IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BLUEFIELD DIVISION
SHAUN LINDSEY, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-00205 v. ) ) C. CUTRIGHT, ) ) Respondent. )
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Respondent’s “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed on June 5, 2024. (Document No. 6.) By Standing Order, this matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Document No. 3.) PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 22, 2024, Petitioner, acting pro se,1 filed her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Document No. 1.) Petitioner argues that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is incorrectly calculating her time credits pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). (Id.) On the same day, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee. (Document No. 2.) By Order entered on April 24, 2024, the Court ordered that Respondent file an Answer to the allegations contained in the Petitioner’s Petition and show cause, if any, why the Writ of Habeas Corpus sought by the Petitioner in this case should not be granted. (Document No. 4.) On June 5, 204, Respondent filed
1 Because Petitioner is acting pro se, the documents which she has filed in this case are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer, and therefore they are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). a “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” and Memorandum in Support. (Document Nos. 6 and 7.) Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Petition should be denied based on the following: (1) “Petitioner admits she has failed to exhaust administrative remedies in relation to her claim” (Document No. 7, pp. 3 – 4); (2) “The BOP’s calculation of FTC
is discretionary and not reviewable” (Id., pp. 4 – 5); and (3) “Petitioner has received all FTC she is entitled to” (Id., p. 5 – 9). As Exhibits, Respondent attaches the following: (1) The Declaration of Misty Shaw (Document No. 6-1, pp. 2 - 3); (2) A copy of Petitioner’s “Public Information Inmate Data As of 04-30-2024” (Id., pp. 5 – 7); (3) A copy of Petitioner’s “Inmate History ADM- REL” (Id., p. 9); and (4) As copy of Petitioner’s “FSA Time Credit Assessment” (Id., p. 11). By Order and Notice entered on June 6, 2024, the undersigned notified Petitioner of her right to file a Reply to Respondent’s Response. (Document No. 8.) On July 8, 2024, Petitioner filed her Reply. (Document No. 10.) According to the BOP’s website, Petitioner was released from custody on July 17, 2024. ANALYSIS
The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Section 2241 Petition must be dismissed as moot. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that federal Courts may adjudicate only live cases or controversies. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 866, 115 S.Ct. 184, 130 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994). This means that the “litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. In the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, the writ “does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
2 who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1129, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). In this case, by virtue of Petitioner’s release from custody, the Respondent can no longer provide the requested relief. Consequently, the Court can no longer consider Petitioner’s Petition under Section 2241.
An incarcerated convict’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict’s sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole - - some “collateral consequence” of the conviction – must exist if the suit is to be maintained.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BLUEFIELD DIVISION
SHAUN LINDSEY, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-00205 v. ) ) C. CUTRIGHT, ) ) Respondent. )
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Respondent’s “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment,” filed on June 5, 2024. (Document No. 6.) By Standing Order, this matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Document No. 3.) PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 22, 2024, Petitioner, acting pro se,1 filed her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Document No. 1.) Petitioner argues that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is incorrectly calculating her time credits pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). (Id.) On the same day, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee. (Document No. 2.) By Order entered on April 24, 2024, the Court ordered that Respondent file an Answer to the allegations contained in the Petitioner’s Petition and show cause, if any, why the Writ of Habeas Corpus sought by the Petitioner in this case should not be granted. (Document No. 4.) On June 5, 204, Respondent filed
1 Because Petitioner is acting pro se, the documents which she has filed in this case are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer, and therefore they are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). a “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” and Memorandum in Support. (Document Nos. 6 and 7.) Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Petition should be denied based on the following: (1) “Petitioner admits she has failed to exhaust administrative remedies in relation to her claim” (Document No. 7, pp. 3 – 4); (2) “The BOP’s calculation of FTC
is discretionary and not reviewable” (Id., pp. 4 – 5); and (3) “Petitioner has received all FTC she is entitled to” (Id., p. 5 – 9). As Exhibits, Respondent attaches the following: (1) The Declaration of Misty Shaw (Document No. 6-1, pp. 2 - 3); (2) A copy of Petitioner’s “Public Information Inmate Data As of 04-30-2024” (Id., pp. 5 – 7); (3) A copy of Petitioner’s “Inmate History ADM- REL” (Id., p. 9); and (4) As copy of Petitioner’s “FSA Time Credit Assessment” (Id., p. 11). By Order and Notice entered on June 6, 2024, the undersigned notified Petitioner of her right to file a Reply to Respondent’s Response. (Document No. 8.) On July 8, 2024, Petitioner filed her Reply. (Document No. 10.) According to the BOP’s website, Petitioner was released from custody on July 17, 2024. ANALYSIS
The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Section 2241 Petition must be dismissed as moot. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that federal Courts may adjudicate only live cases or controversies. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 866, 115 S.Ct. 184, 130 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994). This means that the “litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. In the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, the writ “does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
2 who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1129, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). In this case, by virtue of Petitioner’s release from custody, the Respondent can no longer provide the requested relief. Consequently, the Court can no longer consider Petitioner’s Petition under Section 2241.
An incarcerated convict’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict’s sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole - - some “collateral consequence” of the conviction – must exist if the suit is to be maintained.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 983, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are rendered moot by virtue of her release from custody and the absence of collateral consequences, and therefore, her Section 2241 Petition must be dismissed. See e.g., Alston v. Adams, 178 Fed.Appx. 295, 2006 WL 1194751 (C.A.4 (Va.)); Alvarez v. Conley, 145 Fed.Appx. 428, 2005 WL 2500659 (C.A.4 (W.Va.); Smithhart v. Gutierrez, 2007 WL 2897942 (N.D.W.Va.). PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION Based upon the foregoing, it is therefore respectfully PROPOSED that the District Court confirm and accept the foregoing factual findings and legal conclusions and RECOMMENDED that the District Court DISMISS Petitioner’s Section 2241 Petition (Document No. 1), DENY as moot Respondent’s “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (Document No. 6), and REMOVE this matter from the Court’s docket. The Petitioner is hereby notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” is hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge David 3 A. Faber. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rule 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days (filing of objections) and three (3) days (if received by mail) from the date of filing of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the portions of the Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause. Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States _v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208, 104 S. Ct. 2395, 81 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Faber, and this Magistrate Judge. The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to Petitioner, who is acting pro se, and counsel of record. ENTER: September 19, 2024.
eB ‘fg Omar J. Aboulhosn & mrs □ LS United States Magistrate Judge