Linda Ewing v. Randy Megrdle

Ninth Circuit

Linda Ewing v. Randy Megrdle

678 F. App'x 524

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 23, 2017

Docket14-56061

StatusUnpublished

This text of 678 F. App'x 524 (Linda Ewing v. Randy Megrdle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Linda Ewing v. Randy Megrdle, 678 F. App'x 524 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Linda E. Ewing appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ewing’s Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim because Ewing failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Megrdle procured the search warrant by making misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. See Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of judicial deception).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for leave to amend because granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to defendants and cause undue delay. See Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review and relevant factors; noting that prejudice is the most important factor). We reject as without merit Ewing’s contention that the district court improperly considered the motion seeking leave to amend after grant- *525 mg defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for reconsideration because Ewing did not present any newly discovered evidence. See Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and noting that evidence is not newly discovered if it could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7-18.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim[.]”).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Linda E. Ewing appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ewing’s Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim because Ewing failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Megrdle procured the search warrant by making misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. See Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of judicial deception).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for leave to amend because granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to defendants and cause undue delay. See Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review and relevant factors; noting that prejudice is the most important factor). We reject as without merit Ewing’s contention that the district court improperly considered the motion seeking leave to amend after grant- *525 mg defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for reconsideration because Ewing did not present any newly discovered evidence. See Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and noting that evidence is not newly discovered if it could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7-18.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim[.]”).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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