LINDA BURKETT MORNAY * NO. 2025-CA-0410 HARRIS * COURT OF APPEAL VERSUS * FOURTH CIRCUIT IBUILD, LLC * STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT NO. 2022-02655, DIVISION “B” Honorable Marissa Hutabarat, ****** Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano ****** (Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Karen K. Herman)
Caitlyn L. Mayer Arita M. L. Bohannan Shelby S. Talley Landis S. Prestigiacomo BOHANNAN, MAYER, & ASSOCIATES 4224 Florida Ave, Suite 2 Kenner, LA 70065
COUNSEL FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
David P. Vicknair Hope E. Hughes Matthew A. Martin SCOTT VICKNAIR, LLC 909 Poydras Street, Suite 1225 New Orleans, LA 70112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED MARCH 4, 2026 JCL RDJ KKH This appeal arises from a property dispute. Plaintiff, Linda Burkett Mornay
Harris, filed suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent the continuing construction on
immovable property she alleges was conveyed to Defendant, iBuild, LLC
(“iBuild”), through the use of a forged power of attorney. In response, iBuild filed
a third-party demand against Dora A. Wences (“Wences”), the notary who
authenticated the sellers’ identities. Wences filed exceptions of lack of personal
jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of action, which the district court
granted. iBuild seeks appellate review. For the reasons that follow, we find the
record does not contain a valid, final judgment sufficient to confer appellate
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises from a Petition for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief, and Damages.
Plaintiff filed suit against iBuild in order to stop it from building a house on the
1 property located at 1720 N. Dupre Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70119. In her
petition she alleges that the property, which she claims she purchased in 1976 and
never sold, was fraudulently sold to iBuild by two individuals who falsely held
themselves out to have authority to sell the property.
In response, iBuild filed a third-party demand against Dora A. Wences, the
notary who authenticated the sellers’ identities, seeking damages for dereliction of
duty in performing notarial services in connection with the property sale. Wences
filed exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of
action, which iBuild opposed. On January 13, 2023, a hearing on the exceptions
was held. Following argument, the Honorable Judge Robin Giarrusso orally
granted Wences’s exceptions. However, the parties disputed the wording of the
judgment, so no written judgment memorializing the ruling was signed by Judge
Giarrusso at that time. Thereafter, on May 1, 2023, Judge Giarrusso retired.
Wences later re-urged her exceptions. The matter was heard by the
Honorable Judge Marissa Hutabarat, as the successor judge. Judge Hutabarat
denied the re-urged exceptions but ordered that a judgment be submitted consistent
with Judge Giarrusso’s January 13, 2023 oral ruling granting the exceptions.
The subsequent drafting and signing of written judgments pursuant Judge
Hutabarat’s order, following the denial of the re-urged exceptions, gives rise to the
jurisdictional issue now before this Court. We now turn to a fuller discussion of the
written judgments and the statutory requirements governing judgments signed by
successor judges to explain why this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
2 DISCUSSION
“An appellate court cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless its
subject matter jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid final judgment.” Moulton
v. Stewart Enter., Inc., 17-0243, 17-0244, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/3/17), 226 So.3d
569, 571 (citations omitted).
The record in the case sub judice contains two written judgments signed by
Judge Hutabarat in connection to the January 13, 2023 oral granting of the
exceptions: one dated August 27, 2024; and another dated August 1, 2025. The
August 27, 2024 judgment states:
This matter came before this Honorable Court on January 13, 2023 on Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action. […]
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED without prejudice and Dora Wences’ Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action are hereby GRANTED with prejudice, and that Third-Party Plaintiff, IBUILD, LLC’s, Third Party Demand against Dora A. Wences is dismissed.
(emphasis added). In contrast, the August 1, 2025 judgment provides:
This matter came before this Honorable Court on January 13, 2023, on Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action. […]
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action are SUSTAINED, and that Third-Party Plaintiff, iBUILD, LLC’s, Third Party Demand against Dora A. Wences is dismissed without prejudice.
(emphasis added).
The August 27, 2024 judgment grants the peremptory exceptions with
3 prejudice and dismisses iBuild’s third party demand, which effectively bars
reassertion of those claims. By contrast, the August 1, 2025 judgment expressly
dismisses iBuild’s third party demand without prejudice, thereby preserving
iBuild’s ability to refile its claims. This change constitutes a substantive
modification of the judgment rather than a permissible change in phraseology
under La. C.C.P. art. 1951. Safeguard Storage Prop., L.L.C. v. Donahue Favret
Contractors, Inc., 10-0673, 10-0855, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/11), 60 So.3d 110,
117. (La. C.C.P. art. 1951 “permits the trial court to amend a final judgment at any
time ‘[t]o alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance; or…[t]o
correct errors of calculation’”). Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that a trial
court may substantively alter a final judgment in limited circumstances, including
the filing of a timely motion for new trial. Mercato Elisio, L.L.C. v. City of New
Orleans, 22-0228, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/22), 356 So.3d 505, 510. In this case,
notice of the August 27, 2024 judgment was mailed on August 29, 2024, and a
motion for new trial was timely filed on September 4, 2024. That motion was
denied on April 15, 2025, after which the August 1, 2025 judgment was issued.
Accordingly, the August 1, 2025 judgment constitutes the operative judgment for
purposes of our review.
Deficient Final Judgment
Louisiana law requires that a judgment be signed by the judge who presided
over the matter. Jones v. Whips Elec., LLC, 22-0095, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.
9/16/22), 348 So.3d 849, 852 (citing Reaney-Gates v. Mendoza, 19-0912, p. 3 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/19/20), 293 So.3d 77, 79). A judgment signed by a judge who did not
preside over the hearing is invalid unless the signing authority is expressly
4 conferred by statute and the statutory requirements are strictly satisfied. See
Lassalle v. Napoleon, 23-0705, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/24), 390 So.3d 805, 809.
La. R.S.
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LINDA BURKETT MORNAY * NO. 2025-CA-0410 HARRIS * COURT OF APPEAL VERSUS * FOURTH CIRCUIT IBUILD, LLC * STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT NO. 2022-02655, DIVISION “B” Honorable Marissa Hutabarat, ****** Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano ****** (Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Karen K. Herman)
Caitlyn L. Mayer Arita M. L. Bohannan Shelby S. Talley Landis S. Prestigiacomo BOHANNAN, MAYER, & ASSOCIATES 4224 Florida Ave, Suite 2 Kenner, LA 70065
COUNSEL FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
David P. Vicknair Hope E. Hughes Matthew A. Martin SCOTT VICKNAIR, LLC 909 Poydras Street, Suite 1225 New Orleans, LA 70112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED MARCH 4, 2026 JCL RDJ KKH This appeal arises from a property dispute. Plaintiff, Linda Burkett Mornay
Harris, filed suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent the continuing construction on
immovable property she alleges was conveyed to Defendant, iBuild, LLC
(“iBuild”), through the use of a forged power of attorney. In response, iBuild filed
a third-party demand against Dora A. Wences (“Wences”), the notary who
authenticated the sellers’ identities. Wences filed exceptions of lack of personal
jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of action, which the district court
granted. iBuild seeks appellate review. For the reasons that follow, we find the
record does not contain a valid, final judgment sufficient to confer appellate
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises from a Petition for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief, and Damages.
Plaintiff filed suit against iBuild in order to stop it from building a house on the
1 property located at 1720 N. Dupre Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70119. In her
petition she alleges that the property, which she claims she purchased in 1976 and
never sold, was fraudulently sold to iBuild by two individuals who falsely held
themselves out to have authority to sell the property.
In response, iBuild filed a third-party demand against Dora A. Wences, the
notary who authenticated the sellers’ identities, seeking damages for dereliction of
duty in performing notarial services in connection with the property sale. Wences
filed exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of
action, which iBuild opposed. On January 13, 2023, a hearing on the exceptions
was held. Following argument, the Honorable Judge Robin Giarrusso orally
granted Wences’s exceptions. However, the parties disputed the wording of the
judgment, so no written judgment memorializing the ruling was signed by Judge
Giarrusso at that time. Thereafter, on May 1, 2023, Judge Giarrusso retired.
Wences later re-urged her exceptions. The matter was heard by the
Honorable Judge Marissa Hutabarat, as the successor judge. Judge Hutabarat
denied the re-urged exceptions but ordered that a judgment be submitted consistent
with Judge Giarrusso’s January 13, 2023 oral ruling granting the exceptions.
The subsequent drafting and signing of written judgments pursuant Judge
Hutabarat’s order, following the denial of the re-urged exceptions, gives rise to the
jurisdictional issue now before this Court. We now turn to a fuller discussion of the
written judgments and the statutory requirements governing judgments signed by
successor judges to explain why this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
2 DISCUSSION
“An appellate court cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless its
subject matter jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid final judgment.” Moulton
v. Stewart Enter., Inc., 17-0243, 17-0244, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/3/17), 226 So.3d
569, 571 (citations omitted).
The record in the case sub judice contains two written judgments signed by
Judge Hutabarat in connection to the January 13, 2023 oral granting of the
exceptions: one dated August 27, 2024; and another dated August 1, 2025. The
August 27, 2024 judgment states:
This matter came before this Honorable Court on January 13, 2023 on Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action. […]
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED without prejudice and Dora Wences’ Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action are hereby GRANTED with prejudice, and that Third-Party Plaintiff, IBUILD, LLC’s, Third Party Demand against Dora A. Wences is dismissed.
(emphasis added). In contrast, the August 1, 2025 judgment provides:
This matter came before this Honorable Court on January 13, 2023, on Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action. […]
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action are SUSTAINED, and that Third-Party Plaintiff, iBUILD, LLC’s, Third Party Demand against Dora A. Wences is dismissed without prejudice.
(emphasis added).
The August 27, 2024 judgment grants the peremptory exceptions with
3 prejudice and dismisses iBuild’s third party demand, which effectively bars
reassertion of those claims. By contrast, the August 1, 2025 judgment expressly
dismisses iBuild’s third party demand without prejudice, thereby preserving
iBuild’s ability to refile its claims. This change constitutes a substantive
modification of the judgment rather than a permissible change in phraseology
under La. C.C.P. art. 1951. Safeguard Storage Prop., L.L.C. v. Donahue Favret
Contractors, Inc., 10-0673, 10-0855, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/11), 60 So.3d 110,
117. (La. C.C.P. art. 1951 “permits the trial court to amend a final judgment at any
time ‘[t]o alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance; or…[t]o
correct errors of calculation’”). Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that a trial
court may substantively alter a final judgment in limited circumstances, including
the filing of a timely motion for new trial. Mercato Elisio, L.L.C. v. City of New
Orleans, 22-0228, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/22), 356 So.3d 505, 510. In this case,
notice of the August 27, 2024 judgment was mailed on August 29, 2024, and a
motion for new trial was timely filed on September 4, 2024. That motion was
denied on April 15, 2025, after which the August 1, 2025 judgment was issued.
Accordingly, the August 1, 2025 judgment constitutes the operative judgment for
purposes of our review.
Deficient Final Judgment
Louisiana law requires that a judgment be signed by the judge who presided
over the matter. Jones v. Whips Elec., LLC, 22-0095, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.
9/16/22), 348 So.3d 849, 852 (citing Reaney-Gates v. Mendoza, 19-0912, p. 3 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/19/20), 293 So.3d 77, 79). A judgment signed by a judge who did not
preside over the hearing is invalid unless the signing authority is expressly
4 conferred by statute and the statutory requirements are strictly satisfied. See
Lassalle v. Napoleon, 23-0705, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/24), 390 So.3d 805, 809.
La. R.S. 13:4209 provides in relevant part:
In cases which are heard and in which judgment is rendered, but not signed, whether the case was taken under advisement or not, if the judge who rendered the judgment dies, resigns, or is removed from office, or if his term expires before signing judgment in the case, his successor in office shall have the authority to sign a judgment which conforms with the judgment rendered.
La. R.S. 13:4209(B)(1).
While La. R.S. 13:4209 does not expressly mandate particular decretal
language relating to signing a judgment in a judge’s capacity as a successor,
jurisprudence has imposed strict requirements to ensure transparency, regularity,
and jurisdictional validity when a successor judge signs a judgment.
In Lassalle, this Court dismissed an appeal without prejudice after
determining the judgment failed to comply with La. R.S. 13:4209. Drawing from a
line of cases interpreting La. R.S. 13:4209, this Court identified several
jurisprudential requirements that collectively mandate that a successor judge’s
authority to sign a judgment under La. R.S. 13:4209 affirmatively appear on the
face of the judgment. This Court explained that the successor judge must state that
he or she: is acting pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4209; has reviewed the evidence
previously introduced; has considered the merits of the case; and had before him or
her the testimony and exhibits received by the predecessor judge. Lassalle, 23-705,
pp. 4-5, 390 So.3d at 809-10 (citations omitted). When these conditions are
satisfied and appear in the record, the judgment is deemed valid, final, and
appealable. Id., 23-705, p. 5, 390 at 809-10 (citations omitted).
The judgment at issue in Lassalle was deemed insufficient to invoke this
5 Court’s appellate jurisdiction because it: (1) failed to state that a judge other than
the signing judge presided over the hearing; (2) failed to indicate whether the
successor judge reviewed the evidence upon which the oral ruling was based; and
(3) failed to state that the signing judge was acting in her capacity as a successor
judge. Id., 23-705, p. 6, 390 So.3d at 810.
In the present matter, the August 1, 2025 judgment states that Wences’s
exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of
action “came before this Honorable Court” on January 13, 2023. The transcript of
the hearing reflects that Judge Giarrusso presided and, at the conclusion of which,
orally granted Wences’s exceptions. On August 1, 2025, Judge Hutabarat, the
successor judge, signed a written judgment that states:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Dora Wences’ Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action are SUSTAINED, and that Third-Party Plaintiff, iBUILD, LLC’s, Third Party Demand against Dora A. Wences is dismissed without prejudice.
We find the August 1, 2025 judgment fails to comply with the
jurisprudential requirements of La. R.S. 13:4209. The judgment contains no
reference to Judge Giarrusso as having presided over the January 2023 hearing of
the exceptions and that Judge Hutabarat did not. Likewise, there is no recitation
indicating that Judge Hutabarat reviewed the evidence on which Judge Giarrusso’s
oral ruling was based or considered the merits. Additionally, the printed signature
line on the judgment states only “JUDGE MARISSA HUTABARAT.” The
judgment fails to indicate that Judge Hutabarat signed the judgment in her
successor-judge capacity pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4209. As in Lassalle, the absence
of these required recitations renders the August 1, 2025 judgment invalid.
6 Considering the record lacks a valid, final judgment signed in compliance
with La. R.S. 13:4209, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this
appeal.
Supervisory Review
Appellate courts have a duty to examine whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists sua sponte, “even when the parties do not raise the issue.” Moon v. City of
New Orleans, 15-1092, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/16), 190 So.3d 422, 425
(citations omitted); see also La. C.C.P. art. 2162. The defect in this case is
jurisdictional and cannot be cured by converting the appeal to an application for
supervisory review. Without a valid judgment signed by the proper judicial
authority, there is no valid ruling over which this Court may exercise supervisory
jurisdiction. This Court has previously declined to exercise its supervisory
jurisdiction when the written judgment sought to be reviewed was not signed by
the proper judge. In Mullins v. Mississippi Valley Silica Co., cited in Lassalle, this
Court observed that the judgment from which the relators sought review was not a
valid judgment because it was not signed by the correct judge as required under La.
C.C.P. 1911, and accordingly declined to consider the writ application. Mullins,
08-0330 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/20/08), 982 So.2d 209, 210. We see no reason to depart
from that jurisprudence here.1 In the absence of a judgment signed by a judge
acting within the authority conferred by statute, there is no appealable judgment
and no proper basis for supervisory review.
CONCLUSION
In that the record lacks a valid, final judgment signed in compliance with La.
1 Although La. C.C.P. art. 1918 favors the amendment of judgments to reach the merits, we
could find no court that has interpreted Article 1918 to permit the correction of a judgment that fails to identify the signing judge as a successor or otherwise comply with La. R.S. 13:4209.
7 R.S. 13:4209, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal or to exercise
supervisory review.
DECREE
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the matter is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED