Linus F. Voves and Linda K. Voves v. Tyler Hansen and Noelle Hansen

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-1490
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1490 Filed November 13, 2025

LINUS F. VOVES and LINDA K. VOVES, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

TYLER HANSEN and NOELLE HANSEN, Defendants-Appellants. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, John

Bauercamper, Judge.

Property owners appeal a district court decree finding that their neighbors

proved their claim of adverse possession. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Jeremy L. Thompson of Putnam, Thompson & Casper, P.L.L.C., Decorah,

for appellants.

Siobhan Briley of Pugh Hagan Prahm PLC, Coralville, and Ray Rinkol of

Miller Law Office, P.L.C., Decorah, for appellees.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

Tyler and Noelle Hansen own residential property that borders farmland

held by Linus and Linda Voves. The couples dispute who owns a small parcel of

land—2/10 of an acre—along a railroad right-of-way. Because the Voveses

acquired the disputed parcel by adverse possession, we affirm the district court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In the early 1970s, Willis and Patricia Hansen bought land bordering a

railroad right-of-way in Chickasaw County. The parcel is identified in this photo as

“2050 Woodland.” Most of their

land was south of the railroad

tracks, but the purchase also

included a small triangle on the

north side.1 That parcel is the

subject of this suit. Willis and

Patricia2 subdivided the large

parcel and created a residential

development plat called Woodland

Estates. They did not plat the

disputed triangle, nor develop it by

inclusion in Woodland Estates.

They lived on lot one of the Woodland Estates until 2014. In August 2015, Willis

1 This aerial photo was a trial exhibit. The yellow lines were part of the original exhibit. We added the white text boxes and arrow to identify key parcels. 2 For clarity, we will refer to Willis and Patricia by their first names and Tyler and

Noelle as the Hansens. 3

and Patricia conveyed that lot to their grandson, Tyler, and his wife, Noelle. The

disputed parcel was not included in this conveyance. When the Hansens

discovered that omission, Willis and Patricia executed a warranty deed and

conveyed title to Tyler in September 2018.

Meanwhile, in July 1978, Linus and Linda Voves3 entered an installment

contract to buy nineteen acres across the railroad right-of-way from the parcel

owned by Willis and Patricia. The Voveses believed that their purchase included

the 2/10 acre of land at issue. To that end, Linus testified he was unaware that

any property in the purchase was disputed.4

And their farming decisions reflected that belief. For example, the Voveses

hired Merle O’Byrne to plant crops on their property, including the triangle now

disputed. O’Byrne had also farmed the land under a rental agreement with the

former owner. In 1983, the Voveses rented the land, including the disputed parcel,

to Don Utley. Then five years later, Linus enrolled those nineteen acres in a ten-

year contract with the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).

In 1993, Patricia Hansen delivered a handwritten note and map to Linda.

The map designated the disputed parcel as belonging to the Hansens and the note

asked for a phone call. After that delivery, the Voveses consulted a lawyer. But

they testified that Patricia and Willis never followed up, so “nothing came of that”

exchange. And the Voveses continued to farm the land. The Voveses testified

3 We will refer to Linus and Linda collectively as the Voveses. 4 The Voveses also owned land on the south side of the railroad right-of-way

bordering the Hansen parcel. 4

they had no further communication from the Hansens until 2016. That September,

Willis sent them a quitclaim deed along with this letter of explanation:

I am enclosing a quit claim deed for a parcel of land that is on the North Side of Tracks from the property that I owned at one time. I have paid the taxes that are past due. If you do not want the title to this property you may just destroy the deed. To clean up property lines I would suggest that you do the same for the real estate that is on the south side of the tracks.

Rather than destroying or recording the deed, Linus again sought legal

advice. The attorney recommended posting no-trespassing signs. The Voveses

did so but did not place any signs along the railroad tracks dividing the properties.

When nothing more happened, Willis and Patricia executed the deed, conveying

title to their grandson and his wife. In March 2019, the Hansens informed the

Voveses they were “no longer allowed to use” the disputed parcel. Yet the

Voveses continued to farm that land. In response, Tyler or Tyler’s father, Dennis,

planted an orange stake at the upper corner of the disputed parcel.5

Those heightened tensions between the property owners led to years of

legal wrangling. The battle started in May 2019, when the Voveses sought to quiet

title in their names. Their petition advanced theories of adverse possession and

boundary by acquiescence.6 The district court granted their motion for summary

judgment on the boundary-by-acquiescence claim. But on appeal, our court

reversed, finding the record did not support either theory as a matter of law.

5 Linus testified that Tyler planted the stake, but Dennis testified that he did so. 6 Those doctrines are “by no means the same” as the two actions have different

objectives. See Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4 N.W.3d 45, 49 (Iowa 2024). An adverse-possession claim establishes ownership in property, while boundary by acquiescence establishes corners and lines, not title or right to possession. Id. 5

Voves v. Hansen, No. 20-1251, 2021 WL 3392816, at *2−3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Aug. 4, 2021).

On remand, the parties tried the matter to the district court, which decided

the Voveses failed to prove either claim. In the second appeal, we reversed and

remanded for a new trial because the district court “cited and made express

credibility findings based on an affidavit that was never admitted into evidence.”

Voves v. Hansen, No. 22-1651, 2023 WL 7391716, at *1−3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 8, 2023) (finding the court’s consideration of Dennis Hansen’s affidavit was

not harmless error).

So the parties appeared for a second bench trial in June 2024. This time,

the district court ruled for the Voveses, finding that they established their claim for

adverse possession and declaring the railroad right-of-way to be the true boundary

between the litigants’ properties. The Hansens now appeal.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

A quiet-title proceeding is an action in equity; thus, we review de novo.

Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996). We give weight to the district

court’s factual findings, especially when considering witness credibility, but we are

not bound by them. Hutchins v. Hutchins, No. 12-1966, 2014 WL 1234164, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2014).

III. Analysis

The Hansens raise two claims. First, they argue the district court erred in

finding the Voveses established their claim for adverse possession. Second, they

contend the court erred in declaring the railroad right-of-way as the true boundary

between the litigants’ properties. We will consider each issue in turn. 6

A. Did the Voveses establish their claim for adverse possession?

We begin with the relevant law. “A party claiming title by adverse

possession must establish hostile, actual, open, exclusive and continuous

possession, under claim of right or color of title for at least ten years.” C.H. Moore

Tr. Est. v. City of Storm Lake, 423 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 1988). The claimant must

offer “clear and positive” proof of all elements. Id. (citation omitted). On the last

element, the claimant may show either color of title or claim of right but need not

prove both. Id. Claimants need not rest their claim of right on a written document;

instead, they can offer evidence that they took and maintained the property—as

an owner of such property would—to the exclusion of the true owner. I-80 Assocs.,

Inc. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 224 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Iowa 1974). Evidence

may include “receiving the rents, issues, and profits of the property, or. . .

conveying, devising, leasing, encumbering, or improving it.” Id.

One more layer. When claiming title by adverse possession under claim of

right, the claimant must act in good faith. Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315

N.W.2d 782, 785 (Iowa 1982). Knowledge of a defect in title is insufficient alone

to show an absence of good faith. Id. But claimants cannot show a good faith

claim of right if they also know they have no basis for claiming an interest in the

property. Id. A primary purpose of this claim-of-right requirement is to prevent

“squatters” from taking advantage of adverse possession.7 Id.

In challenging the adverse-possession finding, the Hansens point to two

alleged flaws in the district court’s reasoning. One, they argue the district court

7 “A squatter is one who settles on the lands of another without any legal authority. . . .” Williams v. Alt, 123 N.E. 499, 501 (N.Y. 1919). 7

failed to consider the Voveses did not act in good faith. Two, they contest the

court’s finding that the Voveses’ possession was hostile and exclusive. Neither

argument is convincing.

The good-faith challenge. The Hansens emphasize that the Voveses never

paid taxes on the disputed property, even after Willis offered them the deed to that

2/10-acre parcel. And the Hansens note that when asked about the taxes at trial,

Linus admitted: “I didn’t know that I owned the property for a long time.” Beyond

the taxes, the Hansens believe that the Voveses’ consultation with lawyers about

the land dispute reveals a lack of good faith.

In our de novo review, we find the record supports a finding that the Voveses

had a good faith claim of right to the disputed parcel. As a start, the tax issue is

not dispositive. I-80 Assocs., 224 N.W.2d at 10 (“[P]ayment of taxes is not

essential to the acquisition of title by adverse possession.”). And the Hansens’

quote from Linus’s testimony is too truncated to prove their point. In the preceding

sentence Linus testified: “I physically didn’t know I had taxes on there.” That

statement reflects his belief that the disputed parcel was included in the overall

nineteen-acre land purchase, and he was unaware of the additional taxes owed.

Indeed, the record shows the Voveses bought their nineteen acres with no

indication that it included any land subject to dispute. And supporting their claim

of right, the Voveses used the whole parcel as any landowners would: they first

rented it to other farmers and then enrolled it in the CRP, reaping returns. True,

the Hansens contest whether the Voveses improved the dispute property by

having it tiled for better drainage. But the record shows that the Voveses asked

the installer to tile “whatever he felt was low ground,” evincing their intent to 8

improve the disputed property if it needed to be tiled. The record supports a finding

that the Voveses believed in good faith that they owned the disputed parcel. They

did not seek legal counsel until after they received the letter from the Hansens

in 1993—after ten years had passed.

Hostile and exclusive possession. The Hansens insist that the Voveses

“mere use” of the disputed parcel is insufficient to establish hostility. Johnson v.

Kaster, 637 N.W.2d 174, 178–79 (Iowa 2001). And the Hansens contend that the

Voveses did nothing to exclude the true owners.

But possession of property is hostile if the claimants exert the type of control

that owners usually exercise in managing similar property. S. Cent. Iowa Landfill

Agency v. Corwin, No. 23-1232, 2024 WL 4758283, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 13, 2024). What activity satisfies these elements depends on the nature of

the property. Id. As for exclusivity, “a claimant’s possession need not be

absolutely exclusive; it need only be of a type of possession which would

characterize an owner’s use.” Huebner v. Kuberski, 387 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Iowa

Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted).

As discussed above, the Voveses used the disputed property as an owner

of farmland would, and they intended to improve the land by tiling it if it needed

that drainage. Still, the Hansens allege the Voveses never excluded them from

the property, pointing to the fact that they did not post no-trespassing signs at the

railroad right-of-way. But that fact carries little weight because there was no

entrance on that side of the disputed parcel. Overall, the record supports the

district court’s finding that the Voveses established their claim of adverse

possession for the 2/10-acre parcel. 9

B. Did the district court err in declaring the railroad right-of-way was the

true boundary between the litigants’ properties?

In their brief, the Hansens note that the district court “considered the

alternate claim of boundary by acquiescence but did not make specific findings as

to whether the Voveses had established that claim.” Instead, the court declared

an existing railroad right-of-way to be the true boundary between the land owned

by each of the parties.

We agree that the district court’s ruling is unclear on the boundary-by-

acquiescence claim. The court recited the law on both boundary by acquiescence

and adverse possession. But after deciding for the Voveses on their adverse

possession claim, the district court did not return to the boundary-by-acquiescence

theory except to say that it “retain[ed] jurisdiction of this case to make appropriate

orders under Iowa Code sections 650.7 or 650.17 to obtain a legal description of

the disputed parcel to be platted and filed of record.”

While the court could have been more precise, it was not wrong to stop after

the finding of adverse possession. Because a successful adverse possession

claimant “establishes ownership” and takes title, there was no need to proceed on

a boundary by acquiescence claim which merely “establish[es] corners and lines”

without affecting title or right of the claimants. See Vaudt, 4 N.W.3d at 49. And

because the court did not rule on the boundary-by-acquiescence claim, we will not

consider that alternative ground for relief.

When the court declared “the existing railroad right-of-way is the true

boundary between the adjoining land now owned by the plaintiffs Linus F. and

Linda K. Voves and the defendants Tyler and Noelle Hansen,” it was resolving the 10

adverse possession question. It was not making a separate finding of boundary

by acquiescence. We find no error in the court’s boundary determination. 8

A final note. As the Hansens explain, Iowa Code chapter 650 (2019)

governs how boundaries are to be established. See Sundance Land Co. v.

Remmark, 8 N.W.3d 145, 150 (Iowa 2024) (“Iowa Code chapter 650 codifies the

doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in our state.”). That chapter does not apply

to adverse possession. Rather, “[a]dverse possession is established by a quiet

title action, an equitable proceeding under chapter 649.” Sille v. Shaffer, 297

N.W.2d 379, 380 (Iowa 1980). Thus, the district court’s reliance on sections 650.7

and 650.17 to obtain a boundary survey is misplaced.9 We modify the decree to

delete the references to chapter 650. See Merten v. Eggers, No. 08-1110, 2009

WL 2952064, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2009) (modifying decree to clarify limits

of easement). The decree should instead order that the boundaries of the plots

owned by the Voveses and the Hansens be redrawn to reflect the adverse

possession findings.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

8 Because we do not reach the merits of the boundary by acquiescence claim, we

do not consider the Hansens’ argument that the railroad right-of-way was “only a partial boundary.” 9 Section 650.7 provides for the commission of a professional land surveyor to

locate lost, destroyed, or disputed corners and boundaries. And section 650.17 permits parties to agree in writing to a lost or disputed corner or boundary. Because the court found adverse possession, neither section applies.