Linda Henderson v. Altura Realty LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 7, 2023
• Docket: 05-21-00860-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 7, 2023

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00860-CV

LINDA HENDERSON, Appellant V. ALTURA REALTY LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-03582-E

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Garcia, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Miskel Linda Henderson, pro se,1 appeals the county court’s default judgment in

favor of Altura Realty LLC in a forcible-detainer action for possession of a property

located on Kensington Drive in DeSoto, Texas. Henderson raises two issues2 on

appeal arguing the county court erred because: (1) the justice court did not have

1 A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney. Henderson v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 05-19-01258-CV, 2021 WL 1186149-CV, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Id. 2 In the “Issues Presented” section of her brief, Henderson lists three separate issues. However, in the “Arguments” section, she combines the second and third issues into a single issue and argument. subject-matter jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer action and therefore, the county

court also lacked jurisdiction; and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to establish

Altura Realty’s status as a holder of the note. We conclude there is subject-matter

jurisdiction and the evidence is legally sufficient. The county court’s default

judgment is affirmed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Altura Realty acquired the property from Freedom Mortgage Corporation

through a foreclosure sale. Through its legal counsel, Altura Realty sent Henderson

written notice to vacate and demand for possession of the property.

After Henderson refused to vacate, Altura Realty filed a verified original

petition for forcible detainer in the justice court (trial court cause no. JE-2101112G).

After a default bench trial, the justice of the peace signed a judgment in favor of

Altura Realty for possession of the property and noted that Henderson had failed to

answer or deny the suit. Henderson appealed the justice court’s judgment to the

county court (trial court cause no. CC-21-03582-E) for a trial de novo.3

Altura Realty filed the following documents as evidence: (1) Dallas Central

Appraisal District documents related to the property; (2) a special or limited

warranty deed whereby Freedom Mortgage conveyed the property to Altura Realty;

(3) a notice to vacate sent from Altura Realty’s legal counsel by certified mail to

3 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c).

–2– Henderson; (4) a COVID notice of possible eviction; and (5) a report related to

attorney’s fees. Henderson failed to appear at a dispositive setting and the county

court judge signed a default judgment awarding Altura Realty possession of the

property and attorney’s fees.4

Henderson filed a motion to set aside the default judgment arguing she did not

file an answer because she was not properly served with citation, she did not receive

notice of the trial, and she has a meritorious defense because Altura Realty did not

have a contractual agreement with her. The county court held a hearing on

Henderson’s motion, and according to Henderson, denied it.5

A writ of possession issued.

II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION In issue one, Henderson argues the justice court did not have subject-matter

jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer action and therefore, the county court also

lacked jurisdiction. She contends that Altura Realty did not acquire the property

through a legal sale and therefore, the issue of the title to the real property is

intertwined with the issue of possession.

4 The record does not contain a reporter’s record of the trial in the county court. 5 The record does not contain a reporter’s record of the hearing on Henderson’s motion to set aside the default judgment or an order denying the motion. However, in her notice of appeal, Henderson states that a hearing occurred, and during that hearing, the county court denied her motion. –3– A. Standard of Review Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a

case and is never presumed. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d

440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power

to decide a case and presents a question of law that courts must review de novo. See

City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013).

When determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists in a forcible-

detainer action, an appellate court focuses first on the plaintiff’s petition to determine

whether the facts pleaded affirmatively demonstrate that jurisdiction exists. See

Sosa v. Garcia, No. 01-13-01033-CV, 2015 WL 545529, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Feb. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d

639, 642 (Tex. 2007) and Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). An appellate court must examine the pleadings, taking as

true the facts pleaded, and determine whether those facts support jurisdiction in the

trial court. See Sosa, 2015 WL 545529, at *1. The appellate court will construe the

pleadings in favor of the pleader. See id. To defeat the trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction in a forcible-detainer action, the defendant must provide specific

evidence of a genuine title dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate

possession. In re Catapult Realty Capital, L.L.C., No. 05-19-01056-CV, 2020 WL

831611, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 20 2020, orig. proceeding and no pet.) (mem.

op.) (combined orig. proceeding and appeal).

–4– A. Applicable Law District courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction to determine title to real

property. In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL 831611, at *7 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE

ANN. § 26.043). However, jurisdiction over a forcible-detainer action is given to a

justice court in the precinct where the property is located. See GOV’T § 27.031(a)(2);

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(b); In re Catapult Realty,

2020 WL 831611, at *7; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.084

(forcible entry and detainer suits). The justice court’s judgment in an eviction case

may be appealed for a trial de novo in the county court. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

510.10(c); In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL 831611, at *7. Notwithstanding the grant

of general jurisdiction to a county court, in an appeal of a forcible-detainer judgment,

the county court’s jurisdiction extends only as far as the justice court’s jurisdiction.

In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL 831611, at *7.

However, rule 510.3(e) specifies that the only issue the justice or county

courts may adjudicate is the right to possession, not title, and any counterclaims and

joinder of suits against third parties must be brought in a separate suit in a court of

proper jurisdiction. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood

Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tex. 2013); In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL

831611, at *7. As a result, in most cases, when there are issues of title and right to

immediate possession, the issues may be litigated in separate proceedings in

different courts with appropriate jurisdiction. In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL

–5– 831611, at *6. Because a forcible-detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative,

of any other remedy that a party may have, the displaced party is entitled to bring a

separate suit in the district court to determine the question of title. Id. at *7. As a

result, justice and county courts may adjudicate possession when issues related to

the title of real property are tangentially or collaterally related to possession. Id.

When there are grounds for determining immediate possession independent

from title, the justice court and county court will have jurisdiction to hear the

forcible-detainer action. Id. Not only can the right to immediate possession be

determined separately from the right to title, but the Texas Legislature purposely

established just such a system. Id. Challenges to the validity of a foreclosure sale

do not deprive the justice court or county court of jurisdiction. Id. However, when

the right to immediate possession necessarily requires the resolution of a title

dispute, the justice court, and consequently the county court, have no jurisdiction to

enter a judgment and the case must be dismissed. Id. at *8.

B. Courts Had Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Forcible-Detainer Action In its petition for forcible detainer, Altura Realty alleged that it purchased the

property in a foreclosure sale, sent Henderson a written notice to vacate, and

Henderson was a holdover tenant. Taking as true the facts pleaded by Altura Realty

and construing them in its favor, we conclude these allegations are sufficient to

support subject-matter jurisdiction in the justice and county courts. See Sosa, 2015

WL 545529, at *1.

–6– In addition, the record does not contain any pleadings or evidence challenging

these alleged facts—Henderson did not answer or appear in this suit at the justice

court or the county court prior to judgment being rendered against her in either court.

Nor does Henderson contend that there was a suit to quiet title pending in the district

court at the time the forcible detainer action was pending in the justice and county

courts. She did not plead any dispute involving title to real property. In order to

defeat jurisdiction, it was Henderson’s burden to provide specific evidence of a

genuine title dispute intertwined with the issue of possession. See generally In re

Catapult Realty, 2020 WL 831611, at *8.

Further, Henderson failed to request or file a reporter’s record in this appeal,

and the county court judge did not file written findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Accordingly, we must presume the evidence presented supported the county

court’s default judgment, and its implicit finding that the resolution of title was not

required for a determination of the right to immediate possession. See Henderson v.

Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 05-19-01258-CV, 2021 WL 1186149-CV, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Nothing in the record on appeal supports Henderson’s assertion that a title

dispute was pending at the time the justice and county courts considered the forcible

detainer action or that the existence of a title dispute was ever presented to the justice

or county courts. Thus, the record does not support that the issue of title to the real

–7– property is intertwined with the issue of possession. Accordingly, we conclude the

justice and county courts had subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue one is decided against Henderson.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE In issue two, Henderson argues the evidence is legally insufficient to establish

Altura Realty’s status as a holder of the note.6 She contends there is no evidence

Freedom Mortgage transferred the note to Altura Realty.

A. Standard of Review Evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding when: (1) the record bears

no evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from

giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence

offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence

conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Shields Ltd. P’ship v.

Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017); Lua v. Capital Plus Fin., LLC, 646

S.W.3d 622, 632 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied). When determining whether

legally sufficient evidence supports a finding, an appellate court must consider

evidence favorable to the finding if the factfinder could reasonably do so and

disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not.

6 In her briefing, Henderson argues there is “no evidence” and that “[Altura Realty] failed to demonstrate its status as a holder.” Also, Henderson prays that this Court grant her reentry onto the property and $2 million in damages. As a result, we liberally construe Henderson’s complaint as a legal sufficiency challenge and a request that we render judgment in her favor. See Scott Pelley P.C. v. Wynne, No. 05-15- 01560-CV, 2017 WL 3699823, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). –8– Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 480; Lua, 646 S.W.3d 622, 632. Further, the sufficiency of

the evidence to support a default judgment can be challenged even though the

challenging party is not entitled to have the default set aside under Craddock v.

Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939). See In re Marriage of

Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022).

In an appeal from a bench trial where neither party has requested findings of

fact and conclusions of law, the trial court’s implied findings are reviewable for legal

and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 480; D’Olivio v.

Hutson, No. 05-20-01118-CV, 2022 WL 2980706, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July

28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). However, when there is no reporter’s record and

findings of fact and conclusions of law are not requested or filed, the judgment of

the trial court implies all necessary findings of fact to support the judgment.

Henderson, 2021 WL 1186149-CV, at *2. In other words, an appellate court must

presume the missing reporter’s record supports the decisions of the trial court. Id.

B. Applicable Law Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code authorizes a suit for forcible detainer

to obtain possession of real property from a tenant who refuses to surrender

possession. See PROP. §§ 24.001–.011. A forcible-detainer action is a procedure to

determine the right to immediate possession of real property. In re Catapult Realty,

2020 WL 831611, at *7 n.20. It is a special proceeding governed by the Texas

Property Code and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See PROP. §§ 24.001–24.011;

–9– TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.1–510.13; In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL 831611, at *7 n.20;

see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.084 (forcible entry and detainer suits). Forcible-

detainer actions are intended to be a summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy for

resolving the question of who is entitled to immediate possession of real property.

See Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919; In re Catapult Realty, 2020 WL 831611, at *7

n.20.

To establish a superior right to immediate possession, the person entitled to

possession has the burden to prove: (1) it owns the property; (2) the person who

refuses to surrender possession is a tenant at will, tenant at sufferance, or a tenant or

subtenant willfully holding over after the termination of the tenant’s right of

possession; (3) the person entitled to possession gave proper notice to vacate the

premises to the person refusing to surrender possession; and (4) the person refusing

to surrender possession refused to vacate the premises. Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 478;

Lua, 646 S.W.3d at 632; PROP. § 24.002. A plaintiff is not required to prove title,

but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a

superior right to immediate possession. See Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).

A judgment in a forcible detainer action is a final determination only of the

right to immediate possession; it is not a final determination of whether the eviction

is wrongful or whether the tenant’s continued possession was a trespass. See

Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919.

–10– C. Evidence is Legally Sufficient The record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s record. Nor does it contain

a statement from the court reporter that the proceedings were not recorded, or that

the record was lost or destroyed. In her docketing statement, Henderson stated that

there is no reporter’s record, she did not request a reporter’s record, the reporter’s

record was not digitally recorded, and she did not make payment arrangements with

the court reporter. The county court’s default judgment suggests that there was a

trial in the county court because it recites that “[Altura Realty] appeared through its

attorney of record. [Henderson], although duly cited to appear, failed to appear at a

dispositive setting as require by law.”7 And this is supported by the county court’s

docket sheet which reflects the case was tried before the county court.

Further, we note that the default judgment states that the county court judge

“considered the pleadings, official records, and other evidence on file.” The day

before the county court trial, Altura Realty filed “evidence” that included a special

or limited warranty deed whereby Freedom Mortgage conveyed the property to

Altura Realty.

7 It has long been a cardinal rule of appellate procedure in Texas that an appellate court must indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of proceedings and documents in the trial court. See Drake v. Walker, No. 05-14-00355-CV, 2015 WL 2160565, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). The presumption of regularity is a judicial construct that requires a reviewing court, absent evidence of impropriety, to indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of the trial court’s judgment. See id. Therefore, an appellate court must uphold the presumption of regularity of the judgment and the proceedings absent a showing to the contrary. See id. The burden is on the complaining party to overcome this presumption. See id. However, the presumption of regularity applies only when the record is silent or ambiguous and, even then, only to reasonable presumptions. Diamond Offshore Servs. Ltd. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. 2018). –11– Henderson has failed to request or file a reporter’s record in this appeal. And

the county court judge did not file written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Accordingly, we must presume the evidence supports the county court’s default

judgment. See Henderson, 2021 WL 1186149-CV, at *2. As a result, we conclude

the evidence is legally sufficient to establish Altura Realty’s status as a holder of the

note.

Issue two is decided against Henderson.

IV. CONCLUSION The justice and county courts had subject-jurisdiction over the forcible

detainer action and the evidence is legally sufficient to support the county court’s

default judgment.

The county court’s default judgment is affirmed.8

/Emily Miskel/ 210860f.p05 EMILY MISKEL JUSTICE

8 We affirm the judgment as to Henderson and all other occupants.

–12– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

LINDA HENDERSON, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-21-00860-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-03582- E. ALTURA REALTY LLC, Appellee Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel. Justices Carlyle and Garcia participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee ALTURA REALTY LLC recover its costs of this appeal and the full amount of the trial court’s judgment from appellant LINDA HENDERSON and from any supersedeas bond or cash deposit in lieu of supersedeas bond.

After all costs have been paid, we DIRECT the clerk of the county court to release the balance, if any, of any cash deposit to the person who made the deposit.

Judgment entered this 7th day of June, 2023.

–13–