Lindsey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedMarch 19, 2025
Docket4:24-cv-00082
StatusUnknown

This text of Lindsey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Lindsey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lindsey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., (D. Idaho 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MICHAEL PAUL LINDSEY, Case No. 4:24-cv-00082-DCN Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND v. ORDER

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court is Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction” (“Motion”). Dkt. 17. On September 18, 2024, the Court held oral argument and took the Motion under advisement. Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Motion. II. BACKGROUND After serving seventeen-years as a conductor and engineer for Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”), Plaintiff Michael Lindsey alleges he was terminated for reporting safety concerns to Union Pacific, government officials, and on social media. Dkt. 18, at 1. Lindsey was terminated on April 21, 2023, and filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) on May 25, 2023, alleging his termination violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et. seq. (the “FRSA”). Id. at 3. On July 28, 2023, OSHA dismissed Lindsey’s complaint, finding there was no nexus between Lindsey’s termination and his safety complaints, and concluding Union Pacific had legitimate reasons for terminating him. Dkt. 17-2. Pursuant to the enforcement

procedures set forth under the FRSA, Lindsey appealed OSHA’s decision to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) the next day, and the ALJ issued a Notice of Case Assignment on September 14, 2023. Dkt. 18, at 4. The ALJ set an initial scheduling conference for November 27, 2023, and, in the meantime, instructed the parties to, within certain time frames: (1) file a formal notice of appearance; (2) begin formal discovery; (3)

file a pleading complaint; and (4) ultimately attend the scheduling conference. Dkt. 18-3, at 3. Lindsey’s counsel did not comply with any of these instructions. Id. at 4. On November 28, 2023, when Lindsey’s counsel failed to attend the scheduling conference, the ALJ issued a ruling staying the case. Dkt. 17-2, at 23. Additionally, the ALJ found that while Lindsey’s counsel’s behavior was neglectful and wasteful, such

conduct did not constitute bad faith under current case law. Id. Further, the ALJ directed Lindsey to provide a copy of his federal complaint—once filed—in order to obtain dismissal of his administrative proceeding. Id. On February 9, 2024, Lindsey filed the instant suit. Dkt. 1. On March 25, 2024, Union Pacific filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 49

U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3). Dkt. 17. III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Rule 12(b)(1) A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A lack of jurisdiction is presumed unless the party asserting jurisdiction establishes that it exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995). If the court determines it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). B. FRSA The FRSA was enacted in 1970 “to promote safety in every area of railroad

operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 20101. An employee protections section was first added to the Act in 1980 to ensure that railroad companies did not retaliate against employees who, among other things, “reported violations of federal railroad safety laws or refused to work under hazardous conditions.” Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Solis, 915 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Federal

Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-423, § 10, 94 Stat. 1811, 1815 (1980)). To pursue an FRSA whistleblower complaint under Section 20109, an employee must first file a complaint with OSHA, which investigates the complaint and issues findings and a preliminary order. See 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(1–2). If either party objects to

OSHA’s determination, it may then seek a final decision from the Department of Labor. The FRSA also contains a “kick-out” provision, which allows an employee to bring his FRSA action in a district court if the “Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 210 days after the filing of the complaint and if the delay is not due to the bad faith of the employee.” Id. § 20109(d)(3). Before using the kick-out provision, the employee must provide 15-days’ notice to the Department of Labor that he intends to file a lawsuit. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS A. Bad Faith Union Pacific claims Lindsey acted in bad faith by failing to follow the orders of the ALJ regarding the initial scheduling conference, which prevented the Secretary of Labor from entering a final order in his case before the 210-day deadline. Dkt. 17-1, at 6.

This, Union Pacific argues, deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Id. Lindsey counters—and the ALJ specifically found—that case law does not support a finding of bad faith under the circumstances. Lindsey further counters that even if Lindsey’s counsel had complied with the ALJ’s order, a final decision would not have been issued before the deadline. Dkt. 18, at 8–10.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, although Lindsey bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, he is not required to affirmatively show “good faith” in his delay. While Union Pacific contends the kick-out provision requires Lindsey to show good faith (Dkt. 17-1, at 6), that provision simply states an employee may bring an action in district court “if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 210 days

after the filing of the complaint and if the delay is not due to the bad faith of the employee.” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3) (emphasis added). A plain and ordinary reading of the statute indicates Lindsey must only show that any delay beyond the deadline was not due to his bad faith. “Bad faith” is defined as dishonesty of belief, purpose, or motive. Bad Faith, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Bad faith can, in some instances, include the delay of litigation or preventing the enforcement of a court order. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). Union Pacific points out that Lindsey failed to respond to the ALJ’s order, which delayed the agency’s litigation process. Dkt. 17-1, at 6. However, against the backdrop of case law interpreting § 20109(d)(3), and consistent with the ALJ’s ruling, the Court finds Lindsey’s conduct does not rise to the level of bad faith. Lindsey relies on three cases to support his position. In Pfeifer v. Union Pacific, a

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
501 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc.
218 F.3d 1078 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp.
263 F.3d 942 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Lynch v. Union Pacific Railroad
24 F. Supp. 3d 597 (N.D. Texas, 2014)
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Solis
915 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.C. Circuit, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Lindsey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lindsey-v-union-pacific-railroad-co-idd-2025.