Linnhaven, Inc., and Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United Heartland v. Roger Blasdell, surviving spouse of Heather Blasdell

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 24-0333
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0333 Filed October 30, 2024

LINNHAVEN, INC., and ACCIDENT FUND NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY/UNITED HEARTLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

ROGER BLASDELL, surviving spouse of HEATHER BLASDELL, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,

Judge.

An employer appeals the district court’s denial of its petition for judicial

review of the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decision finding that a

surviving spouse’s death benefits are not barred by the willful-injury defense of

Iowa Code section 85.16(1) (2016). AFFIRMED.

Laura J. Ostrander, Lansing, Michigan, for appellants.

Thomas Wertz of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. 2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Tragically, Heather Blasdell died from an overdose of prescription drugs.

The workers’ compensation commissioner found that the overdose was accidental.

So the commissioner awarded her husband, Roger Blasdell, workers’

compensation death benefits. But on judicial review, Heather’s former employer,

Linnhaven, Inc., contends that her death was a suicide.1 Linnhaven thus argues

that the death benefits are barred by the willful-injury defense of Iowa Code section

85.16(1) (2016) and the commissioner’s contrary finding is not supported by

substantial evidence. And Linnhaven argues that regardless whether the death

was accidental, it was not caused by Heather’s work injury.

But this second causation issue is not properly before us because it was not

decided by the commissioner or the district court. Neither did Linnhaven ever

clearly raise the issue before the commissioner. So we cannot consider it now.

Linnhaven’s properly preserved challenge to the commissioner’s finding

that Heather’s death was accidental fails on the merits. Such factual disputes are

resolved before the commissioner. Because substantial evidence in the agency

record supports the commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was accidental,

the commissioner’s decision must be affirmed. We thus affirm the district court’s

judgment, including its unchallenged order to remand Blasdell’s burial-expense

claim to be decided by the commissioner.

1 Linnhaven’s insurer, Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United Heartland, is also a party to this judicial-review proceeding and the underlying workers’ compensation proceeding. For readability, we refer only to Linnhaven. And because Heather and her husband have the same last name, we refer to Heather by her first name and her husband by his last name. 3

I. Factual Background and Proceedings

In November 2012, Heather injured her ankle while working for Linnhaven.

She later developed lower-back pain and depression as a result of the injury. And

the workers’ compensation commissioner thus found that Heather was

permanently and totally disabled because of the injury and awarded her workers’

compensation benefits.

Heather sought mental-health counseling after the injury. She was

diagnosed with a major depressive disorder starting in 2013 and continuing up until

August 2015. Multiple counseling records note that Heather had suicidal thoughts

several times a week, but she had “no plans” and “no intent” to act on those

thoughts.

In September 2016, Heather died at her home alone. An autopsy report by

the state medical examiner found the cause of death was a “[m]ixed drug

(quetiapine and zolpidem) intoxication.” And the manner of death was

“undetermined.”

Police investigated and concluded based on the evidence at the scene,

Heather’s previous medical history, and the autopsy report that Heather either had

an accidental overdose or a successful suicide attempt. The investigation noted

that Heather had a history of suicide attempts, that she would “routinely take

excess amounts of her prescription medications to get ‘high,’” and that she “and

her boyfriend had recently broken up.” The police also discovered an undated

note in a notebook under a stack of paperwork on Heather’s bed that included

negative statements about herself, praise for her son, and a request that her friend

or mom take care of her “fur babies.” The note to her son appears unfinished, 4

ending in the middle of a line and without a punctuation mark: “You have become

a strong very proud of you. I wish I could have [ . . . ].”

Heather’s son and a neighbor friend both talked with Heather early on the

morning of her death before leaving for work. They both agreed that she appeared

“high,” but that “this did not alarm them to seek medical attention for her” because

of her past history with prescription drugs. The friend “talked to Heather about

seeing each other that evening.”

From before her workplace injury until her death, Heather and Blasdell were

married but separated. So after Heather’s death, Blasdell sought death benefits

under Iowa Code section 85.31(1)(a)(1) and reimbursement for burial expenses

under section 85.28. Linnhaven denied liability, arguing that Blasdell was barred

from receiving any benefits under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) because he

willfully deserted Heather and under section 85.16(1) because her death was a

suicide and thus a willful injury.

A hearing was held before a deputy commissioner, at which all parties

agreed the only issues to be decided were: (1) Linnhaven’s defense that Blasdell

willfully deserted Heather; (2) Linnhaven’s defense that the death was a willful

injury; (3) the proper rate of compensation; and (4) taxation of costs. Both

Heather’s son and Blasdell testified that they believed her death was an accidental

overdose, not a suicide. Her son—who was living with her—explained that in the

days before her death, Heather’s “emotional state was really well.” And he shared

that the night before, she was up “baking cookies and stuff” and “we had plans with

my sister to come down.” When pressed by Linnhaven, he said he thought that 5

“she had taken her medicine to go to sleep, and she was unable to fall asleep and

didn’t know—didn’t realize that she had already taken it and took more.”

The workers’ compensation commissioner agreed with Linnhaven that

Blasdell willfully deserted Heather. So the commissioner denied Blasdell benefits

under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a). And the commissioner did not decide

whether Heather’s death was accidental or a suicide.

Blasdell then successfully petitioned for judicial review. The district court

reversed the commissioner’s decision that Blasdell deserted Heather and

remanded the case back to the commissioner to decide whether Linnhaven had

proved that Heather’s death was a willful injury. And on appeal, our supreme court

agreed “with the district court that there is not substantial evidence to support the

commissioner’s finding that [Blasdell] deserted Heather without fault by her.”

Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc., 989 N.W.2d 131, 140–41 (Iowa 2023). It likewise

agreed that because the commissioner “did not address Linnhaven’s claim that the

willful injury exception under Iowa Code section 85.16 bars [Blasdell’s] recovery of

the benefits,” “remand is appropriate for the commissioner to make the factual

findings necessary to decide this issue.” Id. at 141.

Two months after procedendo issued, formally concluding the appeal, the

workers’ compensation commissioner issued a remand decision. Based on the

evidence and briefing submitted prior to the first judicial-review proceeding, the

commissioner found that Linnhaven “failed to carry [its] burden of proof that

Heather’s death was a suicide under Iowa Code section 85.16(1).” The

commissioner acknowledged the counseling records stating Heather’s “‘moderate’

risk for suicide” and the undated note that “could be construed to be a suicide 6

note.” But it did not find this evidence persuasive because “there is no evidence if

[the note] was written the day before death, or written months or even years prior

to death” and because of the other contrary or missing evidence. The

commissioner reasoned:

No expert has opined that Heather committed suicide. The police investigation indicates Heather’s death was caused by an accidental overdose or suicide. The autopsy report found that the cause of death was undetermined. The death certificate also found that the cause of death was undetermined. The police report noted that [her son] and a friend believed Heather took excessive amounts of medication to get high. [Her son and Blasdell] both testified at hearing they believed that Heather’s death was an accidental overdose.

And so, the commissioner ruled that Blasdell’s claim for benefits was not barred

under Iowa Code section 85.16(1)(a) and he was entitled to death benefits. The

commissioner also found that Linnhaven had not proved that the rate of benefits

should be changed from the agreed-to rate from Heather’s original award and thus

ordered Linnhaven to pay death benefits of $408.46 per week to Blasdell for so

long as he is eligible under Iowa Code section 85.31(1)(a)(1).

Blasdell petitioned for rehearing, asking the commissioner to decide his

claim for burial expenses that was not addressed in the remand decision.

Linnhaven resisted the petition, arguing that the issue was not properly before the

commissioner on remand. But Linnhaven did not file its own rehearing petition

asking the commissioner to address any other issues. The commissioner did not

grant Blasdell’s petition within twenty days, so it was “deemed to have been

denied.” Iowa Code § 17A.16(2).

Linnhaven then petitioned for judicial review of the commissioner’s remand

decision under Iowa Code chapter 17A. The one-page petition stated a single 7

ground for reversal: “that substantial evidence supports none of the

Commissioner’s findings with regard to any of the issues Defendants raised in the

appeal.” In its briefing to the district court, Linnhaven clarified that the “sole issue”

was whether the court “should reverse the Commissioner’s Appeal Decision that

found Roger Blasdell entitled to death benefits despite the Claimant’s intentional

suicide and the affirmative defense of intentional injury raised by the Defendants

pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.16(1).” But rather than arguing why substantial

evidence does not support the commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was

accidental, it focused nearly all its briefing on a new argument. Linnhaven

contended that under the statute authorizing death benefits, Iowa Code section

85.31(1)(a), “no benefits may be awarded” because Heather’s “death, regardless

of whether an intentional suicide or accidental overdose, did not arise out of or in

the course of employment.” Blasdell cross-petitioned for review of the

commissioner’s ruling, arguing that the commissioner’s failure to award burial

expenses was “affected by errors of law, is not supported by substantial evidence

in the record, and is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an

abuse of discretion[] or unwarranted exercise of discretion.”

The district court denied Linnhaven’s petition, holding that the

commissioner’s decision that Linnhaven failed to prove its willful-injury defense

was “supported by substantial evidence.” The court reasoned that “[w]hile

Linnhaven certainly can point to facts in the record that support a suspicion that

Heather’s death was a suicide, they simply have not conclusively proven that to be

the case” because “[t]here are likewise facts in the record that support a finding

that Heather’s death was the result of a tragic accidental drug overdose and not a 8

suicide.” The district court did not address Linnhaven’s newfound claim that

benefits should have been denied because Heather’s death was not caused by

her employment. On Blasdell’s cross-petition, the court concluded that Blasdell

made a timely request for burial expenses but “for reasons that are unclear in the

record, the agency never acted on [his] request.” So the court decided “remand is

appropriate for the Commissioner to consider and rule on [Blasdell’s] request for

burial expenses.”

Neither party moved under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 for the district

court to reconsider or enlarge its ruling. Instead, Linnhaven appealed, challenging

only the court’s ruling on its willful-injury defense to Blasdell’s death benefits.

II. Error Preservation on Causation

In a judicial-review proceeding under chapter 17A, we may only consider

issues that have been raised in and decided by both the agency and the district

court. See Archer Daniels Midland v. Williams, 3 N.W.3d 231, 236 (Iowa Ct. App.

2023); Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 665, 670–71 (Iowa 2005). Because a

judicial-review proceeding is appellate in nature, a party cannot wait to raise an

issue “for the first time during judicial review.” Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 236. And

even when the party raises the issue before the agency, if the agency fails to

decide it, the party must “point out the issue in a motion for rehearing” before the

agency to preserve error on the issue. KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792

N.W.2d 308, 329 (Iowa 2010). The same is true in the district court. To preserve

error for our review—in a judicial-review proceeding, same as any other—a party

must request a ruling by filing a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 9

“when the district court fails to resolve an issue, claim or other legal theory properly

submitted for adjudication.” Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 671 (cleaned up).

Linnhaven devotes much of its briefing to arguing that the death-benefits

award must be reversed regardless of whether Heather’s death was accidental or

a suicide because Blasdell did not prove that it was causally related to injuries

arising out of and in the course of her employment. See Iowa Code § 85.31(1)(a);

Tebbs v. Denmark Light & Tel. Corp., 300 N.W. 328, 331 (Iowa 1941). But

Linnhaven failed to preserve error on this issue twice over. First, Linnhaven did

not raise this issue for the commissioner to decide. The closest it came—a stray

sentence buried in briefing in an argument that Heather’s death was a suicide and

thus proved Linnhaven’s willful-injury affirmative defense—does not suffice to raise

this distinct issue based on a different statute and a different burden than the willful-

injury affirmative defense.2 And even if that mere hint were enough to raise the

issue, when the commissioner did not decide it, Linnhaven needed to seek

rehearing to preserve error. See KFC Corp., 792 N.W.2d at 329; Williams,

3 N.W.3d at 236.

Second, Linnhaven did not preserve error in the district court because it did

not get a ruling on this issue there either. See Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 670–71.

Linnhaven did make this new causation argument in the district court—for the first

2 Three of Linnhaven’s briefs before the commissioner prior to the first judicial-

review proceeding contain the same stray sentence and factual citation in its argument about the facts supporting a suicide finding and its willful-injury affirmative defense: “In addition, Mr. Blasdell has provided no evidence that Ms. Blasdell’s suicide was caused by the initial November 5, 2012 work injury to her ankle. See all Claimant’s exhibits on file herein.” Linnhaven did not explain the importance of this assertion nor tie it to any statutory requirement. 10

time offering some legal authority and analysis. But the court decided only the

properly preserved substantial-evidence challenge to the commissioner’s finding

that Heather’s death was accidental and did not address or acknowledge

Linnhaven’s causation argument. Because the court did not rule on it, Linnhaven

had to file a 1.904 motion asking the court to enlarge its ruling to address the

causation argument. See id. So even if we could overlook Linnhaven’s failure to

preserve error before the commissioner, we still could not consider this new

argument for the first time on appeal.

At oral argument, Linnhaven urged that we can nevertheless reach this

issue because Blasdell did not raise any error-preservation concerns. But the

requirement to preserve error protects more “than simply the interests of the

opposing party.” Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470

(Iowa 2000). That is especially so in a judicial-review proceeding, which involves

not just “judicial resources,” but the interests of another branch of government that

we afford respect. Id. So we must consider whether error is preserved even when

it has been ignored—or conceded—by the opposing party on appeal. See id. We

thus consider only Linnhaven’s properly preserved substantial-evidence challenge

to the commissioner’s decision.

III. Affirmative Defense of Willful Injury under Section 85.16(1)

In an appeal of a district court’s ruling on judicial review of agency action,

we apply the same statutory standards of review of the agency action as the district

court. See Carreras v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 977 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa 2022).

Those standards provide that a court “shall reverse, modify, or grant other

appropriate relief” of an agency decision when that decision prejudices the judicial- 11

review petitioner’s “substantial rights” because the decision is “[b]ased upon a

determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the

agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court

when that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). The workers’

compensation commissioner has been vested with discretion to make fact

determinations on compensation claims like this one. See Mike Brooks, Inc. v.

House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014). We thus must “accept the

commissioner’s factual findings when supported by substantial evidence.”

Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 234 (cleaned up).

Evidence is substantial if it “would be deemed sufficient by a neutral,

detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the

consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be

serious and of great importance.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). “Evidence is not

insubstantial just because it could lead reasonable minds to different conclusions.”

Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 234; see also Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842,

850 (Iowa 2009). The commissioner, as trier of fact, decides the credibility of the

witnesses, assesses the evidence, and resolves the disputed facts. Arndt v. City

of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007). And so, like challenging a jury

verdict, a substantial-evidence challenge to the commissioner’s decision is a heavy

lift. See Sellers v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)

(explaining that because judicial review of agency action is “severely

circumscribed,” “[n]early all disputes are won or lost” in the agency).

Linnhaven argues that substantial evidence in the record does not support

the commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was accidental. And it thus seeks 12

reversal of the commissioner’s decision that Linnhaven failed to prove its willful-

injury affirmative defense under Iowa Code section 85.16(1). That statute provides

that “[n]o compensation . . . shall be allowed for an injury caused . . . [b]y the

employee’s willful intent to injure the employee’s self.” Iowa Code § 85.16(1). As

an affirmative defense, Linnhaven had the burden of proving it. See Nelson v.

Cities Serv. Oil Co., 146 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1966). Before the commissioner,

Linnhaven tried to meet its burden by proving that Heather’s death was a suicide.3

No doubt, there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable mind

could reach the conclusion Linnhaven urged. Medical records showed that

Heather reported suicidal thoughts and was a moderate suicide risk. She may

have previously attempted suicide. She and her boyfriend had recently broken up.

And a note was found at her home that reads like a suicide note. But that is not

the question here. See Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 234. On substantial-evidence

review, we ask whether substantial evidence supported the findings made by the

commissioner—not whether they could support a contrary finding. See id.

And we agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports the

commissioner’s finding that Heather’s death was an accident. The potential

suicide note was found in a notebook under a stack of papers on Heather’s bed—

not right next to her. It was undated. And it was unfinished. So the commissioner

could have reasonably found it merely showed Heather had been thinking about

3 The supreme court has held that even some suicides are compensable injuries

not disallowed by the willful-injury defense. See Humboldt Cmty. Schs. v. Fleming, 603 N.W.2d 759, 762–63 (Iowa 1999). But Blasdell has never argued—and the commissioner did not find—that Heather’s death was a suicide. So we do not consider whether Heather’s death could be a compensable injury even if it were a suicide. 13

suicide at some point in the past—not that she intended to do so when she

overdosed. Heather’s son testified that she had been doing “really well” in the

days before her death. And both he and another friend who spoke with her the

morning she died shared that they were making plans and indeed that Heather

had baked cookies just the night before. What’s more, neither the medical

examiner nor the police investigation concluded that Heather’s death was a

suicide.

With evidence pointing in both directions, we cannot say that the record

lacked substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s conclusion that

Linnhaven failed to prove its willful-injury affirmative defense. We thus affirm the

decisions of the commissioner and the district court.

Linnhaven did not appeal the district court’s order remanding the case to

the commissioner only “to consider and rule on [Blasdell’s] request for burial

expenses.” So our affirmance of the challenged ruling does not disturb the district

court’s order remanding to the commissioner for that purpose.

AFFIRMED.