Linora Felix Gonzalez

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 28, 2020
Docket19-30761
StatusUnknown

This text of Linora Felix Gonzalez (Linora Felix Gonzalez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Linora Felix Gonzalez, (Ill. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION In re: Case No. 19 BK 30761 LINORA GONZALEZ, Chapter 13 Debtor. Judge: Hon. Jack B. Schmetterer MEMORANDUM DECISION BACKGROUND Property taxes for certain tax years were not paid for the property located at 126 Bohland Avenue, Bellwood, Illinois (the “Property”). On April 4, 2017, William J. Mark (“Creditor”) purchased those taxes. The original period of redemption would have expired on October 9, 2019, but Creditor extended the period of redemption to October 30, 2019. Unbeknownst to Creditor, Debtor filed for bankruptcy on October 29, 2019. In her Schedule A, Debtor did not claim any interest to the Property and answered “No” to the question “Do you own or have any legal or equitable interest in any residence, building, land, or similar property?” But, in her Schedule B, Debtor answered “Yes” to the question “Any interest in property that is due you from someone who has died” and lists the Property in question. [Dkt. No. 19]. In her Response, Debtor provides that while she is not on the title of the Property, she has a sufficient interest in the Property as the daughter-heir of the record owner, with a statutory right to redeem the property under Illinois law. [Dkt. No. 89]. On January 22, 2020, the Cook County Circuit Court (the “State Court”) issued an order directing the issuance of a tax deed. On the same day, the tax deed was recorded, and title to the Property was transferred to Creditor. [Dkt. No. 43, Ex. 4]. Creditor filed its appearance in the bankruptcy on February 25, 2020. On February 26, 2020, Creditor filed the present Motion to Annul the Automatic Stay (the “Motion”) seeking annulment of the automatic stay as it had no knowledge of Debtor’s bankruptcy when it sought, received, and recorded a tax deed. In her Response, Debtor admits notice was not given to Creditor, but argues that she was not required to give direct notice to Creditor, and the lack of such direct notice is irrelevant as the automatic stay was imposed at the time of Creditor’s actions regardless of whether it had knowledge or not of her bankruptcy. JURISDICTION AND VENUE Subject matter jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C, § 1334. The district court may refer bankruptcy proceedings to a bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and

this proceeding was thereby referred here by Operating Procedure 15(a) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of [linois. Venue lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), (G), and (L). As determinations of claim objections, plan objections, and motions to annul the automatic stay are core proceedings that only arise in a case under the Bankruptcy Code, without objection by the parties, constitutional authority exists to hear and determine these matters. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015); Richer v, Morehead, 798 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2015). DISCUSSION Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “a petition filed under section 301... of this title .. . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or . . . exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). “Orders issued in violation of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code .. . ordinarily are void.” Matthews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249, 251 (7th Cir. 1984). However, a bankruptcy court may grant relief from the automatic stay by “terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay ... for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). Bankruptcy courts have “wide latitude to grant relief from the automatic stay including the ability to retroactively annul the stay.” Jn re Syed, 238 B.R. 133, 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ti. 1999). Annulment asks the court to approve post-petition action which violated the automatic stay if “cause” exists. In Re Szyszko, 234 B.R. 408, 412 (Bankr. N.D. IIL. 1999). If the automatic stay is annulled as to a certain creditor, any actions the creditor took post-petition would not be wiped out. Rather, “[a]nnulment of the automatic stay grants retroactive relief to the movant, allowing the creditor for whose benefit the stay is annulled to proceed as if the bankruptcy had never been filed and the automatic stay [had] never been imposed.” In re Wilke, No. 10 B 04976, 2010 WL □ 2034525, at *6 (Bankr, N.D. Ill. May 20, 2010) (Schmetterer, J.). The Bankruptcy Code does not define “cause.” Rather, “cause” is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Fernstrom Storage & Van Co., 938 F.2d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1991). “But, generally, courts will find cause for an annulment of the automatic stay if doing so is consistent with the same equitable principles that guide bankruptcy proceedings at large.” AP Siding & Roofing Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon, 548 B.R. 473, 479-80 (N.D. Ill. 2016). A bankruptcy court may consider equitable factors in the decision to annul, including whether the movant had

notice of the bankruptcy at the time of the violation and whether the movant would be unfairly prejudiced should the stay be enforced. fn re Will, 303 B.R. 357, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (Cox, J.). A decision to annul the automatic stay is committed to the discretion of the bankruptcy court. Maiter of C & S Grain Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1995). In this case, equitable considerations weigh in favor of annulling the automatic stay as to Creditor. Creditor was not given notice of Debtor’s bankruptcy. Debtor did not list Creditor in her bankruptcy petition nor her schedules. As such, the bankruptcy clerk did not provide notice of the bankruptcy nor confirmation hearing to Creditor. Because Creditor had no knowledge of Debtor’s bankruptcy, it did not act willfully in violating the automatic stay when it moved in State Court for a tax deed. Debtor argues that she was not required to provide direct notice to Creditor anyway for the automatic stay to be imposed. True, “[t]he automatic stay is a self-executing provision of the Bankruptcy Code and begins to operate nationwide, without notice, once a debtor files a petition for relief.” In re Swindle, 584 B.R. 259, 264 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018) (Cox, J.). However, it is also “well-settled that a debtor who files for bankruptcy protection must give notice that is reasonably calculated under the totality of circumstances presented to apprise potential creditors of the pendency of the bankruptcy case.” Grand Pier Cir. LLC v. ATC Grp. Servs., Inc., No. 03 C 7767, 2007 WL 2973829, at *4 (N.D. HL. Oct. 9, 2007); see also Swindle, 584 B.R.

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Related

Stern v. Marshall
131 S. Ct. 2594 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Bobby H. Fowler, Debtor-Appellant v. Scott F. Shadel
400 F.3d 1016 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
In Re Anderson
159 B.R. 830 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)
In Re Syed
238 B.R. 133 (N.D. Illinois, 1999)
Will v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In Re Will)
303 B.R. 357 (N.D. Illinois, 2003)
In Re Szyszko
234 B.R. 408 (N.D. Illinois, 1999)
Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif
575 U.S. 665 (Supreme Court, 2015)
AP Siding & Roofing Co v. Bank of New York Mellon
548 B.R. 473 (N.D. Illinois, 2016)
Richer v. Morehead
798 F.3d 487 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
In re Swindle
584 B.R. 259 (N.D. Illinois, 2018)

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