Linsangan v. Government Of Guam

• Court: District Court, D. Guam
• Decided: February 10, 2020
• Docket: 1:19-cv-00011
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

5 THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM 6

7 SEDFREY M. LINSANGAN (Pro Se), CIVIL CASE NO. 19-00011

8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 vs. Re Objection to U.S. Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s 10 GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, LOURDES Motion for Summary Judgment LEON GUERRERO, Acting in Her Official 11 Capacity,

12 Defendants.

13 14 Before the court is Plaintiff Sedfrey M. Linsangan’s Objection to the U.S. Magistrate 15 Judge’s Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See ECF 16 Nos. 24 and 25. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and relevant cases and statutes, the court 17 hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection to 18 the Report and Recommendation. 19 I. BACKROUND 20 On April 4, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Sedfrey M. Linsangan filed a Complaint against 21 Defendants Government of Guam and Lourdes Leon Guerrero in her official capacity as 22 Governor of Guam (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). ECF No. 1. The gist of Plaintiff’s 23 complaint is that Defendants violated the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), the Organic Act 24 of Guam, and the Supremacy Clause, when the Defendants legalized the use of marijuana in 1 Guam. Id. Plaintiff seeks “injunctive and declaratory relief”, ECF No. 1, at 2, and requests that 2 the court should “11) Declar[e] Guam’s legalization of recreational and medical marihuana null 3 and void[;] 12) Enjoin[] defendants from engaging on policy making sale and distribution of 4 marihuana[; and] Declar[e] that the Governor of Guam and Legislature of Guam have committed 5 official misconduct and violated the Federal law.” ECF No. 1, at 3. 6 On May 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 7. The parties 7 briefed the motion and argued it before the U.S. Magistrate Judge on August 16, 2019. See ECF 8 No. 22. After the Report and Recommendation was issued on September 6, 2019, ECF No. 23,

9 Plaintiff timely filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation, ECF Nos. 24 and 25. 10 Defendants did not file a response to the objections. 11 The issue at hand is whether Plaintiff has standing to bring the instant suit. This court 12 finds that Plaintiff lacks standing and therefore sua sponte dismisses this case. 13 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 When a party files a timely objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, 15 “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or 16 specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 17 636(b)(1)(C); see Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991); see also FED.R.CIV.P. 18 72(b)(3) (stating “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

19 disposition that has been properly objected to”). “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or 20 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 21 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b)(3) (stating a district judge “may accept, 22 reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to 23 the magistrate judge with instructions”). 24 A district court’s obligation to make a de novo determination of properly contested 1 portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation does not require that the judge 2 conduct a de novo hearing on the matter. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). In 3 addition, neither party requested the court for an oral argument,1 and having read the motion and 4 related filings, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that oral argument is unnecessary. 5 The court makes a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation in which Plaintiff 6 had lodged objections to. 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 A. Plaintiff has not met the Article III standing requirements.

9 Article III of the United States Constitution requires that those who seek to invoke the 10 power of the federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy. See U.S. CONST. art. III; 11 see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94– 12 101 (1968)). 13 “The Article III case or controversy requirement limits federal courts’ subject matter 14 jurisdiction by requiring, inter alia, that plaintiffs have standing and that claims be ‘ripe’ for 15 adjudication … Standing addresses whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the matter to 16 the court for adjudication. The related doctrine of ripeness is a means by which federal courts 17 may dispose of matters that are premature for review because the plaintiff’s purported injury is 18 too speculative and may never occur.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d

19 1115, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “The standing question is whether the plaintiff 20 has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation 21 of federal-court jurisdiction. The ripeness question is whether the harm asserted has matured 22 sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention. Both questions bear close affinity to one another.” 23

24 1 In a subsequent filing, Plaintiff informed the court of his availability for a hearing if the court was going to schedule one. See ECF No. 27. 1 Immigrant Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO) v. I.N.S., 2 306 F.3d 842, 859 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks, editorial brackets and citations omitted). See 3 also, City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1172 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 4 standing “overlaps substantially” with ripeness and that in that case, both were “inextricably 5 linked”). 6 In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate standing for injunctive and declaratory relief: 7 [A] plaintiff must show that he [or she] is under threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not 8 conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent 9 or redress the injury.

10 Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009) (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. 11 v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). 12 A plaintiff must demonstrate “a real and immediate threat that he would again” suffer the 13 injury to have standing for prospective equitable relief. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105. The “mere 14 physical or theoretical possibility” of a challenged action again affecting a plaintiff is not 15 sufficient. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). It is necessary that there be a “reasonable 16 expectation” or a “demonstrated probability” that the same controversy will recur involving the 17 plaintiff. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). 18 To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show inter-alia that he faces imminent injury on account of the defendant’s conduct. Past exposure to harmful 19 or illegal conduct does not necessarily confer standing to seek injunctive relief if the plaintiff does not continue to suffer adverse effects. Nor does speculation or 20 “subjective apprehension” about future harm support standing. Once a plaintiff has been wronged, he is entitled to injunctive relief only if he can show that he 21 faces a “real or immediate threat that he will again be wronged in a similar way.”

22 Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 23 In order to establish an injury in fact necessary to a claim for injunctive relief, the moving 24 party must demonstrate that a defendant’s conduct is causing irreparable harm. Levin v. 1 Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1992). This requirement cannot be met absent a showing of 2 a real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again. Lyon, 461 U.S. at 101. While 3 past wrongs consist of evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of 4 repeated injury, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 5 controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 6 effects.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). Thus, “there must be sufficient 7 immediacy, reality and causality between defendants’ conduct and plaintiffs’ allegations of 8 future injury” to warrant injunctive relief. Weiser v. Koch, 632 F.Supp. 1369, 1373 (S.D.N.Y.

9 1986). 10 Examining the facts of the case, it is clear there is no on-going, real and immediate threat 11 of repeated injury sufficient to confer standing for injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not successfully 12 argued nor has he shown that he is presently threatened with or has already suffered any 13 irreparable damage or injury because of the passage of the Guam Cannabis Industry Act of 2019 14 (“Cannabis Act”) by the Guam Legislature. See Benoit v. Gardner, 345 F.2d 792, 793 (1965) 15 (“There must, at the least, be a strong showing of a likelihood of success and of irreparable 16 harm.”). 17 In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleges that “[t]he illegal acts by the Defendants will destroy 18 families, children, economy, businesses[,] and the [i]sland of Guam. It will put more financial

19 pressure on medical system and public coffers to treat those that will be addicted and eventually 20 try stronger drugs[.]” Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. Further, in Plaintiff’s motion for summary 21 judgment, he alleges the following: 22 Guam has big problems with substance abuse such as marihuana and other hard drugs . . . Department of Education have stated the 2 pressing problems in school 23 are substance abuse on marihuana and prospective shooting. One teacher even testified in the [p]ublic [h]earing that students are coming to class stone [sic] and 24 cannot learn anything. Prospective shooting is attributed to people high on drugs 1 in the [m]ainland. In April 29, 2019, Post [a local Guam newspaper] reported that there are 263 foster kids up from 205 in 2018 and 170 in 2017. The cause is 2 parents have drug abuse problem on marihuana and other hard drugs. Guam is the highest in the [n]ation per capita on suicide. Marihuana is associated with suicidal 3 acts, psychosis, mental disorder and increase [sic] car accidents. More home invasion, burglary, stealing[,] and other crimes have increased in Colorado since 4 the legalization of marihuana.

5 Pl.’s Mot. at 5, ECF No. 7. None of these allegations point to a concrete, particularized, and 6 actual or imminent threat of injury to Plaintiff. These allegations are, at best, general 7 speculations. 8 In his objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff outlines 9 the following: 10 (1) Plaintiff suffered “concrete injury” because “[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, 11 distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.” Obj. to 12 R. & R. at 3, ECF No. 24. This is not a concrete and particularized injury or threat of injury to Plaintiff. 13 (2) Plaintiff suffered “psychological injuries” because of his “1. [f]ear that the crimes such 14 as home invasion, burglary, robbery, etc. will increase . . . 2. Mental anguish that defendants violated the [f]ederal [l]aw that protect the people. 3. Anxiety, insecurity, 15 adjustment disorder, post-stress disorder due to personal attacks or backlash by marihuana supporters on media.” Id. Plaintiff has not provided any medical 16 documentation that supports these alleged mental health conditions. But more importantly, there is no evidence that these alleged mental health conditions are traceable 17 to the challenged action of Defendants.

18 (3) Plaintiff will suffer financially from the challenged action of Defendants, because “Plaintiff has tenants subsidized by [the] [f]ederal [g]overnment, [and] once addicted to 19 marihuana, they will be kicked out in [sic] the program leading to loss of income. Same with my workers, will lead to low production and prone to accidents. Plaintiff’s store will 20 be victimized by burglaries and robberies due to increase of crime.” Id. These allegations are hypothetical and too speculative, and Plaintiff has failed to show that the financial 21 harm is real or imminent.

22 Plaintiff relies on Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), for standing. See Obj. to R. & R. 23 at 2, ECF No. 25. Plaintiff argues that the “Supreme Court of the United States made a ruling 24 1 that Congress may ban marihuana even [if] it is used for medicinal purposes.” Id. In that case, 2 Respondents suffer from serious medical conditions. They are under the care of medical 3 professionals who have concluded—after prescribing a host of conventional medicines—that 4 marijuana is the only drug available that provides effective treatment to respondents’ medical 5 conditions. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-7. As such, what Plaintiff here fails to understand is, 6 that case is distinguishable from the instant case. The Respondents in Gonzales v. Raich suffered 7 an actual harm and will continue to suffer harm because of Petitioners’ actions. Plaintiff here, on 8 the other hand, has not suffered an actual harm and has not shown evidence that he will suffer

9 from a real and imminent threat of harm. Thus, Plaintiff does not have standing. 10 B. Plaintiff does not have an “automatic” standing pursuant to the Organic Act. 11 Plaintiff also relies on the Organic Act of Guam to support his position that he has 12 “automatic” standing. See Obj. to R. & R., ECF Nos. 24 and 25. Specifically, Plaintiff cites to 48 13 U.S.C. §§ 1421b and 1423a. Obj. to R. & R. at 4-5, ECF No. 24. Section 1421b provides in 14 relevant part that, “All laws enacted by Congress with respect to Guam and all laws enacted by 15 the territorial legislature of Guam which are inconsistent with the provisions of this subsection 16 are repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.” 48 U.S.C. § 1421b. Section 1423a provides in 17 relevant part that, “The legislative power of Guam shall extend to all rightful subjects of 18 legislation not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter and the laws of the United States 19 applicable to Guam.” 48 U.S.C. § 1423a. 20 Plaintiff is mistaken in his argument that the Organic Act of Guam grants him an 21 “automatic” standing to bring this instant action to this court, simply because he believes that 22 “[i]f there is a conflict, [the] Supremacy Clause of Article 6 of the Constitution supersede[s] 23 [s]tate [l]aws.” Obj. to R. & R. at 3, ECF No. 25. As the U.S. Magistrate Judge correctly pointed 24 1 out in this Report and Recommendation, Section 1421b does not provide a specific provision 2 “which authorizes a citizen to file a private action to compel enforcement of the ‘Bill of Rights’ 3 law or to declare null and void any Guam law that contravenes or is inconsistent with the said 4 “Bill of Rights” provisions.” R. & R. at 5-6, ECF No. 23. The same can be said of Section 5 1423a. “[A] private right of action under federal law is not created by mere implication, but it 6 must be ‘unambiguously conferred[.]’” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 7 1378, 1387-88 (2015) (citation omitted). 8 Lastly, Plaintiff appears to imply that he has “automatic” standing because his

9 constitutional rights were violated as a result of the Cannabis Act not having been enacted 10 through the initiative process, citing 48 U.S.C. § 1422a. Obj. to R. & R. at 1-3, ECF No. 25. 11 Section 1422a(a) provides that “[t]he people of Guam shall have the right of initiative and 12 referendum, to be exercised under conditions and procedures specified in the laws of Guam.” 13 This argument has no merit. Similar to Sections 1421b and 1423a, Section 1422a(a) does not 14 grant any “automatic” standing or private right of action for Plaintiff to sue. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 The Organic Act of Guam does not grant automatic standing for Plaintiff to bring this 17 action to this court. Plaintiff must meet the Article III requirement of alleging an actual case or 18 controversy, which includes Plaintiff having standing and the claims being ripe for adjudication.

19 As thoroughly discussed above, to have standing for injunctive and declaratory relief, Plaintiff 20 must show, among other things, an injury that is concrete and particularized. For the claims to be 21 ripe, Plaintiff’s purported injury cannot be too speculative. Plaintiff has not met any of these. 22 Plaintiff simply alleges unsubstantiated mental health conditions, potential financial harm, and 23 general harm to the public (e.g., higher crime rates). At most, Plaintiff offers general 24 speculations as to the threat of injury or harm he will suffer. 1 Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged any concrete or immediate harm, this court 2 hereby OVERRULES Plaintiffs objection and AFFIRMS the U.S. Magistrate Judge’s Report 3 || and Recommendation. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Moreover, 4 || because Plaintiff lacks standing, the court sua sponte DISMISSES the above-captioned matter 5 || without prejudice. Plaintiff may refile if he is able to establish standing. 6 SO ORDERED. & ws /s/ Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood 8 2 Chief Judge ve &@ Dated: Feb 10, 2020 9 a A

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