Linda W. v. Frank T.

2004 NY Slip Op 51657(U)
CourtNew York Family Court, Suffolk County
DecidedJuly 19, 2004
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2004 NY Slip Op 51657(U) (Linda W. v. Frank T.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Family Court, Suffolk County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Linda W. v. Frank T., 2004 NY Slip Op 51657(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

Linda W. v Frank T. (2004 NY Slip Op 51657(U)) [*1]
Linda W. v Frank T.
2004 NY Slip Op 51657(U)
Decided on July 19, 2004
Family Court, Suffolk County
Simeone, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on July 19, 2004
Family Court, Suffolk County


LINDA W., Petitioner,

against

FRANK T., Respondent.




V-13130-03A

Petitioner's AttorneyRespondent's AttorneyLaw Guardian

Edward Emanuel, Esq. Paul DeJesse Jr., Esq.Jane Bernstein, Esq.

300 Old Country Rd.500 Montauk Hwy., Suite NLaw Guardian Bureau

Mineola, NY West Islip, NY 11795400 Carleton Ave.

Central Islip, NY 11722

Ettore A. Simeone, J.

This litigation involves these parents and their ten year old son Matthew. In this proceeding, each party is seeking to modify the existing order of custody that was entered by Honorable Bruce Cozzens, Jr. on February 6, 1998 and for this court to find the other in contempt of court. The current order awards the parents joint legal custody with shared parenting time. The father had Matthew commencing at 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday of each week, and continuing through until 4:00 p.m. on Friday of each week, except that on alternate weeks, such physical possession shall extend to Saturday at 10:00 a.m. In addition, the father shall have physical possession of Matthew at 10:00 a.m. on Sunday of each week and continuing through and until 10:00 a.m. on Monday of each week. The mother shall have physical possession of Matthew at all other times. The parties' were permitted to adjust their schedules accordingly with the consent of the other, and did so in 1999 and again in 2001. The order also made provisions for holidays.

In support their respective petitions, each party accuses the other of making numerous unilateral decisions involving Matthew in direct contradiction to the terms of the parties' Divorce Judgment. Further, each claim that Matthew's needs would be best met if he resided with them, respectively.

This Court conducted a thirteen day trial to determine the validity of the allegations contained within all of the petitions. Upon the conclusion of said trial, the mother argued that it would be in the child's best interest to award her residential custody of Matthew . She said that she has been the primary caretaker of Matthew since birth and has dedicated her life to him. The mother argues that she would continue to encourage and facilitate the respondent's relationship with Matthew, but fears that the respondent would not do the same if he were granted custody.

The father contends that it would be in Matthew's best interest to award residential custody to him. He avers that Matthew needs his father and that they have a closer emotional [*2]bond than Matthew does with his mother. He also expressed concerns about the mother facilitating a relationship between the respondent and Matthew if awarded custody.

The Law Guardian's position is that it is in Matthew's best interest to reside with his mother. The Law Guardian argues that although both parents have a wonderful and loving relationship with Matthew, the father would impede the relationship between Matthew and his mother. The Law Guardian recommends that the father be granted liberal visitation to maintain his strong relationship with Matthew.

Upon having heard the testimony and reviewing the applicable law, this Court determines a follows:

LAW

The petitioning party seeking a change of custody must show a sufficient change in circumstances reflecting a real need for change in order to insure the continued best interest of the child (see, Carnrike v. Kasson, 291 AD2d 680 (3d Dept. 2002); see also, Fox v. Fox, 177 AD2d 209 (4th Dept. 1992)). In determining the best interest of the child where a change of custody is sought, the court considers such factors as the original placement of the child, the length of that placement, relative fitness of parents, quality of home environment, parental guidance given to the child, parents' financial status, and parents' ability to provide for the child's emotional and intellectual development (Dr. Santoro v. Dr. Santoro, 638 NYS2d 4789 (2d Dept. 1996)). Custody of children should be established on a long term basis, wherever possible; children should not be shuttled back and forth between divorced parents merely because of changes in marital status, economic circumstances or improvements in moral or psychological adjustment, at least so long as the custodial parent has not been shown to be unfit, or perhaps less fit, to continue as the proper custodian (Matter of Lang v. Lang, 9 AD2d 401, 409, affd 7 NY2d 1029 (1st Dept. 1959); see also, Matter of Wout v. Wout, 32 AD2d 709 (3d Dept. 1969)).

The court should also consider the effect that an award of custody to one parent might have on the child's relationship with the other parent (J.F. v. L.F., 694 NYS2d 592 (NY Family Court 1999)). "Interference with the relationship between a child and a noncustodial parent by the custodial parent has been said to be an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to per se raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent." (In the Matter of Carl J.B. v. Dorothy T., 186 AD2d 736 (2d Dept. 1992)).

It is important for the court to consider the desires of the child. While not determinative, the child's expressed preference is some indication of what is in the child's best interests. Of course, in weighing this factor, the court must consider the age and maturity of the child and the potential for influence having been exerted on the child (see, Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 (1982)).

The court should also be reluctant to separate siblings, and thus sibling relationships will not be disrupted where there is no overwhelming need to do so (see, Eschbach v. Eschbach, supra . at 173; Salerno v. Salerno, 273 AD2d 818 (4th Dept. 2000).

Where the court appoints a forensic psychologist, that expert's opinion is a factor for the court to consider, but that opinion is not determinative (see, Matter of Aldrich v. Aldrich, 263 AD2d 579 ( 3rd Dept. 1999 )). The Family Court would be seriously remiss if it delegated its fact finding role and ultimate determination to the psychologist (see, Matter of Betancourt v. Boughton, 204 AD2d 804 (3rd Dept. 1994)). [*3]

FACTS

Linda T., the respondent's current wife, testified that she met the respondent and was engaged on December 24, 2000. The two have lived together since March 2002 and were married October 5, 2002. She and the respondent own a four bedroom high ranch in West Islip. The two live with her two children from her first marriage and her stepson Matthew, the subject child. She is employed as an accountant.

Mrs.T. expressed a sincere affection for Matthew and described him as "a ray of sunshine". Although she loves Matthew and seems fully involved in his life, Mrs. T. stated she would never try to replace his mother.

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Related

Lang v. Lang
166 N.E.2d 861 (New York Court of Appeals, 1960)
Eschbach v. Eschbach
436 N.E.2d 1260 (New York Court of Appeals, 1982)
Lang v. Lang
9 A.D.2d 401 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1959)
Wout v. Wout
32 A.D.2d 709 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1969)
Fox v. Fox
177 A.D.2d 209 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1992)
Carl J. B. v. Dorothy T.
186 A.D.2d 736 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1992)
Betancourt v. Boughton
204 A.D.2d 804 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
Aldrich v. Aldrich
263 A.D.2d 579 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1999)
Salerno v. Salerno
273 A.D.2d 818 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)
Carnrike v. Kasson
291 A.D.2d 680 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2002)
J. F. v. L. F.
181 Misc. 2d 722 (NYC Family Court, 1999)

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2004 NY Slip Op 51657(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/linda-w-v-frank-t-nyfamctsuffolk-2004.