Linehan v. Harvard University
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Linehan v. Harvard University. Read the opinion of the Court — 29 F.3d 619 →
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
June 9, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-2311
DENIS MARTIN LINEHAN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
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Before
Torruella, Cyr and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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Denis M. Linehan on brief pro se.
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Allan A. Ryan, Jr., on brief for appellee.
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__________________
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Per Curiam. Plaintiff appeals the district court's
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dismissal of his diversity suit as time-barred under
Massachusetts three-year statute of limitations for personal
injury actions. The complaint alleges that between March and
May, 1987, while plaintiff was enrolled in a graduate studies
program at Harvard Law School, defendant subjected him to
sonic abuse from a remote controlled device installed in
close proximity to his dormitory room. Plaintiff claims that
defendant's wrongful actions were motivated by a vendetta
that had its origin in an employment dispute between the
plaintiff and University College Cork in Ireland.
The complaint was filed on December 10, 1992, more
than five years after the dates of alleged injury. Plaintiff
argues, however, that the three-year statute of limitations
is tolled by (1) fraudulent concealment, or (2) his absence
from the jurisdiction, or (3) the disability caused by
defendant's alleged tort. He also argues (4) that his claims
survive under the state's six-year statute of limitations for
breach of contract claims,1 and (5) that defendant is
estopped from asserting the limitations bar by certain
judgments of the Irish courts. We reject these contentions
for the following reasons. (1) A defendant's alleged
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1. Plaintiff reportedly completed his course of study at
Harvard, obtaining an LL.M. degree in June, 1987.
Nevertheless, he alleges interruptions in contracts for
"studentship," accommodation, medical and linen services.
-2-
fraud may toll the limitations period only if it "conceals
the cause of . . . action from the knowledge of the person
entitled to bring it . . . . " Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, 12.
Plaintiff's complaint asserts, however, that he was aware of
the alleged sonic abuse and his physical injury at the time
it occurred. His theory that Harvard is responsible for the
alleged tort is built almost entirely on actions and
statements by Harvard personnel of which he was aware in 1986
and 1987. In addition, as early as May, 1987, plaintiff
sought legal assistance to litigate or mediate this claim
against Harvard. "[A] cause of action is not concealed from
one who has knowledge of the facts that create it . . . ."
Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 251, 565 N.E.2d 780, 787
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(1991) (citation omitted); see also Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
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408 Mass. 204, 205, 557 N.E.2d 739, 740 (1990) (holding that
a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has notice of
the basic fact that he has been harmed by the defendant's
conduct, regardless of an ignorance of the particulars).
(2) A plaintiff's voluntary departure from the
state after the accrual of his cause of action does not toll
the statute of limitations. Cf. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, 9
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(a defendant's absence may toll the limitations period);
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Walsh v. Ogorzalek, 372 Mass. 271, 361 N.E.2d 1247 (1977)
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(tolling for non-resident defendants is limited to those
defendants not amenable to service during their absence).
-3-
The plaintiff's residence in a foreign country during the
relevant period does
not qualify as a disabling factor unless the foreign country
was then at war with the United States. Mass. Gen. L. ch.
260, 8.
(3) We know of no case, and plaintiff has cited
none, which holds that a plaintiff's alleged physical injury
alone tolls the Massachusetts statute of limitations. The
state recognizes mental illness as a disabling factor, but
plaintiff does not claim a period of insanity. See Mass.
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Gen. L. ch. 260, 7. In any event, the complaint alleges
facts which show that during the relevant period plaintiff
understood his legal rights, employed counsel, and actively
pursued legal claims relating to his disability in the Irish
courts. His injury is thus not one recognized as disabling
for purposes of tolling the statute. See McGuinness v.
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Cotter, 412 Mass. 617, 624 n.9, 591 N.E.2d 659, 663 n.9
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(1992) (holding that a mental disability tolls the statute
when it prevents the plaintiff from "comprehending his legal
rights," or pursuing a lawsuit); Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404
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Mass.
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