retrieve his Glock .45 caliber handgun. Lipham testified
that the men intended to poach a deer, and that he hid the
handgun from his wife because she would not approve. The
two men then entered the woods behind the house.
While in the woods, Lipham shot Langway in the back of
the head, killing him. Lipham testified that he tripped and
fell, causing the handgun to accidentally discharge. After
the shooting, Lipham discarded Langway's wallet, shirt, and
lunchbox in a Bangor dumpster. In the days following the
shooting, Lipham dismembered and buried the body in the
woods behind his house. He sought to conceal Langway's
death by using Langway's food stamp card to purchase
groceries, and having Langway's mail forwarded to a private
mailbox opened by Lipham using the alias Jimmy Green.
In September 2003, the police investigating Langway's
disappearance stopped at Lipham's home when Lipham was
visiting his family in Alabama. After speaking with
3 Lipham's wife, the police conducted a search of the woods
behind his house, where they found a skull fragment and a
buried torso that DNA tests later confirmed were the
remains of Langway.
At the request of police, Lipham's wife placed a
secretly recorded phone call to him in Alabama. During the
call, Lipham's wife confronted him about the death of
Langway, making several statements indicating that she
believed Lipham had killed him intentionally. 1 Lipham did
not respond to her allegations, other than to direct her to
file for a legal separation and a restraining order, and to
tell the police nothing. Soon thereafter, Lipham was
arrested in Alabama for the murder of Langway. When members
of the Maine State Police arrived to supervise his
extradition to Maine, Lipham made a voluntary statement
confessing to the shooting, but claiming it was an
accident.
Prior to trial, Lipham filed two motions in limine
seeking to exclude evidence of the recorded phone call as
inadmissible under the husband-wife privilege, and unfairly
prejudicial pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. The Superior Court
1 Mrs. Lipham's more damning statements include: "I'm not stupid. I know what you did . . . "~ "He was harmless. Why? Why did you do that? Why couldn't you just have said 'Go to hell Dave, I quit,' and just gone home"~ and "I'll never understand how you could have stood there and done that, I, I'll just never understand it."
4 denied both motions, but instructed the jury on several
occasions that Mrs. Lipham's statements during the call
were not admissible for any reason other than context.
Following his conviction, the court denied Lipham's motions
for a new trial pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 33 and for
acquittal pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 29(b), and sentenced
Lipham to forty years in prison. This appeal followed."
2. Post-Conviction Review Challenges
Mr. Lipham raises several specific challenges he feels
demonstrate the ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel. They include (1) that counsel did not challenge
his wife's mental condition (at hearing, this was expanded
to not having impeached her credibility at trial when she
testified). Likewise (2) Petitioner challenged his
counsel's failure to impeach the credibility of the State's
other prime witness, Chad Tracy as well as (3) Counsel's
failure to ask for curative instructions regarding the
admission of the substance of the phone call between the
Petitioner and his wife and failure to ask for a mistrial
on the same grounds.
A. Failure to Challenge Kerry Lipham's Mental
Condition
A review by the Court of the trial transcript of Mrs.
Lipham's testimony clearly revealed efforts to impeach Mrs.
5 Lipham as to both her visual acuity and her history of
memory loss. Trial Transcript ("Trans") Vol. 2 at 107-111.
Mrs. Lipham testified before this Court on behalf of Mr.
Lipham. While the substance of her testimony did not add
to the facts, which had been presented from a variety of
sources, that testimony did confirm Mrs. Lipham's
acknowledgment that she had significant memory problems as
of January of 2008. It was impossible for the Court to
conclude how significant those problems were in June of
2005 when this case was tried. Mr. Lipham's testimony
suggested that Mrs. Lipham sought medical assistance for
her memory problems in the summer of 2005 when this case
was being tried. No records were provided to help the
Court determine what medical professionals were saying
either about the status of her memory in June of 2005 or as
of now.
The transcript of Mrs. Lipham's testimony suggests on
its face that Mrs. Lipham was able to respond to questions
about the facts surrounding this shooting with a higher
degree of comfort in June of 2005 then she was able to
muster in January of 2008. Whether that change is due to
the passage of time or the deterioration of her mental
condition, there is no way for the Court to tell. Without
supporting medical provider records, there is no way to
6 determine what might have been available to counsel to
attack or impeach her visual acuity or her mental capacity.
The questioning of Mr. Lipham and attorney Macdonald
in January of 2008, revealed that Mr. Macdonald used all
the information he had available at the time to impeach
Mrs. Lipham and that he was only made aware of Mrs.
Lipham's alleged memory loss at the last moment before
trial began. He held nothing back. Moreover, as Mr.
Macdonald explained, the impeachment and degree of
impeachment of Mrs. Lipham was a dangerous path for the
defendant to follow. That is, there were only two direct
witnesses to this fatality, Mr. Lipham and the decedent.
Mrs. Lipham was on a picnic bench in her back yard at the
time these events unfolded and as such was the next best
witness on how they unfolded. She was, however, several
hundred yards from the woods into which Mr. Lipham and the
decedent walked. Clearly, there was testimony from Mrs.
Lipham that was very damaging to Mr. Lipham. However, she
had things to say that the defendant needed the jury to
accept. They included that Mr. Lipham came out of the
woods in a panic after she heard the shot - bolstering his
position that the shooting was not intentional but was
accidental. Trans. Vol. 2 at 73, 74.
7 Impeachment questions were asked, perhaps less
aggressively than might have been done, but they were asked
with a clear view to the strategy of demonstrating the lack
of intent. It must be recalled that when he was arrested,
Mr. Lipham admitted that he had shot the decedent but that
it was an accident. See Lipham, 910 A.2d at 391. It also
must be noted that in January of 2008, Mrs. Lipham was
encouraging the Court to accept that she was having memory
problems in June of 2005, although she could not be sure
and vacillated on this point. However, a review of the
trial transcript in June of 2005, demonstrates she clearly
was not willing to acknowledge either that she had memory
problems or visual acuity problems. Trans. Vol. 2 at 107
Ill.
Upon a review of the trial transcript, the Law Court
decision of State v. Lipham, and the testimony of the
witnesses who testified on January 7, 2008, the Court is
not persuaded that Mr. Macdonald's representation of Jimmy
Lipham in preparation for and participation in the trial in
June of 2005, constitutes a violation of Mr. Lipham's
constitutional right to be represented by counsel who
provides effective assistance in the legal representation
of the defendant. As phrased in Francis, the Court is not
persuaded that attorney Macdonald's performance "likely
8 deprived the defendant of an otherwise available
substantial ground of defense" or "likely affected the
outcome of the [proceeding]." The Court denies the
Petition on the grounds raised in item #1.
B. Failure to Impeach Chad Tracy
Mr. Tracy's testimony was brief, but significant.
Trans. Vol. 2 at 172, 127. The essence of it was that Mr.
Lipham has said in a joking manner that he liked Maine
because if someone did you a wrong, you could off them and
bury them in a back yard.
On cross examination, Mr. Macdonald sought to
discredit Mr. Tracy due to outstanding charges and
motivation to improve his position with law enforcement by
coming forward after the murder had been discovered and
reporting this conversation. Trans. Vol. 2 at 181-188.
At the January 7 ili hearing, Mr. Macdonald shared with
the Court and parties, the efforts his office made in order
to find any matter on which Mr. Tracy's credibility could
be impeached. Other than the tangential issue that he
ultimately pressed at trial, he was able to find nothing.
Likewise, when he testified, Mr. Lipham acknowledged that
he was aware of no other impeachment information, but felt
that Mr. Macdonald should have found some. The Court
concludes that Mr. Macdonald's efforts were reflective of
9 creative and good lawyering as opposed to representing in
effective assistance of counsel as defined by the Law Court
in Francis. The Court denies the Petition on the grounds
raised in item #2.
C. Failure to Ask for Curative Instruction on
Admission of Phone Call
Passing by the fact that there were several Motions in
Limine filed by Defense counsel seeking to limit or exclude
the admission of the phone call between Mr. and Mrs. Lipham
(Lipham, 910 A.2d at 391) a review of the trial transcript
confirms multiple times that Mr. Macdonald sought to object
to or limit the introduction and use of the tape recorded
conversation between Mr. and Mrs. Lipham. The Court agreed
at Trans. Vol. 2 at 86-87 to give a limiting instruction in
terms of using that transcript. Again, the Court gave a
cautionary instruction on the admissibility of Mr. Lipham's
statements or lack of statements but not Mrs. Lipham's.
Trans. Vol. 2 at 92. At Trans. Vol. 2 at 96, attorney
Macdonald again objected to the admission and use of the
phone call tape/transcript. Finally at Trans. Vol. 2 at
98, Mr. Macdonald again asked the Court to repeat it
cautionary instruction and that was done.
Reviewing the Trial Transcript, the decision of the
Law Court in State v. Lipham and the testimony of the
10 witnesses at the Post-Conviction Review hearing on January
7, 2008, as well as the arguments of counsel given at that
time, the Court is persuaded that the efforts of Mr.
Macdonald, on behalf of Mr. Lipham with respect to the
admission of the phone call Mr. Lipham had with Mrs. Lipham
during the trial, do not represent the ineffective
assistance of counsel as that term is defined in Francis
and the cases cited therein. The Court denies the Petition
on the grounds raised in item #3.
The Court would restate as it did at the January 7,
2008, hearing that the arguments of prosecutorial
misconduct and erroneous admission by the trial court of
the exhibit reflecting the phone call between Mr. and Mrs.
Lipham is not part of this proceeding. These issues were
dealt with in the direct appeal to the Law Court. Lipham,
910 A.2d at 390 n.1.
The entry shall be: PETITION DENIED
Dated: January 14, 2005 £&?3f Kevin M. Cuddy, Justice
11 ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE
Fernand LaRochelle Asst AG OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 6 STATE HOUSE STATION AUGUSTA ME 04333
ATTORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER
Jeffrey Toothaker Esq POBOX 1084 ELLSWORTH ME 605