Lindsay Jean Kennerly v. Christian Scott Kennerly (Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court: DR-22-900179).

CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
DecidedJune 14, 2024
DocketCL-2023-0631
StatusPublished

This text of Lindsay Jean Kennerly v. Christian Scott Kennerly (Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court: DR-22-900179). (Lindsay Jean Kennerly v. Christian Scott Kennerly (Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court: DR-22-900179).) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lindsay Jean Kennerly v. Christian Scott Kennerly (Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court: DR-22-900179)., (Ala. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Rel: June 14, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 _________________________

CL-2023-0631 _________________________

Lindsay Jean Kennerly

v.

Christian Scott Kennerly

Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court (DR-22-900179)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

Lindsay Jean Kennerly ("the wife") appeals from a judgment

entered by the Coffee Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing her from

Christian Scott Kennerly ("the husband"). We remand the case.

Following a trial, the trial court entered, on June 23, 2023, a final

judgment of divorce that, among other things, divided the parties' marital CL-2023-0631

property; awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $750

per month for a period of 60 months; and reserved jurisdiction to award

the wife periodic alimony in the future. On appeal, the wife challenges

the trial court's award of alimony and the division of the marital

property. Those awards are interrelated, and we must consider the

entirety of the judgment in determining whether the trial court exceeded

its discretion in making the awards. See Willing v. Willing, 655 So. 2d

1064 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).

Among other arguments, the wife contends that the trial court

erred in awarding her $4,000 of the equity in the parties' marital

residence. Regarding the marital residence, the divorce judgment

provides, in pertinent part:

"4. Division of Real Property: The parties own real property consisting of a house and lot located at ... Enterprise, AL. Said property was purchased in 2020 for $265,000.00 and is subject to a mortgage with an approximate balance of $257,000.00. The husband is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the real property and shall be responsible for and pay promptly when due all indebtedness and expenses thereon, including but not necessarily limited to the existing mortgage, ad valorem property taxes, hazard insurance and the usual and normal maintenance of the home. [The h]usband shall make reasonable efforts to assume the mortgage debt in his name individually. The parties shall cooperate in having all household related accounts, utilities, and deposits transferred into the name of the husband

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individually. The wife is awarded the sum of $4,000.00 for her share of equity in the marital residence. The husband shall pay said amount to the wife within ninety days hereafter."

From the foregoing, the wife posits that the trial court determined that

the marital residence was worth $265,000. The wife further assumes

that the trial court deducted the mortgage balance from the purchase

price to determine the equity in the house as being $8,000 ($265,000 -

$257,000 = $8,000), of which she was awarded 50% ($8,000 x 50% =

$4,000).

The wife argues that the trial court erred in determining that the

marital residence was worth $265,000 at the time of the trial. The parties

provided conflicting testimony and exhibits regarding the value of the

marital residence at the time of the trial, placing the value between

approximately $297,000 and $326,000. The wife maintains that,

consistent with that evidence, the trial court should have found that the

marital residence had a higher value and that the equity in the marital

residence was greater than $8,000. The wife asserts that she should have

been awarded more than $4,000 as her share of the equity based on a

proper valuation of the marital residence.

3 CL-2023-0631

The judgment does not, however, clearly set forth any

determination as to the value of the marital residence. The judgment

recites that the parties purchased the marital residence for $265,000, but

it does not contain any conclusive determination that the marital

residence was worth that same amount at the time of the trial in 2023.

The judgment does not specifically address the parties' testimony as to

the value of the marital residence in 2023, and it also does not set forth

the calculations that the trial court made when awarding the wife $4,000

of the equity in the marital residence. Although both parties testified

that the equity in the marital residence should be split equally, the trial

court was not bound by their apparent agreement to award the wife 50%

of the equity in the marital residence. See Mayer v. Mayer, 628 So. 2d

744, 747 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) ("If a trial court considers an agreement

made in contemplation of divorce, the trial court is not bound by the

agreement and may accept and incorporate such agreement, or reject it

in whole or in part."). Based on its evaluation of the evidence, the trial

court could have valued the marital residence in line with the estimates

and opinions provided by the parties and decided to allocate a smaller

percentage of the equity in the marital residence to the wife; however,

4 CL-2023-0631

based on the lack of any specific explanation for the basis of the award,

we cannot readily ascertain whether it did so.

In Wilson v. Wilson, 93 So. 3d 122, 128-29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011),

this court stated, in pertinent part:

"Generally, in the absence of specific findings of fact, this court will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment. See Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 636 (Ala. 2001). However, when, after reviewing the record and the language of the judgment, this court is unable to determine the precise nature of the factual findings of the trial court as to the classification and value of marital property, thereby inhibiting this court's ability to determine whether a property division is equitable, this court should remand the cause for further clarification from the trial court. See Wilhoite v. Wilhoite, 897 So. 2d 303, 308-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); and Giardina v. Giardina, 987 So. 2d 606, 622-23 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)."

In the present case, because this court cannot discern the value the trial

court assigned to the marital residence or the basis for the $4,000 equity

award to the wife, we cannot determine whether the trial court erred in

making that specific award and, if so, how that error, if any, affected the

overall property division and alimony awards. We therefore remand this

cause to the trial court for it to enter an order specifying the value that

it assigned to the marital residence and explaining how it derived the

5 CL-2023-0631

$4,000 equity award to the wife. The trial court shall make a return to

this court within 21 days of the date of this opinion. See Wilson, supra.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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Related

Ex Parte Fann
810 So. 2d 631 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 2001)
Mayer v. Mayer
628 So. 2d 744 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1993)
Willing v. Willing
655 So. 2d 1064 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1995)
Giardina v. Giardina
987 So. 2d 606 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2008)
Wilhoite v. Wilhoite
897 So. 2d 303 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2004)
Eddie W. Wilson v. Suzanne L. Wilson.
93 So. 3d 122 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2011)

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Lindsay Jean Kennerly v. Christian Scott Kennerly (Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court: DR-22-900179)., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lindsay-jean-kennerly-v-christian-scott-kennerly-appeal-from-coffee-alacivapp-2024.