Lindstrom v. McMillan

168 P. 463, 98 Wash. 608, 1917 Wash. LEXIS 999
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 20, 1917
DocketNo. 14130
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 168 P. 463 (Lindstrom v. McMillan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lindstrom v. McMillan, 168 P. 463, 98 Wash. 608, 1917 Wash. LEXIS 999 (Wash. 1917).

Opinion

Main, J.

This, action was brought for the purpose of having declared' void, and restraining the collection of, a local assessment for a permanent highway improvement. After the issues were framed, the cause was tried to the court [609]*609without a jury, and resulted in findings and conclusions of law and judgment supporting the position of the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the defendants appeal.

The facts which present the questions involved may be stated as follows: The location of the permanent improvement was in Whatcom county, and was on the road connect-

[610]*610ing Bellingham and Ferndale. The improvement began about three miles north of Bellingham and extended to approximately the city limits of Ferndale. A part of the improvement was on what was known as road 57, and another portion was on what was known as road 56. Road 57 extends north and south. Road 56 extends east and west. These roads cross each other at right angles. Before making the improvement, a small tract of ground .was acquired by the county at the southwest corner of the intersection of these two roads, in order that, on the permanent improvement, there would be a curve at that point, rather than a right-angle turn. The lands of the respondents are to the northeast of the intersection of the two roads mentioned, being north of 56, extending east from the intersection, and east of 57, extending north from the intersection. The improve-' ment was made under what may be referred to as the permanent highway law. Chapter XXII-B, Title XLI, Rem. Code (§ 5879-1 et seq.) The improvement was initiated by a petition signed by the owners of land fronting on the highway on which the improvement was sought. An examination ■ of the drawing on the previous page, which is not drawn to scale, and is inserted for illustrative purposes only, will tend to clarify the facts as stated.

The road over which the improvement was made is referred to on the plat as the northwest diagonal road. The plat also shows where the improvement was made, the location of the lands of the respondents, a portion of roads 56 and 57, and the intersection thereof.

The first question is whether the petition filed with the county commissioners was sufficient to give that board jurisdiction to fix the boundaries of the assessment district within the limits prescribed by the statute and charge the property therein with the cost of the improvement. The respondents claim that the petition should have been signed by the owners of two-thirds of the lands within the district. The petition was signed by the owners of two-thirds of the lineal feet of [611]*611the lands, other than lands of the state or of the United States, adjoining and touching upon the highway, but was not signed by the owners of two-thirds of the land embraced in the assessment district. Section 5879-2, Rem. Code, provides :

“The owners of two-thirds of the lineal feet of lands, other than lands of the state or the United States, fronting upon any public highway or section thereof in any county may present to the board of county commissioners a petition setting forth that the petitioners are such owners, and that they desire that such highway or section thereof be improved under the provisions of this act.”

Under the subsequent sections of the same act, the board of county commissioners, upon receipt of a petition, or “upon its own motion,” may pass a resolution for the improvement of any public road or highway or section thereof described in such resolution, “under the provisions of this act.” After the resolution is passed, the county commissioners are required to transmit a certified copy thereof to the state highway commissioner. That official, when the resolution is received, is required to investigate and determine whether the highway or section thereof sought to be improved is of sufficient public importance to merit the improvement. The highway commissioner is required to certify his approval or disapproval of the resolution. After the resolution is approved by the highway commissioner, the county engineer is required to perform all engineering in connection with and supervise the improvement contemplated. The county engineer is authorized to make such recommendations concerning deviation from existing lines as he shall deem of advantage to obtain a shorter and more direct route, or to otherwise improve the highway. Upon the completion of the profiles, maps, plans and specifications by the county engineer, a copy thereof must be transmitted to the state highway commissioner for his approval. After the plans and specifications have been approved by the state highway commissioner, the board of county commission[612]*612ers is authorized to advertise for bids and contract for the construction of the proposed improvement. After the highway has been improved or constructed pursuant to the petition above referred to, the county engineer is required to prepare an assessment roll in accordance with § 10 of the permanent highway law (Rem. Code, § 5879-10). The width of the assessment district is to be fixed by the board of county commissioners within the limits specified in this section.

Returning now to the immediate question above stated, it is apparent that the statute does not contemplate that the petition by which the improvement is initiated shall be signed by two-thirds of the owners of land which shall subsequently be included in the district. At the time the petition is prepared and presented to the county commissioners, which is the initial step, it cannot be known what the particular boundaries of the district may be, because these boundaries are to be fixed by the county commissioners after the improvement has been constructed in accordance with the statute, as above outlined in general terms. The section of the statute above quoted, which authorizes the petition, provides that the same shall be signed by the owners of two-thirds of the lineal feet of the lands, other than lands of the state or the United States, “fronting upon any public highway” which such petitioners desire to be improved. The petition in this case was signed by the owners of two-thirds of the lineal feet of lands, other than lands of the state or the United States, fronting upon the highway. It was not necessary, in order to confer jurisdiction upon the board of county commissioners to proceed, that the petition be signed by the owners of two-thirds of the property which would ultimately be within the assessment district. The statute provides for a hearing upon the assessment roll before the board of equalization, after due notice thereof shall have been given as provided. In response to the notice, the respondents in this case appeared before the board of equalization and obj ected to the assessment upon their property. There is no constitutional [613]*613prohibition against the legislature conferring upon the board of county commissioners the power to initiate the improvement without a petition. Collins v. Ellensburg, 68 Wash. 212, 122 Pac. 1010; Redding v. Spokane, 81 Wash. 263, 142 Pac. 664.

If the legislature had power to confer upon the county commissioners the right to initiate the improvement without a petition, it would seem to follow, as a matter of course, that there could be no constitutional objection against the initiating of the improvement by a petition signed by the owners of two-thirds of the lineal feet of the lands fronting upon the highway to be improved.

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Related

State Ex Rel. Johnson v. City of Dayton
93 P.2d 909 (Washington Supreme Court, 1939)
In Re the Assessment for the Establishment of Roeder Avenue
292 P. 113 (Washington Supreme Court, 1930)
Kaufman v. McMillan
175 P. 309 (Washington Supreme Court, 1918)

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Bluebook (online)
168 P. 463, 98 Wash. 608, 1917 Wash. LEXIS 999, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lindstrom-v-mcmillan-wash-1917.