Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.
This appeal is from a judgment dismissing appellant Jennifer Linder’s suit on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Linder contends that the court erred in dismissing her claim because the case had been transferred from chancery court where it had been inadvertently but timely filed. The appellees, Dan Howard and Travis Howard, respond that the trial court was correct in dismissing the suit and also request that we affirm in light of Linder’s failure to adhere to the proscriptions of Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Linder’s abstract falls considerably short of the requirements of Rule 9, it is not “flagrantly” deficient. Rule 9(e)(2). Because Linder’s suit was filed in chancery court before expiration of the applicable limitations period, and because the chancery court was directed by statute to transfer the action to the proper forum, i.e., circuit court, the circuit court judge erred in dismissing the suit. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for trial.
The underlying action arose out of an automobile accident occurring on May 17,1983. Linder was seventeen years old at the time of the accident and turned eighteen on October 15, 1983. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-25-101 and 16-56-116 (1987), Linder had until October 15,1986, to file an action in connection with her injuries from the automobile accident. Linder’s complaint was filed in chancery court on October 14, 1986. Subsequently, after the limitations period had expired, Linder filed a motion in chancery court which acknowledged that the suit had not been filed in the proper forum and requested that the case be transferred to circuit court. The Howards responded with a motion to dismiss.
On February 25,1987, the chancellor transferred the case to circuit court — presumably pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-401 and 16-57-104(a) (1987). Section 16-57-104(a) provides:
An error of the plaintiff as to the kind of proceedings adopted shall not cause the abatement or dismissal of the action, but merely a change into the proper proceedings by an amendment in the pleadings, and a transfer of the action to the proper docket.
Upon transfer of the case, the Howards filed an answer in circuit court which raised the statute of limitations issue and requested that the suit be dismissed. A motion for summary judgment filed on identical grounds was granted by the circuit court which relied upon our decision in Erwin, Inc. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 261 Ark. 537, 550 S.W.2d 174 (1977).
In Erwin we held that the proper commencement of an action tolls the running of the statute of limitations. Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the clerk of the proper court, and the reporter’s note to Rule 3 states that the term “proper court” means one which has jurisdiction of the subject matter. Here, the trial judge determined that the filing of Linder’s suit in chancery court did not constitute the “proper” commencement of an action so as to toll the statute of limitations. Because the applicable limitations period had expired prior to the transfer to circuit court, the trial judge concluded that the suit was barred. We disagree.
The parties do not dispute the propriety of a transfer from chancery to circuit court in cases where a plaintiff has filed in the wrong forum. In fact, we have held that a motion to dismiss by the defendant in such cases should be treated by the court as a motion to transfer. Meeks v. Arkansas Light & Power Co., 147 Ark. 232, 227 S.W. 405 (1921). The crux of this appeal is the effect to be given to section 16-57-104(a), the transfer statute, when an action has been timely filed in the wrong forum and transfer of the case to the proper court necessarily occurs after the running of the limitations period.
We adhere to our language in Erwin, supra, that the proper commencement of an action tolls the running of the statute of limitations. In other jurisdictions, the corollary of our position in Erwin is that the commencement of an action in a court which lacks jurisdiction will not toll the statute of limitations. Star-Kist Foods v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 586 F. Supp. 252 (N.D.Ill. 1984). However, as noted in Star-Kist Foods (citing Herb v. Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117 [1944]), there is an exception. When the court lacking subject matter jurisdiction has, by statute, authority to transfer the action to a court of competent jurisdiction, timely filing of the suit in the first court tolls the statute.
In Phillips v. Catts, 220 Ala. 332, 124 So. 884 (1929), the Alabama court in a well reasoned opinion dealt with the same issue and a code provision similar to section 16-57-104(a). The court found:
Defendant, appellant, takes the position that the filing of the bill in chancery, though for the same cause of action, did not interrupt the running of the statute of limitation. Defendant is in error as to this. The real and only reason for the enactment of section 6486 of the Code [the transfer statute], to which we have referred above, was to intercept the running of the statute in the event the plaintiff, misconceiving his remedy, brings his action in the wrong forum, that is, sues in equity, whereas an action at law would be proper and necessary, or vice versa.
The same is true in this case. The General Assembly’s obvious intent in enacting section 16-57-104(a) is that a plaintiffs error in filing proceedings in an improper court should be corrected merely by transferring the proceedings to the proper court. The statute clearly expresses that such an error or mistake on the plaintiffs part should not cause his or her action to abate or be dismissed. Pursuant to section 16-57-104(a) the chancery court had the authority and the duty to transfer Linder’s suit to circuit court. The filing of the action in chancery court — albeit in the wrong forum — was timely and served to intercept and toll the statute of limitations.
Section 16-57-104(a) is compatible with Arkansas’s savings statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-126 (1987), which we recently discussed in Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 295 Ark. 126, 747 S.W.2d 93 (1988). Section 16-56-126, in part, provides:
If any action is commenced within the time respectively prescribed in this act, in §§ 16-116-101 — 16-116-107, in §§ 16-114-201 — 16-114-209, or in any other act, and the plaintiff therein suffers a nonsuit, or after a verdict for him the judgment is arrested, or after judgment for him the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one (1) year after the nonsuit suffered or judgment arrested or reversed. [Emphasis ours.]
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Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.
This appeal is from a judgment dismissing appellant Jennifer Linder’s suit on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Linder contends that the court erred in dismissing her claim because the case had been transferred from chancery court where it had been inadvertently but timely filed. The appellees, Dan Howard and Travis Howard, respond that the trial court was correct in dismissing the suit and also request that we affirm in light of Linder’s failure to adhere to the proscriptions of Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Linder’s abstract falls considerably short of the requirements of Rule 9, it is not “flagrantly” deficient. Rule 9(e)(2). Because Linder’s suit was filed in chancery court before expiration of the applicable limitations period, and because the chancery court was directed by statute to transfer the action to the proper forum, i.e., circuit court, the circuit court judge erred in dismissing the suit. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for trial.
The underlying action arose out of an automobile accident occurring on May 17,1983. Linder was seventeen years old at the time of the accident and turned eighteen on October 15, 1983. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-25-101 and 16-56-116 (1987), Linder had until October 15,1986, to file an action in connection with her injuries from the automobile accident. Linder’s complaint was filed in chancery court on October 14, 1986. Subsequently, after the limitations period had expired, Linder filed a motion in chancery court which acknowledged that the suit had not been filed in the proper forum and requested that the case be transferred to circuit court. The Howards responded with a motion to dismiss.
On February 25,1987, the chancellor transferred the case to circuit court — presumably pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-401 and 16-57-104(a) (1987). Section 16-57-104(a) provides:
An error of the plaintiff as to the kind of proceedings adopted shall not cause the abatement or dismissal of the action, but merely a change into the proper proceedings by an amendment in the pleadings, and a transfer of the action to the proper docket.
Upon transfer of the case, the Howards filed an answer in circuit court which raised the statute of limitations issue and requested that the suit be dismissed. A motion for summary judgment filed on identical grounds was granted by the circuit court which relied upon our decision in Erwin, Inc. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 261 Ark. 537, 550 S.W.2d 174 (1977).
In Erwin we held that the proper commencement of an action tolls the running of the statute of limitations. Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the clerk of the proper court, and the reporter’s note to Rule 3 states that the term “proper court” means one which has jurisdiction of the subject matter. Here, the trial judge determined that the filing of Linder’s suit in chancery court did not constitute the “proper” commencement of an action so as to toll the statute of limitations. Because the applicable limitations period had expired prior to the transfer to circuit court, the trial judge concluded that the suit was barred. We disagree.
The parties do not dispute the propriety of a transfer from chancery to circuit court in cases where a plaintiff has filed in the wrong forum. In fact, we have held that a motion to dismiss by the defendant in such cases should be treated by the court as a motion to transfer. Meeks v. Arkansas Light & Power Co., 147 Ark. 232, 227 S.W. 405 (1921). The crux of this appeal is the effect to be given to section 16-57-104(a), the transfer statute, when an action has been timely filed in the wrong forum and transfer of the case to the proper court necessarily occurs after the running of the limitations period.
We adhere to our language in Erwin, supra, that the proper commencement of an action tolls the running of the statute of limitations. In other jurisdictions, the corollary of our position in Erwin is that the commencement of an action in a court which lacks jurisdiction will not toll the statute of limitations. Star-Kist Foods v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 586 F. Supp. 252 (N.D.Ill. 1984). However, as noted in Star-Kist Foods (citing Herb v. Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117 [1944]), there is an exception. When the court lacking subject matter jurisdiction has, by statute, authority to transfer the action to a court of competent jurisdiction, timely filing of the suit in the first court tolls the statute.
In Phillips v. Catts, 220 Ala. 332, 124 So. 884 (1929), the Alabama court in a well reasoned opinion dealt with the same issue and a code provision similar to section 16-57-104(a). The court found:
Defendant, appellant, takes the position that the filing of the bill in chancery, though for the same cause of action, did not interrupt the running of the statute of limitation. Defendant is in error as to this. The real and only reason for the enactment of section 6486 of the Code [the transfer statute], to which we have referred above, was to intercept the running of the statute in the event the plaintiff, misconceiving his remedy, brings his action in the wrong forum, that is, sues in equity, whereas an action at law would be proper and necessary, or vice versa.
The same is true in this case. The General Assembly’s obvious intent in enacting section 16-57-104(a) is that a plaintiffs error in filing proceedings in an improper court should be corrected merely by transferring the proceedings to the proper court. The statute clearly expresses that such an error or mistake on the plaintiffs part should not cause his or her action to abate or be dismissed. Pursuant to section 16-57-104(a) the chancery court had the authority and the duty to transfer Linder’s suit to circuit court. The filing of the action in chancery court — albeit in the wrong forum — was timely and served to intercept and toll the statute of limitations.
Section 16-57-104(a) is compatible with Arkansas’s savings statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-126 (1987), which we recently discussed in Carton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 295 Ark. 126, 747 S.W.2d 93 (1988). Section 16-56-126, in part, provides:
If any action is commenced within the time respectively prescribed in this act, in §§ 16-116-101 — 16-116-107, in §§ 16-114-201 — 16-114-209, or in any other act, and the plaintiff therein suffers a nonsuit, or after a verdict for him the judgment is arrested, or after judgment for him the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one (1) year after the nonsuit suffered or judgment arrested or reversed. [Emphasis ours.]
In Carton, we held that section 16-56-126 permits a plaintiff who commences a suit within the applicable statute of limitations, which suit is subsequently dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, to refile the action within the period of the “savings statute.” While Carton involved a nonsuit, we noted that for the purposes of the savings statute a dismissal on defendant’s motion is the same as a nonsuit. The only difference between Carton and the present case is that here the chancery court transferred the action to circuit court — the proper forum. In Carton, the plaintiff nonsuited her tort action in federal court, which had no subject matter jurisdiction, and later refiled her action in the state court, which did have subject matter jurisdiction.
If we were to accept the appellees’ arguments as concerns the holding in Erwin and the language of Rule 3, we would be required to hold that a plaintiff’s action would be barred if the court which had no jurisdiction transferred the proceeding to the proper court as mandated by section 16-57-104(a); whereas if the court dismissed plaintiff’s action for want of jurisdiction, or plaintiff nonsuited for the same reason, plaintiff could avail himself of the savings statute which permits him one year to commence a new action. Obviously, such an inconsistency cannot prevail. Savings statutes and provisions that provide for transfers between our chancery and circuit courts are remedial in nature. They reflect the legislature’s intent to protect those who, although having filed an action in good faith and in a timely manner, would suffer a complete loss of relief on the merits because of a procedural defect.
Rule 3 provides for the commencement of an action and contemplates the filing of a suit in the court of proper jurisdiction; section 16-57-104(a) provides for a fair and just remedy, i.e., transfer, when the suit has been commenced in the wrong court, and the fact that a particular limitations period expires after filing of the suit but before completion of the transfer process should not be viewed in a manner which would elevate the form of Rule 3 over the substance of section 16-57-104(a). In light of the foregoing, we find that the circuit court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
Newbern, J., concurs. Hays, J., dissents.