Lincoln v. Stokes

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: December 8, 2005
• Docket: CUMcv-04-410
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. , CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-04-410 - , 4 - - . J

PATRICIA LINCOLN, individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF STEPHEN DEMERS, ~p - - - ~ - ~ ppp et al., pp- -.-ppp-p---p-----

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

GROUP MAIN STREAM, INC., MACK STOKES and PETER BRYDON,

Defendants.

On October 31, 2005 the court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend their

complaint to add Count XV. On November 9, 2005, the court received a letter dated

November 7, 2005 from defendant Mack Stokes, pro se. As set forth in the court's order

of November 21, 2005, it construed Stokes's November 7 letter as a motion to dismiss

count XV, denied that motion, and stated as follows:

Stokes is hereby ordered to file an answer to Count XV of the complaint w i h n 10 days of the filing of h s order and will be defaulted if he does not do so.

Order of November 21 at p. 2.

Stokes did not file an answer w i h n 10 days. Instead, on December 1, 2005 the

clerk's office received and filed two letters from Stokes, both dated November 27, 2005,

along with a number of attachments. Neither letter constituted an answer to count XV

of the complaint as required by the court's November 21 order. Specifically, neither

letter sets forth admissions or denials of the factual averments set forth in the numbered

paragraphs of the complaint as required by M.R.Civ.P. 8(b) and 10(b). One of Stokes's letters argues that the lawsuit should have been kept confidential

under the Freedom of Access law (whch does not apply to court pleadings) and

expounds on Stokes's view that he has been defamed by the plaintiffs in h s case.

Stokes has enclosed newspaper articles from around the time h s lawsuit was ~- - - - - ~ that re-cit~-*eal*eg-ations the and-whic.h-also~~contain

some statements by family members of the deceased expressing doubt that Stokes was

properly trained and questioning why Stokes had been hred gven a prior conviction

for manslaughter.'

The second letter asks the court to dismiss count XV of the complaint and

recounts why Stokes believes he has been damaged by the bringing of h s lawsuit.

However, it does not offer any arguments to refute the allegations in count XV, namely

(1)that if at the time he filed h s answer to the complaint Stokes possessed any claims

against plaintiffs whch arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims set

forth in the complaint, those claims should have been asserted as compulsory

counterclaims and (2) that statements made in pleadings, affidavits, or testimony

during a lawsuit are privileged and cannot be made the subject of an action for

defamation.

Subsequently, after counsel for plaintiff wrote in to suggest that Stokes had not

complied with the November 21, 2005 order, Stokes wrote in again (letter dated and

filed December 7,2005) to argue he had in fact filed an answer as ordered by the court -

expressly referencing the letters discussed above that were filed on December 1.

Although Stokes is representing hmself on h s issue, the Law Court has

instructed trial courts that they cannot bend the rules or offer speaal consideration to

' The enclosures to Stokes's letters include attachments that confirm that Stokes had been convicted of manslaughter in 1988 unrepresented litigants. Truman v. Browne, 2001 W E 182 ¶ 11,788 A.2d 168,171. Stokes

filed a motion to dismiss that was denied, he was ordered to file an answer, and he has

instead filed what at best can be construed as a second motion to dismiss. Parties are

not entitled to file subsequent motions to dismiss once a motion to dismiss has been

denied and they have been ordered to file an answer. The court concludes that under

these circumstances Stokes has defaulted in filing an answer to count XV.

It bears emphasis that the court expresses no position on the merits of the case or

on any settlement that has been reached. It may be that the charges against Stokes were

unfounded. It may also be that statements were made in the pleadings about Stokes that

were false and defamatory. Regardless of whether h s is true, however, it is established

beyond dispute that statements made in pleadings, affidavits, or testimony are

privileged and cannot form the basis for a claim of defamation. Dineen v. Dau~han,381

A.2d 663 (Me. 1978); Restatement, Second, Torts § 587. Given that rule, and the rule

relating to compulsory counterclaims, n o h n g in any of the letters filed by Stokes offers

any basis on which Stokes would be able to proceed with defamation claims against

plaintiffs even if the charges plaintiffs made against h m were unfounded and damaged

h s career.

The entry will be:

Defendant Stokes is determined to have defaulted in answering count XV of the

complaint. Accordingly, judgment against defendant Stokes is entered on count XV

declaring (1) that defendant Stokes is barred from bringing any claim against plaintiffs

that should have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim and (2) that any

statements made by plaintiffs in the complaint, in pleadings, in affidavits or in

testimony during the course of this case were privileged and cannot be the subject of a

defamation action. The court has been advised that all other claims in h s action have been settled

and the parties are therefore directed to file docket entries, dismissals, or stipulations

finally resolving all of the other claims in h s case w i h n 30 days. The clerk is directed

to incorporate h s order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: ~ e c e m b e r 2005. z

>-- Thomas D. Warren Justice, Superior Court Ivy Frignoca, Esq.---------- Plaintiffs (All)

David Herzer, Esq.--------- Defendant (Group Main Stream)

Robert Hoy, Esq.-----------Defendants (Brydon, Stokes)

Mack Stokes, Jr.------------ Defendant (Pro Se as to Count 15 ONLY)

Peter Brydon---------------- Defendant (Pro Se as to Count 15 ONLY)