Lionel Lewis v. Old Republic Insurance Company
Opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
17-456
LIONEL LEWIS
VERSUS
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
ET AL.
**********
SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2014-4270 HONORABLE EDWARD B. BROUSSARD, DISTRICT JUDGE
SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE
Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.
REVERSED AND RENDERED. Bret Christopher Beyer, Sr. Attorney at Law P. O. Box 53006 Lafayette, LA 70505 (337) 232-9733 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS: Old Republic Insurance Company BFI Waste Services, LLC Dustin Mason
Keith P. Saltzman Anderson & Dozier P. O. Box 82008 Lafayette, LA 70598-2008 (337) 233-3366 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR: Lionel Lewis GREMILLION, Judge.
From the denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability,
Plaintiff/Relator, Mr. Lionel Lewis, has applied to this court for supervisory relief.
We granted Relator’s application. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
render judgment in favor of Relator.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on September
10, 2013, in Lafayette Parish. Mr. Lewis was operating a tractor trailer in the
course of his employment with Reinhart Transportation. He stopped at a red traffic
signal and was hit from behind by a garbage truck driven by Mr. Dustin Mason,
who was employed by BFI Waste Services, L.L.C.
Mr. Lewis sued Mr. Mason, BFI Waste Services, L.L.C., and their insurer,
Old Republic Insurance Company (Respondents), in August 2014. In February
2017, Mr. Lewis filed motions for summary judgment on the issues of liability and
insurance coverage. The motions were set for hearing on March 27, 2017. The
defendants filed their opposition to the motions on March 17, 2017, and included
in their opposition an objection to the inclusion by Mr. Lewis of the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Report. On March 22, 2017, Relator filed a motion to
strike the defendants’ untimely opposition.
The trial court granted Mr. Lewis’s motion for summary judgment on the
issue of insurance coverage. Although the trial court stated on the record that the
Respondents’ late submissions were not considered, it denied Mr. Lewis’s motion
on the issue of liability. From the denial of this motion, Mr. Lewis sought this
court’s exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, which was granted. ANALYSIS
A denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory, and the only
remedy available is to seek supervisory relief. Breaux v. Cozy Cottages, LLC, 14-
486 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/12/14), 151 So.3d 183.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 966
and 967. These articles have been extensively amended by the legislature since
1996, when the legislature first pronounced that summary judgment procedure is
favored. See 1996 La.Acts 1st Ex.Sess. No. 9, §1. The most recent amendment to
Article 966(B) altered the deadlines for filing motions for summary judgment and
oppositions thereto. 2015 La.Acts No. 422. Paragraph (B) now provides:
Unless extended by the court and agreed to by all of the parties, a motion for summary judgment shall be filed, opposed, or replied to in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) A motion for summary judgment and all documents in support of the motion shall be filed and served on all parties in accordance with Article 1313 not less than sixty-five days prior to the trial.
(2) Any opposition to the motion and all documents in support of the opposition shall be filed and served in accordance with Article 1313 not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing on the motion.
(3) Any reply memorandum shall be filed and served in accordance with Article 1313 not less than five days prior to the hearing on the motion. No additional documents may be filed with the reply memorandum.
(4) If the deadline for filing and serving a motion, an opposition, or a reply memorandum falls on a legal holiday, the motion, opposition, or reply is timely if it is filed and served no later than the next day that is not a legal holiday.
The standard of review applicable to summary judgment is well known:
Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo applying the same analysis as the trial court. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ.,591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). Summary judgment is governed by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 966 and 967. Article 966 provides
2 that while the burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment rests with the mover, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action or defense, but rather to point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Hardy v. Bowie, 98–2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606.
Berard v. Home State County Mut. Ins. Co., 11–1372, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/9/12),
89 So.3d 470, 471–72.
In support of his motion, Mr. Lewis attached his own affidavit, in which he
attested that he was stopped at a red traffic signal and was struck from behind by a
truck driven by Dustin Mason. He also attached a copy of the police accident
report, which the trial court properly struck. Proving liability is Mr. Lewis’s
burden at trial
Respondents’ opposition to the motion was untimely under La.Code Civ.P.
art. 966(B)(2). They argue, though, that the trial court had discretion under the
article to allow their late submission. We disagree. As amended, Article 966(B)
allows a trial court to extend the deadline with the agreement of all parties. This
condition clearly was not fulfilled; Relator objected to the late filing of the
opposition. The trial court, therefore, had no discretion to allow this late filing.
The refusal of the trial court to entertain Respondents’ late filings was mandated by
La.Code Civ.P. art. 966.
A motion for summary judgment can be granted on the presumption that a
following motorist who strikes a leading motorist is negligent. See, e.g., Leblanc v.
Bouzon,14-1041 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/15), 159 So.3d 1144. Mr. Lewis attested that
he was operating the 2006 White Freightliner vehicle owned by Reinhardt
3 Transportation north-bound on Evangeline Thruway in Lafayette and came to a
stop at the red traffic signal at the intersection with Kaliste Saloom Road. He was
thereafter struck from behind by a 2006 Mack 40000 driven by Mr. Mason. These
facts are sufficient to invoke the presumption of fault. It thereafter falls upon Mr.
Mason to exonerate himself of fault or establish facts sufficient to demonstrate
comparative fault of Mr. Lewis. Id. Because Respondents’ submissions were
untimely filed and disregarded by the trial court, they failed to establish any facts
that would exonerate Mr. Mason or demonstrate any fault on Mr. Lewis’s part.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Lewis’s motion for summary
judgment on the issue of liability.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment entered in favor of
Mr. Lionel Lewis and against Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Lionel Lewis v. Old Republic Insurance Company (Lionel Lewis v. Old Republic Insurance Company) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.