In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 23–1794
Submitted November 12, 2025—Filed January 9, 2026
Linda Betz,
Appellant,
vs.
Rebecca Mathisen, Eric Muller, Kelly Rasmuson, and Michael Wilson,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,
judge.
The defendants in a defamation action seek further review of a court of
appeals decision reversing the district court’s order granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Decision of Court of
Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment Affirmed.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all participating
justices joined. Waterman, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
Michael J. Carroll (argued) of Carney & Appleby Law Firm, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Dana Hempy (argued), David Bower, Katie Graham, and Haley Hermanson
(until withdrawal), of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees. 2
Mansfield, Justice.
I. Introduction.
An information security executive who lost her job believed that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of sex, unjustly fired, and defamed. She
brought one lawsuit. Then, after that lawsuit proved unsuccessful, she brought
another lawsuit, naming as before the CEO of the company, but this time a
different set of coworkers. Her second lawsuit asserted only defamation claims.
By the time she filed the second lawsuit, over three years had elapsed since her
employment had been terminated and any of the defamatory statements had
been published.
The defendants sought dismissal of the second lawsuit on various
grounds, including the statute of limitations, claim preclusion, absolute
privilege, and qualified privilege. The district court granted dismissal based on
the statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the
discovery rule applies to defamation claims in Iowa and that “application of the
discovery rule is a factual inquiry that cannot be resolved at [the] motion-to-
dismiss stage of the proceedings.”
We agree that application of the discovery rule is sometimes fact-intensive
and not amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss. But here, the allegations
of the first lawsuit make it clear that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of job-
related defamation claims. Yet the plaintiff waited over two years from that filing
to file her second lawsuit. By then, it was too late. Accordingly, we affirm the
statute-of-limitations dismissal order of the district court and vacate the decision
of the court of appeals. We do so without reaching any of the other legal issues
in this case, including whether a discovery rule applies to defamation claims and
whether the plaintiff’s case might be barred by claim preclusion or privilege. 3
II. Facts and Procedural History.
A. Linda Betz’s Employment with Federal Home Loan Bank of Des
Moines. Because this case was decided on a motion to dismiss, we accept Linda
Betz’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952
N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 2020). In addition, the defendants asked the district court
to take judicial notice of certain filings from Betz’s prior federal lawsuit. Betz
objected to the district court’s taking judicial notice of any facts asserted within
those filings but did not oppose the court taking “judicial notice of the fact that
various pleadings exist and that they read as they read on their face.” On that
basis, we set forth the essential facts of this case.1
Betz was hired by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines (FHLB) on
March 19, 2018, as its chief information security officer. She was recruited to
correct deficiencies in FHLB’s information-security program. Three employees
reported directly to her, including Rebecca Mathisen, manager of information
security.
During Betz’s tenure, FHLB retained independent contractor Paul
Crosthwaite. On July 21, 2019, Mathisen and Crosthwaite informed Betz that
certain “SOX controls” were not being performed.2 This was a serious issue.
1In Meade v. Christie, we recently reaffirmed that “when ruling on a motion to dismiss,
courts generally cabin their factual analysis to the claims set forth in the plaintiff’s petition and the matters on which the court can take judicial notice.” 974 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Iowa 2022). We held that publicly filed articles of incorporation could be considered part of the record on the motion to dismiss, although the articles were not mentioned in the petition, where the defendants had asked the district court to take judicial notice, the district court had taken judicial notice, and the plaintiff didn’t challenge that determination on appeal. Id. Likewise, here we can take judicial notice of filings in the federal litigation to the extent (1) copies were submitted to the district court and (2) they are being considered solely for notice purposes and not to establish the truth of facts asserted. 2“SOX controls” is shorthand for internal controls required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 to ensure accuracy and integrity in financial reporting. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–66. 4
On August 7, Mathisen filed an internal complaint against Betz.
Mathisen’s complaint stated that she had certified the relevant SOX controls as
“not effective” but that Betz had improperly certified them as effective. At that
time, Mathisen had not seen Betz’s certifications. Mathisen also stated that Betz
was going to terminate her. Betz, however, had no plans to terminate Mathisen’s
employment.
Based on Mathisen’s complaint, an internal audit was commenced. The
auditors—Kelly Rasmuson and Eric Muller—did largely a paper review. They
interviewed Mathisen and Crosthwaite but not Betz. They created an interim
audit report on September 4 and a final report on October 19. Their audit report
found no evidence that Betz’s certification conflicted with Mathisen’s. Yet the
report described Betz as having a “steep learning curve” and identified other
concerns with Betz, such as “a lack of listening to others . . . and a lack of depth
with awareness/knowledge of controls.” The audit report noted that Michael
Wilson had decided to terminate Betz’s employment because of actions described
in Mathisen’s complaint and also because of ineffective performance on
information security projects.
Wilson did not terminate Betz immediately. Meanwhile, he brought in an
independent contractor, Zeeshan Kazmi, to act as interim chief information
officer. Kazmi became Betz’s supervisor. Betz believed that Kazmi was sexist and
someone who treated female employees different from male employees. Betz
complained to human relations about Kazmi to no avail. Kazmi frequently would
not meet with Betz but would meet with his other direct report who was male.
Kazmi worked closely with Sunil Mohandas, FHLB’s chief risk officer. Betz
believed that Mohandas also disapproved of female employees. It was apparent 5
to Betz that Kazmi, Mohandas, and Wilson worked closely together. Mohandas,
like Kazmi, would ignore Betz’s advice, position, and experience.
On December 4, Betz met with Kazmi and Mohandas. They shared with
her a presentation they had created to show the board that the information
security risk of FHLB had changed. Betz did not agree with them and she was
not invited to their follow-up meeting with the board later that month.
On January 3, 2020, Wilson fired Betz, stating that FHLB had “decided to
go in a different direction” with information security. Betz asked what the
different direction was and Wilson replied, “[M]ore risk-based.” Wilson had been
scheduled to retire from FHLB and did so within a month of firing Betz.
FHLB filed a “Form 8-K” with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosing Betz’s termination but omitting any statement that
the termination was “without cause.” Her position was later eliminated.
While employed by FHLB, Betz was not informed of Mathisen’s complaints,
nor did she have any knowledge of the internal audit performed by Rasmuson
and Muller.
B. Betz’s First Lawsuit. On March 30, 2020, Betz filed a complaint with
the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging that she had been terminated because
of her sex. On November 11, Betz filed a civil action in the Polk County District
Court against FHLB, Wilson, Kazmi, and Mohandas. This initial lawsuit, which
was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
contained ten counts: sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in
violation of Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (counts I–IV); defamation, false
light, and blacklisting (counts V–VII); intentional interference with employment
rights and wrongful termination (counts VIII and X); and civil conspiracy (count
IX). 6
Betz’s defamation claim centered on the Form 8-K that FHLB filed with the
SEC and its failure to mention that her termination was “without cause.”
However, she also alleged that the defendants had “made additional slanderous
and libelous statements regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job or
surrounding the circumstances of her termination, which include, but are not
limited to statements made to the Bank’s regulator, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency.”
On February 3, 2021, the defendants in the federal litigation moved to
dismiss most of Betz’s claims. Discovery also proceeded. On July 19, the federal
district court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. Betz v.
Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 549 F. Supp. 3d 951, 968–69
(S.D. Iowa 2021). The federal district court dismissed Betz’s claims for wrongful
discharge and interference with employment rights as preempted and her claims
for defamation, false light, blacklisting, and civil conspiracy for failure to state a
claim. Id. As to defamation, the court determined that “the objectively reasonable
reader, reading [the statement about Betz’s termination in the Form 8-K] and
nothing else, would not draw the implication that Plaintiff’s employment
termination was for cause.” Id. at 966.
Regarding the “additional slanderous and libelous statements” alleged by
Betz, the court added that the “Plaintiff does not identify any additional
statements, written or oral, that were allegedly made by any Defendant. Her
claim for defamation as to these unidentified statements is dismissed because
she fails to plead any facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id.
at 961 n.6.
In light of the federal district court’s ruling, Betz still had claims under
Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. See id. at 957–58. But when Betz moved 7
for summary judgment on those claims, Betz consented to the dismissal of her
sex discrimination and harassment claims, resisting summary judgment solely
as to her retaliation claims. On December 6, 2022, the federal district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants on those remaining claims. Betz
v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 644 F. Supp. 3d 500, 513 (S.D.
Iowa 2022). That court found that FHLB had offered legitimate, nonretaliatory
reasons for Betz’s termination. Id. at 510–13. Those reasons had nothing to do
with Betz’s complaints about Kazmi but instead related to the audit and
Mathisen’s complaints. Id. Betz did not appeal.
C. The Present Lawsuit. Approximately three months later, on March 6,
2023, Betz filed this action in the Polk County District Court against Mathisen,
Muller, Rasmuson, and Wilson, alleging a single count of defamation based on
Mathisen’s 2019 whistleblower complaints, the internal audit reports by
Rasmuson and Muller, and Wilson’s statements to FHLB personnel and
regulators.
The defendants moved to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment.
Their motion argued that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of
limitations contained in Iowa Code section 614.1(2) (2023), by claim preclusion
arising from the federal judgment, or by absolute or qualified privilege. The
district court granted dismissal based on the statute of limitations.
First, the district court concluded that under Iowa law, the limitations
period for defamation begins to run on the date of publication. Because all the
allegedly defamatory statements were published more than two years before Betz
initiated this case in March 2023, they were time-barred.
Alternatively, the district court found that even if a discovery rule applied,
Betz was on inquiry notice of the defendants’ defamation by November 11, 2020, 8
the date when she filed her first lawsuit. The district court further noted that
Betz apparently received actual notice of the defamatory statements within
several months of filing her first lawsuit, in the first part of 2021. Yet, again, she
did not bring this action until March 10, 2023.
Betz appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court
of appeals reversed and remanded the district court’s order of dismissal by a 6–
3 en banc vote. The majority concluded that a discovery rule applies to
defamation claims where the allegedly defamatory statements are “inherently
secretive, inherently undiscoverable, or not a matter of public knowledge.” The
majority further found unresolved factual questions as to when Betz was on
notice for discovery rule purposes. The dissent, however, would have affirmed
the district court. The dissent reasoned that “whether the discovery rule applies
to a defamation action does not matter, as Betz was on inquiry notice based upon
her earlier allegations in the first suit involving her employment at the bank.”
We granted the defendants’ application for further review.
III. Standard of Review.
“We review the granting of a motion to dismiss for errors at law.” Askvig v.
Snap-On Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Jacobs v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 887 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 2016)). “When we review motions to
dismiss, ‘we accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not
its legal conclusions.’ ” MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller, 16 N.W.3d 489,
493 (Iowa 2025) (quoting Riley Drive Ent. I, Inc. v. Reynolds, 970 N.W.2d 289,
295 (Iowa 2022)). “A defendant may raise the statute of limitations by a motion
to dismiss if it is obvious from the uncontroverted facts contained in the petition
that the applicable statute of limitations bars the plaintiff’s claim for relief.” 9
Benskin, 952 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d
792, 809 (Iowa 2019)).
IV. Analysis.
The statute of limitations for defamation claims is two years. Iowa Code
section 614.1(2) provides,
Actions may be brought within the times limited as follows, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared:
....
2. Injuries to person or reputation . . . . Those founded on injuries to the person or reputation, . . . within two years.
The parties dispute whether this two-year period is subject to a discovery
rule or whether it runs from the date of publication without exception. See Linn
v. Montgomery, 903 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 2017) (stating in dicta that “[w]e have
not decided whether the discovery rule applies to this statute for nonnegligence
claims such as defamation”). We conclude that we need not address this issue.
Like the district court and the court of appeals dissent, we conclude that Betz’s
defamation claims against the defendants are barred even under a discovery
rule.
A preliminary question arises as to whether we can consider filings from
the first lawsuit. As we have already discussed, the defendants timely asked the
district court to take judicial notice of those filings. Betz resisted to the extent
the court was being asked to accept factual assertions or factual findings. But we
conclude (as did the district court) that it is proper to rely on those filings to the
extent they establish what notice Betz had at certain timeframes in the federal
litigation. Betz herself quoted from her federal lawsuit in resisting the motion to
dismiss. See State v. Gale, 21 N.W.3d 151, 156 (Iowa 2025) (holding that judicial 10
notice of the records in another case is proper if the parties agree to it); Meade
v. Christie, 974 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa 2022) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the court considers only ‘the contents of the petition and matters of which the
court can take judicial notice.’ ” (quoting Southard v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 734 N.W.2d
192, 194 (Iowa 2007))); see also Gray v. Kinseth Corp., 636 N.W.2d 100, 102
(Iowa 2001) (concluding that a motion to dismiss was properly granted based on
the statute of limitations where the plaintiff “conceded all of the facts necessary
to resolve the narrow legal issue of whether his suit is time-barred”).3
Betz filed her present lawsuit in early March 2023. She alleges that she
did not become aware of the defendants’ allegedly defamatory statements “until,
at the earliest, late March 2021.” For motion to dismiss purposes, this would
make her present lawsuit timely under a discovery rule—but just barely—if
actual notice were necessary to start the clock running. But actual notice isn’t
needed. According to our precedent, the statute of limitations begins to run
under a discovery rule “when the plaintiff knows or should have known facts
that put the plaintiff on inquiry notice that a claim may be present.” Mormann v.
Iowa Workforce Dev., 913 N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2018). “[U]nder the discovery
rule, the limitations period begins when a claimant has knowledge sufficient to
put that person on inquiry notice.” Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d
235, 243 (Iowa 1988). Inquiry notice is triggered when “a claimant . . . gains
information sufficient to alert a reasonable person of the need to investigate.”
3We do not consider for any purpose federal court filings that were not actually submitted
to the district court before it ruled on the motion to dismiss. Two days before we heard oral argument in this appeal, the defendants provided a copy of an affidavit that Betz had filed in the federal litigation on February 26, 2021. Because that affidavit was not part of the record below, we will not consider it. See Peterzalek v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 7 N.W.3d 37, 41 (Iowa 2024) (declining to take judicial notice on appeal and noting that our review is limited to the record below). This may be stating the obvious, but it isn’t free for our judges to access the federal PACER system. Anyone who wants an Iowa judge to take judicial notice of a federal filing should submit a copy through our own filing system. 11
Ranney v. Parawax Co., 582 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Iowa 1998) (en banc). At that
point, the plaintiff “is charged with knowing . . . what a reasonable investigation
would have disclosed,” whether or not the plaintiff actually undertook such an
investigation. Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985). “The
period of limitations is the outer time limit for making the investigation and
bringing the action.” Id. “A claimant can be on inquiry notice without knowing
‘the details of the evidence by which to prove the cause of action.’ ” Hallett Constr.
Co. v. Meister, 713 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Vachon v. State, 514
N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 1994)).
We have repeatedly held that the discovery rule cannot save a plaintiff who
may have lacked actual notice but who failed to act diligently in investigating the
facts they had. Thus, in Mormann v. Iowa Workforce Development, we held that
a motion to dismiss was properly granted in an employment discrimination case
despite the discovery rule. 913 N.W.2d at 576–77. The plaintiff admittedly knew
“he was a member of the protected class, he was qualified for the job, he suffered
an adverse employment action, and a younger worker was hired.” Id. at 576.
Those facts were enough to kick-start the limitations period even though the
defendant allegedly concealed the real reasons why the plaintiff had not been
hired. Id. at 561.
In Franzen v. Deere & Co., we outlined some principles that govern the
discovery rule and inquiry notice. 377 N.W.2d at 662. There, the plaintiffs
brought a products liability action two years and eight months after a farm
accident involving a forage wagon. Id. We affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant, reasoning that as of the date of the accident, the plaintiffs had
information that was “plainly sufficient to put them on inquiry notice concerning
possible defects in the wagon.” Id. at 663. The plaintiffs failed to investigate at 12
the time of the accident; “[w]hen they later investigated, they found the alleged
defects they now rely on.” Id. We held that the statute of limitations period began
on the day of the injury, not on the later date when they discovered the alleged
defects. Id. at 664. Regarding when inquiry notice is triggered, we explained that
“the duty to investigate does not depend on exact knowledge of the nature of the
problem that caused the injury”; instead, “[i]t is sufficient that the person be
aware that a problem existed.” Id. at 662. “One purpose of inquiry is to ascertain
its exact nature.” Id.
Vachon v. State—another discovery rule case—bears some resemblance to
the present case because it involved successive lawsuits. 514 N.W.2d 442. There,
the injured party sustained a catastrophic leg injury in October 1987 when he
was struck by a car, transported to one hospital, transferred to another hospital,
diagnosed with compartment syndrome, and ultimately underwent amputation
of his leg below the knee. Id. at 444. On May 25, 1988, the plaintiffs retained
legal counsel, and by March 27, 1989, their counsel had obtained medical
records. Id. In August 1989, the plaintiffs filed their first lawsuit. Id. On May 7,
1990, while the first lawsuit was pending, the plaintiffs’ counsel received a letter
from a doctor directing his attention to the potential negligence of the emergency
room physician who had treated the injury. Id. The plaintiffs filed a second
lawsuit on July 8, 1991. Id.
On appeal, this court concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiffs had
inquiry notice of their cause of action more than two years before filing the
second suit. Id. at 448. By the time the plaintiffs had retained counsel and
received the relevant medical records, “plaintiffs knew all of the facts needed to
investigate and determine the existence of a cause of action.” Id. Therefore, we 13
held that “[e]ven when the discovery rule is applied, . . . the two-year statute has
run.” Id.
Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc. also involved successive lawsuits. 408 N.W.2d
347 (Iowa 1987). In 1980, a doctor evaluated the injured party and informed him
that his medical issues appeared to be related to his work with certain solvents.
Id. at 348. The following year, he and his wife filed a lawsuit against his employer
and several co-employees. Id. In 1983, the plaintiffs obtained in discovery a
document in the employer’s possession prepared by the solvent manufacturer
and describing the solvents as nontoxic. Id. at 348–49. In 1984, the injured party
underwent additional testing and examination by a specialist who opined that
he suffered from “chemically acquired immune disregulation” that “he will
probably never completely recover from.” Id. at 349. The plaintiffs subsequently
filed a second suit against the solvent manufacturer in January 1985, alleging,
among other claims, negligence or gross negligence and fraud and deceit based
on the document. Id. The district court granted summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations defense. Id. at 349–50.
As in Vachon, the plaintiffs argued for application of the discovery rule and
that they could not have discovered their causes of action through diligent
investigation. Id. at 350–51. But we held that, at least by the time of filing the
first lawsuit, the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of all their causes of action. Id.
at 352. With respect to the fraud claim against the solvent manufacturer, the
plaintiffs argued that their cause of action accrued when they uncovered the
document through discovery in the first action. Id. Not persuaded by this
contention, we elaborated as follows:
The underlying purpose of the discovery rule is that a statute of limitations should not bar the remedies of claimants who have been excusably unaware of their rights to sue. Franzen, 377 N.W.2d at 14
662; Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hosp., 203 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Iowa 1973). Such purpose would be thwarted if we allowed claimants to ignore the statute of limitations when it becomes obvious they have a basis for an actionable claim based on one or more theories of action, and then later permit them to sue when additional facts are uncovered supporting additional theories. We therefore hold that once claimants have knowledge of facts supporting an actionable claim they have no more than the applicable period of limitations to discover all the theories of action they may wish to pursue in support of that claim.
Id.; see also Hallett Constr. Co., 713 N.W.2d at 231 (finding that the plaintiff-
lessors were on inquiry notice when the lessee invoked a fraudulently added
renewal provision, even though the plaintiffs attributed the addition to their
misremembering the original lease); K & W Elec., Inc. v. State, 712 N.W.2d 107,
119–20 (Iowa 2006) (determining that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the
contents of a report that it would have uncovered through “a reasonably diligent
investigation”); Est. of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470–
71 (Iowa 1993) (holding that plaintiff was on inquiry notice at least by the time
he began to investigate a possible connection between a toxic chemical and his
illness by asking his doctor about it).
By November 11, 2020, Betz was already aware that she had been
wrongfully discharged from FHLB. She was aware that FHLB management had
filed a Form 8-K implying (in her view) that she had been terminated for cause.
Betz also believed that she had been defamed through “additional slanderous
and libelous statements regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job or
surrounding the circumstances of her termination.” Betz knew that her
subordinate Mathisen had informed her several months before termination that
SOX controls were not being performed—a serious issue. Finally, Betz had been
told by Wilson, when he fired Betz, that she was being let go because FHLB
wanted to go in a “more risk-based” direction with information security. 15
In light of the foregoing, we have no doubt that as of November 11, Betz
was on inquiry notice of defamation claims based on negative statements by
FHLB employees relating to her job performance. Betz may not have known who
said what, or that there had been an internal complaint and an internal audit,
but she realized that people had been unjustly criticizing her work. It’s true that
Betz may have initially believed that her gender was responsible for her job loss,
but her first lawsuit also contained other claims, demonstrating that Betz didn’t
believe that was the only explanation. Wilson had told her that she was being
dismissed because, in effect, she didn’t understand risk well enough.
This should have triggered an investigation by Betz. In fact, it did. By late
March 2021, Betz acknowledged that she knew of the statements made by
defendants Mathison, Rasmuson, Muller, and Wilson. Still, Betz waited almost
another two years before filing suit over those statements.
We asked Betz’s counsel at oral argument why Betz did not amend her
first lawsuit to add these defamation claims or file them separately in state court
while the federal litigation was still ongoing. Betz’s counsel responded that they
had “decided that the best thing to do was to ride the federal claim through, until
it was concluded, one way or the other, and then decide whether to file in federal
court or state court, at that point.” But under a discovery rule, wait-and-see may
not be an option. We recognize that Betz may have viewed her sex discrimination
and her defamation theories for her job loss as inconsistent with each other. But
“[a]ttorneys may plead in the alternative,” Chicoine v. Wellmark, Inc., 2 N.W.3d
276, 286 (Iowa 2024), and when necessary whittle down those claims to the ones
that are most substantiated.
Betz’s decision to hold off on one of her litigation theories for her loss of
her job while she litigated another theory brings to mind the circumstances in 16
Vachon and Sparks. As in Vachon, Betz “knew all of the facts needed to
investigate and determine the existence of a cause of action.” 514 N.W.2d at 448.
As in Sparks, Betz cannot “ignore the statute of limitations when it becomes
obvious [she has] a basis for an actionable claim based on one or more theories
of action, and then later . . . sue when additional facts are uncovered supporting
additional theories.” 408 N.W.2d at 352. Even if we were to apply the discovery
rule, Betz knew enough to be on inquiry notice of these defamation claims more
than two years before she filed her petition.
V. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals
and affirm the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment
Affirmed.
All justices concur except Waterman, J., who takes no part.