Lindy Robinson v. David Ingordo

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: November 7, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-1429
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 7, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1429-MR

LINDY ROBINSON APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE LIBBY G. MESSER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 11-CI-04595

DAVID INGORDO APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Lindy Robinson (“Mother”), appeals the October

28, 2024, order of the Fayette Circuit Court, Family Division, concerning the

custody of the minor child (“Child”) that she shares with Appellee, David Ingordo

(“Father”). That order modified the prior joint custody arrangement to give sole custody of Child to Father. After carefully reviewing the briefs, the record on

appeal, and the relevant law, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Child was born in 2011 to Mother and Father, who were never

married. They soon filed a joint petition for custody in Family Court, which

awarded them joint custody by agreement. For the following 13 years, Mother and

Father proceeded to litigate a plethora of parenting issues. The history of the case

demonstrates the following cyclical behavior: Mother fails to comply with Family

Court orders or discuss parenting issues with Father; Father files a motion to

compel; and Mother and Father usually reach an agreement before a substantial

hearing occurs.1

One such ongoing, parenting issue revolved around the best manners

by which to address Child’s Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”).

In early 2019, Father filed a motion to compel Mother to conference the issue with

him, as he claimed she was refusing to discuss it. While Father mentioned that he

was initially opposed to medication, he believed that starting Child on a trial run of

medication, as suggested by Child’s school and doctor, may be something

beneficial to explore. (Record (“R.”) at 267.) Pursuant to an order of the Family

1 While the Family Court instructed Mother and Father to go to parenting coordination and family counselling various times throughout litigation to attempt to address coparenting issues there, it appears the parties did not engage in either of these patently-needed processes.

-2- Court, and by their agreement with its contents, Mother and Father began this trial

run of medication for 14 days. (R. at 376.) In late 2019, Father filed a motion

stating that while Mother had obtained and filled an ADHD prescription for Child,

he did not know whether Child had taken any of it. He alleged that Mother may be

taking the prescription herself to address her own ADHD. He requested that the

ADHD prescription be taken to Child’s school and administered by her teachers to

determine whether Child had any positive effects from taking it. (R. at 395.) The

Family Court complied by issuing an order to that effect, but it is unclear from the

record whether this procedure was followed, and if so, for what period of time.

However, it is uncontroverted that Child did not take any ADHD medication after

2019. In late 2022, Father filed a motion for contempt because Mother allegedly

had maternal grandmother take Child to a pediatrician to renew Child’s ADHD

prescription without Father’s knowledge or agreement. The Family Court found

Mother in contempt for this violation, as well as other infractions, but the parties

did not raise the ADHD medication issue again until the following year.

In October of 2023, Father expressed concerns about Child’s fatigue,

mood swings, and a headache. Father claimed that Child had reported to him that

before she went to school, Mother had given her a pill, which Mother claimed

would “make her smarter.” Mother initially told Father that she had given Child a

vitamin. After Child continued to exhibit symptoms, she was taken to her doctor

-3- for drug testing, which yielded a positive result for amphetamines. Mother then

revealed that she had lied, and she claimed to have given Child some of Child’s

expired ADHD prescription, which Mother had stored from 2019. Father filed

another motion for contempt, which the Family Court heard in early November of

2023. The Family Court noted serious concerns with Mother’s bad decision-

making and continuous defiance of Court orders. It issued another order

temporarily suspending Mother’s unsupervised timesharing, ordering Mother to

obtain a psychological evaluation from Dr. David Feinberg, and appointing a

Friend of the Court (“FOC”)2 to investigate the case and assist in finding an

appropriate supervisor for Mother’s timesharing. Mother later saw Dr. Feinberg,

who completed a psychological evaluation in the Spring of 2024, which will be

discussed in more detail below.

Father subsequently filed a motion to modify custody and

timesharing, and he specifically requested sole custody. The Family Court

conducted a hearing on this motion over the span of two days in August and

September of 2024, during which it heard testimony from a variety of individuals

2 A Friend of the Court is an individual appointed as an officer by a circuit court to investigate the child’s and the parents’ situations, to file a report summarizing his or her findings, and to make recommendations as to the outcome of the proceeding. Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 403.090. In this case, this FOC was the third one that the Family Court appointed during the tenure of the case.

-4- including both parties, Dr. Feinberg, Father’s personal assistant, some of Mother’s

medical providers, Mother’s friend, and Child’s maternal grandmother.

Dr. Feinberg testified that Mother exhibited extreme defensiveness

during his evaluation, and that as a result, her testing results were not as accurate as

they could have been had Mother authentically engaged. In his professional

opinion, Dr. Feinberg stated that Mother is very limited in sharing and expressing

her feelings, has a strong need for control and is angered by the fact that she is

being required to “coparent,” expresses anger management issues presented

primarily in the form of verbal aggression, and perceives Father to be the reason

for most of the issues concerning Child. He further explained that he did not

believe that Mother was a physical threat to Child, but he did have significant

concerns with Mother’s impulsive behaviors and her apparent inability to

differentiate her own feelings and needs from those of Child. While he did not

make a formal diagnosis in his report, he testified that Mother exhibited several

signs of avoidant personality disorder. He recommended that Mother engage in

weekly counselling and consult with a psychiatrist to discuss medications and

ensure that Mother took her own ADHD medication as prescribed.

The FOC testified that her communications and interactions with

Mother were substantially similar to those reported by Dr. Feinberg, namely that

Mother was extremely defensive and unwilling to engage thoughtfully. When

-5- talking with Mother about the ADHD medication, the FOC stated that Mother did

not understand the gravity of the issue because all of Child’s classmates were

taking similar medications. The FOC noted that she believed Mother to have an

unhealthy obsession with her weight and had concerns that she might be projecting

that obsession onto Child. Ultimately, the FOC opined that it was clear that

Mother is unwilling to parent along with Father and recommended that Father be

awarded sole custody of Child. She also agreed with Dr. Feinberg’s

recommendations.

Father testified to the history of the inability to “coparent” throughout

Child’s life, Mother’s previous behaviors, and his actions in engaging with the

Courts as a result. Some of Mother’s behaviors included her denigration of some

of Child’s teachers, resulting in the school blocking communication with Mother

for a time; her belittling of Father’s personal assistant, resulting in a Family Court

order prohibiting contact between Mother and the personal assistant; and Mother’s

negative comments directed towards Father and his current wife, which Mother

placed on Child’s social media. He also had concerns about Mother having an

expired driver’s license and lacking a working vehicle for multiple months in 2024.

Mother believed that the parties’ parenting relationship was not as

bleak as Father had suggested and had been going well in 2023 before the ADHD

medication incident. She acknowledged that her past communications with Child’s

-6- teachers and Father’s personal assistant were inappropriate. Mother also expressed

regret in giving Child an expired ADHD medication without talking with Father

first; although when asked why she engaged in those actions, she did not provide

any explanation. As of the date of the hearing, Mother had not started going to

therapy as recommended by Dr. Feinberg,3 though she had attended one recent

meeting with a psychiatrist. Mother also expressed her concerns with Father

throughout the history of the case, testifying that he travelled extensively because

of his job and would often place his parental responsibilities on his wife and his

personal assistant. Mother, as well as her friend and Child’s maternal

grandmother, testified that Mother and Child had a good relationship.

On October 28, 2024, the Family Court issued its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order, in which it awarded sole custody to Father. On

appeal Mother argues that the Family Court’s findings were not supported by

substantial evidence and that it incorrectly applied KRS 403.340.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews child custody decisions made by a Family Court

for an abuse of discretion and analyzes whether its findings of fact were clearly

3 Mother did have a handful of meetings with a therapist to which she had been referred previously. That therapist, who also happened to be Child’s physical education teacher, appeared as a witness and testified that Mother had never shown Dr. Feinberg’s report to her, and had since ceased working with Mother due to Mother’s need to consult with a psychiatrist.

-7- erroneous. Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d 153, 153 (Ky.1974). “Findings of

fact[] shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given

to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01. A Trial Court’s findings of fact

are only clearly erroneous when they are manifestly against the weight of the

evidence or otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. See Wells v. Wells,

412 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1967). Substantial evidence is “evidence of substance

and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the mind” of a

reasonable person. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409,

414 (Ky. 1998) (citations omitted). Finally, to the extent that the Circuit Court was

required to interpret the statutes under KRS Chapter 403 and its application of the

law to established facts, we will conduct a review de novo. See Commonwealth v.

Montaque, 23 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

Before modifying a custody decree, a Family Court must find, after a

hearing, that a change in circumstances has occurred with the family, and that a

modification is in the best interests of the child. KRS 403.340(3). When making

these determinations, KRS 403.340(3) provides a list of factors for the Family

Court to consider that include the following:

(a) Whether the custodian agrees to the modification;

-8- (b) Whether the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with consent of the custodian;

(c) The factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2) to determine the best interests of the child;

(d) Whether the child’s present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health;

(e) Whether the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him; and

(f) Whether the custodian has placed the child with a de facto custodian.

KRS 403.340(5) further provides:

Subject to KRS 403.315, if the court orders a modification of a child custody decree, there shall be a presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child for the parents to have joint custody and share equally in parenting time. If a deviation from equal parenting time is warranted, the court shall construct a parenting time schedule which maximizes the time each parent or de facto custodian has with the child and is consistent with ensuring the child’s welfare.

A Family Court considers the rebuttable presumption of joint custody afforded by

KRS 403.340(5) only after it determines that a change in circumstances has

occurred, and that a modification of custody is in a child’s best interests.

Berzansky v. Parrish, 583 S.W.3d 6, 8 (Ky. App. 2019).

-9- We will begin with Mother’s argument that the Family Court’s

findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Mother

contends that there was no substantial evidence to support some of the claims

raised against her, namely that she was abusing prescription medications herself,

had an unhealthy obsession with weight that she was encouraging Child to adopt,

or had any mental health diagnoses that would endanger Child. She also argues

that there was no evidence presented that Child had adverse reactions to joint

custody.

Contrary to what Mother purports, from our review of the record on

appeal, there was substantial evidence presented that supports the Family Court’s

findings that a change of circumstances occurred, and a modification of custody

was in Child’s best interests. It is abundantly clear from the record on appeal that

Mother has significant problems in controlling and regulating her emotions, has a

history with verbally denigrating individuals involved in Child’s upbringing to the

point that communications either need to be halted or limited, and has consistently

defied the Family Court’s orders. Strictly speaking, whether Mother has an

unhealthy obsession with weight that she is projecting onto Child, is abusing

-10- prescription medications, or has been formally diagnosed with avoidant personality

disorder were not necessary findings to support the Family Court’s decision.4

Furthermore, we find that there was evidence that Child had adverse

reactions to joint custody. While the Family Court found that Child was relatively

thriving despite Mother’s and Father’s inability to parent together, it is uncontested

that Child experienced medical distress due to receiving from Mother an alleged

expired narcotic medication. Mother administered this medication without

consulting Father and did so with the knowledge that he had opposed it in the past.

Mother then lied about it and only revealed the truth once she was confronted with

Child’s unassailably positive drug test. The Family Court also took into account

Mother’s less-than-forthcoming testimony about the incident, particularly noting

Mother’s inability and unwillingness to provide any explanation for her behaviors

or assurances that such actions would not occur in the future.

Mother next argues that the Family Court erred in its application of

KRS 403.340. First, she asserts that the Family Court inappropriately interpreted

Father’s motion for sole custody as a motion to modify timesharing. We are

4 Notably, the Family Court did not actually find any of these ostensible claims to be true. It merely noted the testimony of the FOC, Father, and Dr. Feinberg about those claims in its consideration of statutory factors. And even if the Family Court had found those claims to be accurate, “judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court. Thus ‘[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal[.]’” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted).

-11- unpersuaded. This argument appears to be based on a typographical error

contained within the October 28, 2024, order. Mother points to a portion of the

order that states: “[a]s the original custody decree was entered more than two

years ago, the court finds that this is a modification of timesharing governed by

KRS 403.340(3) and (4).” (R. at 1188.) While listing “timesharing,” it does not

mention “custody.” However, on the next page, the order states that when

considering the factors of KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.270, “it is simply required

that the court consider and weigh them all when determining whether a

modification in custody and timesharing serves the best interest of the child.” (R.

at 1189) (emphasis added). It is apparent after reviewing the record on appeal and

watching the relevant hearings, that the Family Court indeed considered Father’s

motion to be one to modify custody. Additionally, the statutory factors that the

Family Court considered are essentially the same in their applications to

modifications of timesharing and custody. Insofar as the manner in which the

relevant statutes apply differently to custody and timesharing modifications, the

primary contrast is the rebuttable presumption of joint custody afforded by KRS

403.340(5), which leads us to Mother’s final argument – that the Family Court

failed to apply the presumption of joint custody.

We initially observe that, while Mother briefly mentioned the

rebuttable presumption issue during the hearing below, she filed no motion

-12- requesting either post-judgment relief, such as a motion to alter, amend, or vacate

under CR 59.05, or additional findings of fact under CR 52.04 after the appealed

order was entered. Thus, preservation of this issue requisite to invoke our review

is questionable. See Oakley v. Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012); see

also Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4). Regardless, given

that this case involves the welfare of Child, we choose to review the matter for

manifest injustice, or in other words, palpable error. See G.P. v. Cabinet for

Health & Fam. Servs., 572 S.W.3d 484, 489-90 (Ky. App. 2019); see also CR

61.02. “For an error to be palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious

and readily noticeable[;] . . . must involve prejudice more egregious than that

occurring in reversible error[;] . . . [or] must be so grave in nature that if it were

uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings.” Brewer v.

Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

In this case, Mother is correct that the Family Court did not explicitly

mention the rebuttable presumption in the appealed order. However, after a review

of the record on appeal, it is apparent that the Family Court took into consideration

the rebuttable presumption in its rulings. Counsel and the Family Court

specifically discussed whether the rebuttable presumption of joint custody afforded

by KRS 403.340(5) would apply. The Family Court emphatically stated that it

-13- would apply that presumption. Further, it emphasized that, if it determined that a

modification from joint custody to sole custody was in Child’s best interests, the

allegations Father has raised in this case, it would necessitate applying the

presumption because “if factually proven to be true, [the allegations] would more

than likely overcome that presumption.” (Video Record, (“V.R.”) August 20, 2024,

Hearing – 9:14:45.) The appealed order also states that while the Family Court

finds that sole custody is appropriate, it “will enter a timesharing order that

maximizes the child’s time with the mother in a safe and appropriate way but

minimizes opportunities for dangerous parental decision making.” (R. at 1194.)

This language mirrors the language of KRS 403.340(5). While the Family Court

could have been clearer on this issue, considering the circumstances and the

Family Court’s extensive findings regarding the factors of KRS 403.340(3) and (4)

and best interest factors contained in KRS 403.270(2), we find no error in the

Family Court’s application of KRS 403.340.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the Fayette Family Court’s order of October

28, 2024.

ALL CONCUR.

-14- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

J. Ross Stinetorf Lisa L. Johnson Lexington, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky

-15-