DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
LINDA FRIEDEL,
Appellant,
v.
ELIZABETH EDWARDS,
Appellee.
No. 2D20-2233
September 29, 2021
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Alane Laboda, Judge.
Alexander Brockmeyer, Molly Brockmeyer and Mark Boyle of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
Jesse R. Butler of Dickinson & Gibbons, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.
LUCAS, Judge.
Elizabeth Edwards was involved in a car accident with Linda
Friedel on December 1, 2015. Ms. Friedel filed a negligence
complaint against Ms. Edwards in the Lee County Circuit Court. The lawsuit, however, was not filed until February 15, 2019; and as
it happened, Ms. Edwards had passed away some three months
earlier.
On December 17, 2019, the circuit court entered an order
removing the now-deceased Ms. Edwards and substituting Scott
Kuhn, Esq., as the personal representative for the Estate of
Elizabeth Edwards (Estate). According to the court's order, Mr.
Kuhn agreed to accept service on behalf of the estate and respond
to Ms. Friedel's complaint within twenty days of service.
The Estate eventually moved to dismiss the complaint,
asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action. Its argument ran as follows: since the complaint named a
deceased person as the defendant, and since an action cannot
proceed against a deceased person, the complaint was a "legal
nullity," and, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to proceed
upon it. Furthermore, the Estate maintained, Ms. Friedel's
complaint could not be amended and relate back to the original
filing because "th[e] action was and is invalid, . . . . the four-year
time limit in which to bring this action has expired[, and] [t]he court
in Staines[ v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 239 So. 3d 164 (Fla. 1st
2 DCA 2018),] held that without jurisdiction, no basis existed in
which the relation back doctrine could apply."1 Thus, according to
the Estate, Ms. Friedel was barred from seeking recovery on her
negligence claim.
The circuit court agreed and entered an order deeming "the
Complaint void as a matter of law" in that it failed to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Because the statute of limitations had
run, and the relation back provision of Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.190(c) "was inapplicable," the court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
Ms. Friedel has brought this timely appeal.
We review a circuit court's determination of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. See Artz ex rel. Artz v. City of Tampa, 102 So.
3d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Whether a proposed amended
complaint should be permitted and whether it should relate back to
a prior filing under rule 1.190(c) is reviewed for an abuse of
1 See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) ("When the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original pleading.").
3 discretion. See Bosco v. Glob. Props. of Naples, LLC, 319 So. 3d
181, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Est. of Eisen v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
126 So. 3d 323, 327, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). In both respects, the
circuit court erred.
First, the complaint that was filed was not a "legal nullity." To
the contrary, Ms. Friedel asserted a tried-and-true cause of action
in negligence, alleged a sufficient amount in controversy for the
circuit court's jurisdiction, detailed sufficient factual allegations to
satisfy our state's fact pleading standard, and included a demand
for judgment. That is all that is required to begin a negligence
lawsuit. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). "The pleading threshold to
invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court when the
complaint is one for money damages is not high." Foley v. Wilson,
126 So. 3d 340, 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). It may have been
improper to name the late Ms. Edwards personally as a party
defendant in the initial complaint, but a factual discrepancy of that
nature does not render a pleading "void ab initio" any more than if
the evidence were to show that Ms. Edwards had not, in fact, been
negligent, or that Ms. Friedel's damages had not, in fact, arisen to
the circuit court's jurisdictional threshold.
4 The circuit court concluded to the contrary because of a
discrete (and, as yet, unsettled) vein of civil law concerning
deceased plaintiffs in civil actions. The First District has held that
the filing of a civil complaint in the name of a deceased plaintiff
should be considered a legal nullity. See In re 73 Engle-Related
Cases, 239 So. 3d 166, 168-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("The lawsuits
filed here were nullities because a dead person cannot file and
maintain a lawsuit. . . . [P]laintiffs' counsel had no authority to file
and maintain these cases on behalf of the dead plaintiffs."). While
the premises the First District recited are well founded, our district
has never addressed what the legal effect of filing a complaint on
behalf of a predeceased plaintiff ought to be. There is perhaps an
arguable justification for tethering a predeceased plaintiff's status
to subject matter jurisdiction because civil lawsuits—and, hence, a
civil court's adjudicative powers—must be initiated by a plaintiff or
petitioner's action. On the other hand, courts routinely allow
substitution of plaintiffs where an originally named plaintiff lacked
sufficient standing to maintain an asserted cause of action. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Workman, 73 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1954) ("[T]he
proceeding was not a nullity. It was, on the other hand, a [cause]
5 pending in which, by the liberal principles of our Code, the party
plaintiff, though lame in one particular, might be allowed to cure
that defect and proceed to a determination of the merits." (quoting
Archdeacon v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 81 N.E. 152, 154 (Ohio
1907))); Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kubicki Draper, LLP, 137 So. 3d
487, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that it was error to deny
motion to amend to correct plaintiff name because "[a]lthough Arch
Specialty inserted an incorrect plaintiff name in its original
complaint, there is no doubt that the identity of the intended
plaintiff was the insurance company" and the defendant would
suffer no prejudice "because the cause of action would still squarely
center on the alleged malpractice"); Cunningham v. Fla. Dep't of
Child. & Fams., 782 So. 2d 913, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ("If a
personal representative was improperly appointed, the subsequent
appointment of a substituted personal representative relates back
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
LINDA FRIEDEL,
Appellant,
v.
ELIZABETH EDWARDS,
Appellee.
No. 2D20-2233
September 29, 2021
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Alane Laboda, Judge.
Alexander Brockmeyer, Molly Brockmeyer and Mark Boyle of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
Jesse R. Butler of Dickinson & Gibbons, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.
LUCAS, Judge.
Elizabeth Edwards was involved in a car accident with Linda
Friedel on December 1, 2015. Ms. Friedel filed a negligence
complaint against Ms. Edwards in the Lee County Circuit Court. The lawsuit, however, was not filed until February 15, 2019; and as
it happened, Ms. Edwards had passed away some three months
earlier.
On December 17, 2019, the circuit court entered an order
removing the now-deceased Ms. Edwards and substituting Scott
Kuhn, Esq., as the personal representative for the Estate of
Elizabeth Edwards (Estate). According to the court's order, Mr.
Kuhn agreed to accept service on behalf of the estate and respond
to Ms. Friedel's complaint within twenty days of service.
The Estate eventually moved to dismiss the complaint,
asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action. Its argument ran as follows: since the complaint named a
deceased person as the defendant, and since an action cannot
proceed against a deceased person, the complaint was a "legal
nullity," and, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to proceed
upon it. Furthermore, the Estate maintained, Ms. Friedel's
complaint could not be amended and relate back to the original
filing because "th[e] action was and is invalid, . . . . the four-year
time limit in which to bring this action has expired[, and] [t]he court
in Staines[ v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 239 So. 3d 164 (Fla. 1st
2 DCA 2018),] held that without jurisdiction, no basis existed in
which the relation back doctrine could apply."1 Thus, according to
the Estate, Ms. Friedel was barred from seeking recovery on her
negligence claim.
The circuit court agreed and entered an order deeming "the
Complaint void as a matter of law" in that it failed to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Because the statute of limitations had
run, and the relation back provision of Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.190(c) "was inapplicable," the court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
Ms. Friedel has brought this timely appeal.
We review a circuit court's determination of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. See Artz ex rel. Artz v. City of Tampa, 102 So.
3d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Whether a proposed amended
complaint should be permitted and whether it should relate back to
a prior filing under rule 1.190(c) is reviewed for an abuse of
1 See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) ("When the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original pleading.").
3 discretion. See Bosco v. Glob. Props. of Naples, LLC, 319 So. 3d
181, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Est. of Eisen v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
126 So. 3d 323, 327, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). In both respects, the
circuit court erred.
First, the complaint that was filed was not a "legal nullity." To
the contrary, Ms. Friedel asserted a tried-and-true cause of action
in negligence, alleged a sufficient amount in controversy for the
circuit court's jurisdiction, detailed sufficient factual allegations to
satisfy our state's fact pleading standard, and included a demand
for judgment. That is all that is required to begin a negligence
lawsuit. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). "The pleading threshold to
invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court when the
complaint is one for money damages is not high." Foley v. Wilson,
126 So. 3d 340, 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). It may have been
improper to name the late Ms. Edwards personally as a party
defendant in the initial complaint, but a factual discrepancy of that
nature does not render a pleading "void ab initio" any more than if
the evidence were to show that Ms. Edwards had not, in fact, been
negligent, or that Ms. Friedel's damages had not, in fact, arisen to
the circuit court's jurisdictional threshold.
4 The circuit court concluded to the contrary because of a
discrete (and, as yet, unsettled) vein of civil law concerning
deceased plaintiffs in civil actions. The First District has held that
the filing of a civil complaint in the name of a deceased plaintiff
should be considered a legal nullity. See In re 73 Engle-Related
Cases, 239 So. 3d 166, 168-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("The lawsuits
filed here were nullities because a dead person cannot file and
maintain a lawsuit. . . . [P]laintiffs' counsel had no authority to file
and maintain these cases on behalf of the dead plaintiffs."). While
the premises the First District recited are well founded, our district
has never addressed what the legal effect of filing a complaint on
behalf of a predeceased plaintiff ought to be. There is perhaps an
arguable justification for tethering a predeceased plaintiff's status
to subject matter jurisdiction because civil lawsuits—and, hence, a
civil court's adjudicative powers—must be initiated by a plaintiff or
petitioner's action. On the other hand, courts routinely allow
substitution of plaintiffs where an originally named plaintiff lacked
sufficient standing to maintain an asserted cause of action. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Workman, 73 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1954) ("[T]he
proceeding was not a nullity. It was, on the other hand, a [cause]
5 pending in which, by the liberal principles of our Code, the party
plaintiff, though lame in one particular, might be allowed to cure
that defect and proceed to a determination of the merits." (quoting
Archdeacon v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 81 N.E. 152, 154 (Ohio
1907))); Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kubicki Draper, LLP, 137 So. 3d
487, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that it was error to deny
motion to amend to correct plaintiff name because "[a]lthough Arch
Specialty inserted an incorrect plaintiff name in its original
complaint, there is no doubt that the identity of the intended
plaintiff was the insurance company" and the defendant would
suffer no prejudice "because the cause of action would still squarely
center on the alleged malpractice"); Cunningham v. Fla. Dep't of
Child. & Fams., 782 So. 2d 913, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ("If a
personal representative was improperly appointed, the subsequent
appointment of a substituted personal representative relates back
to the filing of the original wrongful death complaint, and the
substituted personal representative is entitled to go forward with
the action."); see also Est. of Eisen, 126 So. 3d at 328, 336 (holding
that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied a
deceased plaintiff's estate leave to amend to name the properly
6 appointed personal representative and observing that "Florida
courts have taken the view that, generally, an amendment to a
complaint changing the plaintiff, which does not introduce a new
cause of action or make any new or substantially altered claim,
relates back to the commencement of the action so as to avoid the
operation of the statute of limitations").
We need not decide the issue today, though, because by all
accounts, the plaintiff here, Ms. Friedel, is very much alive. She
has properly pled a cause of action. And she has a right to seek
redress and be heard in the circuit court. The prohibition described
in 73 Engle-Related Cases, to the extent it is properly grounded in
subject matter jurisdiction, has no applicability to this case.2
2 In so holding, we acknowledge other state appellate courts have held to the contrary. But we find their reasoning somewhat lacking. To be sure, a dead person cannot be a party to a lawsuit. But why it follows that an action against a deceased individual must be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a point that seems to be either conspicuously ignored, see, e.g., Volkmar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 432 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("[A] dead person is a non-existent entity and cannot be a party to a suit. Therefore, proceedings instituted against an individual who is deceased at the time of the filing of suit are a nullity. Such proceedings are void ab initio and do not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court."), or premised only on "common sense," see, e.g., Oliver v. Swiss Club Tell, 35 Cal. Rptr. 324, 329 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (noting that a suit brought against a legally nonexistent
7 Turning now to the second error, it was an abuse of discretion
not to grant Ms. Friedel leave to file an amended complaint that
substituted the Estate and related back to the filing of the original
action. "It is well-settled that the rule permitting amendments to
pleadings, and the relation-back doctrine, are to be liberally
construed and applied." Est. of Eisen, 126 So. 3d at 328-329
(collecting cases). As we explained in Sorenson v. Bank of New York
Mellon as Trustee for Certificate Holders CWALT, Inc., 261 So. 3d
660, 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018),
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a) provides that "[l]eave of court [to amend pleadings] shall be given freely when justice so requires." Behind this rule is a "[p]ublic policy favor[ing] the liberal amendment of pleadings, and courts should resolve all doubts in favor of allowing the
entity is "void ab initio" and "[t]he common sense rationale of this rule is that courts sit to settle disputes between existing parties and when the defendant is not a legal person no lawful judgment can be rendered against such a nonentity" (citations omitted)), which overlooks important and well-developed principles of liberally allowing amendments, avoiding prejudice to parties, and preferring actions be decided on their merits. See Caduceus Props., LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 991–92 (Fla. 2014); cf. Marcus v. Art Nissen & Son, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 694, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (addressing cases cited to support that "a complaint filed by or against a dead person does not invoke the jurisdiction of the court and is accordingly a nullity," and noting that "[n]one [of the cited cases involving lawsuits against dead defendants] contains a rationale for the stated proposition" that such a suit is void ab initio).
8 amendment of pleadings to allow cases to be decided on their merit." Laurencio v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 65 So. 3d 1190, 1193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing S. Developers & Earthmoving, Inc. v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 56 So. 3d 56, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)). "A trial court's refusal to permit an amendment of a pleading is an abuse of discretion unless it is clear that: (1) the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, (2) the privilege to amend has been abused, or (3) the amendment would be futile." Id.
Moreover, in May v. HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc., our
court held that amendments should relate back to the original date
of filing if the new party "knew or should have known that the
plaintiff had made a mistake or was guilty of a misnomer as
concerns the correct identity of the defendant so that the added
party was deemed to have suffered no prejudice by being tardily
brought in or substituted as a party." 166 So. 3d 850, 854 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2015) (quoting Arnwine v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, N.A., 818 So.
2d 621, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). We observed that "[t]he relation
back doctrine is in accordance with the policies that [the rule]
permitting the amendment of pleadings[] 'should be liberally
construed' and that 'cases should be resolved on the merits
whenever possible.' " Id. at 854 n.2 (quoting Caduceus Props., LLC
v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 993 (Fla. 2014)).
9 Ms. Friedel's proposed amendment changed nothing in her
complaint except to substitute Mr. Kuhn as the personal
representative of Ms. Edwards' estate for the late Ms. Edwards. It
concerns the same accident between the same persons on the same
date, it is brought in the name of the same plaintiff, it asserts the
same cause of action, and it was filed in the same court.3 The
Estate has not, and cannot, plausibly claim it would be prejudiced
since the nearly identical original complaint was, without question,
timely filed. We have found no case where a Florida court has shut
the courthouse doors to a litigant who sued a deceased defendant
and sought leave to amend to properly substitute the defendant's
estate. We decline the Estate's invitation to be the first to do so.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant
Ms. Friedel's motion for leave to amend.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
VILLANTI and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
3 We suspect the court's second error likely proceeded from its first because it appears the circuit court simply failed to conduct the appropriate Rule 1.190 analysis.
10 Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.