LINDER v. DEA ADMINISTRATOR
This text of LINDER v. DEA ADMINISTRATOR (LINDER v. DEA ADMINISTRATOR) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DAVID W LINDER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:20-cv-00037-JPH-MJD ) DEA ADMINISTRATOR, ) ) Defendant. )
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT I. Screening Standard Because Plaintiff David Linder is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), the Court must screen his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Under this statute, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any claim within a complaint which “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the amended complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal, [the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015).
II. The Complaint Mr. Linder appears to allege that the DEA has added and removed drugs from a drug schedule in a way that exceeded its promulgation authority. Dkt. 1 at 2–3. He seeks a declaratory judgment that the DEA published incorrect penalties related to drug scheduling, and an order requiring the DEA to publish a correction in the Federal Register. Id. at 2. III. Discussion of Claims Mr. Linder appears to be challenging an underlying conviction or sentence. However, such a challenge is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which bars a civil judgment in a plaintiff’s favor if that judgment
would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence: In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held (so far as relates to this case) that a person who has been convicted of a crime cannot seek damages or other relief under federal law (as in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)) for violation of his rights by officers who participated in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge, if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff [in the civil suit] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’
Hill v. Murphy, 785 F.3d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). It appears from Mr. Linder’s complaint that he believes he was sentenced based on a misunderstanding of a drug schedule or according to a drug schedule that was improperly promulgated. Dkt. 1 at 3. A judgment declaring such a schedule unlawful would thus imply that his sentence is invalid. Cf Ward v. Akpore, 702 Fed. App’x 467, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore, to proceed in this case, Mr. Linder must first show that he has successfully challenged his underlying conviction or sentence. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004). The complaint does not allege that he has done so. If Mr. Linder believes that his conviction or sentence is invalid, but he has not raised a successful challenge, he must raise his claim in a habeas action. See id. at 750-51. To the extent that Mr. Linder is attempting to bring this claim on behalf of others, he does not have standing to do so. See Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A] named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing his action on behalf of others who suffered injury which would have afforded them standing had they been named plaintiffs ... .”). Mr. Linder’s complaint therefore must be dismissed. He SHALL HAVE through May 4, 2020 to file an amended complaint or show cause why this case should not be dismissed. If Mr. Linder does not do so, the Court will dismiss this case without prejudice without further notice. SO ORDERED. Date: 3/19/2020 wend Pate 1 James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
DAVID W LINDER 25913-048 TERRE HAUTE - FCI TERRE HAUTE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION Inmate Mail/Parcels P.O. BOX 33 TERRE HAUTE, IN 47808
^ Date upper left ^ Judge stamp upper left
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
LINDER v. DEA ADMINISTRATOR, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/linder-v-dea-administrator-insd-2020.