2025 IL App (4th) 241012 FILED NO. 4-24-1012 November 14, 2025 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, a/k/a Lincoln College, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Logan County LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS; THE LOGAN ) No. 23CH7 COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW; JENNIFER ) BRYANT, in Her Official Capacity as Chief County ) Assessment Officer for Logan County, Illinois; PENNY ) THOMAS, in Her Official Capacity as Treasurer for ) Logan County, Illinois; and THE DEPARTMENT OF ) Honorable REVENUE, ) William G. Workman, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lannerd and Vancil concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 At issue in this case is the continuing validity of a tax exemption granted by
legislative charter the same year that the Civil War ended and while the namesake of the institution
in question here still sat in the White House. The charter holder, plaintiff Lincoln University also
known as Lincoln College (University), filed suit to establish that the exemption cannot be altered
by any of the defendants pursuant to the normal administrative process that governs modern, use-
based tax exemptions. The circuit court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the University’s
complaint on the basis that the University had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Because
of the unique nature of a tax exemption created by the legislature pursuant to its authority under
the 1848 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1848, art. IX, § 3), we hold that the University’s exemption is not subject to the administrative process for modification or elimination that applies
to other use-based tax exemptions. Consequently, the University had no obligation to exhaust that
administrative process, and the court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. We therefore
reverse and remand.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Complaint
¶4 The University initiated this matter by filing its complaint seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against defendants Logan County, Illinois; the Logan County Board of Review;
Jennifer Bryant, in her capacity as chief county assessment officer for Logan County, Illinois;
Penny Thomas, in her capacity as treasurer for Logan County, Illinois; and the Illinois Department
of Revenue. We refer to the latter as “IDOR” and to the other defendants as the “County
defendants.” As discussed more fully below, our review of the circuit court’s dismissal order is
undertaken with acceptance of the truth of all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. The
following factual summary is, therefore, gleaned from those allegations.
¶5 The University is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated under a special act of
the Illinois General Assembly approved on February 6, 1865 (1865 Ill. Laws 44) (Charter). The
University previously offered two- and four-year degree programs for its students, as well as a
master’s degree program.
¶6 Section 9 of the University’s original 1865 charter provides as follows: “All
property, [of] whatever kind and description belonging or appertaining to the corporate body
created by this act, shall be and forever remain free and exempt from taxation for any and all
purposes whatever.” 1865 Ill. Laws 48 (§ 9). The Charter was issued by the legislation pursuant to
its authority under article IX, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution of 1848. Ill. Const. 1848, art.
-2- IX, § 3.
¶7 In early 2022, the University decided to cease its teaching operations, and the last
classes ended on May 13, 2022. Since early May 2022, the University has engaged in ongoing
activities to wind up its affairs, including but not limited to “transitioning students to other
educational institutions; completing audits and other activities required by the Higher Learning
Commission and Department of Education; safeguarding and disposing of [the University’s] assets
and restricted funds; and paying liabilities and expenses.” The University retains ownership of 21
properties.
¶8 In prior years, the assessor would send the University a blank certificate of status
of exempt property form at the beginning of each tax year, which the University would complete
and file with the assessor’s office. See 35 ILCS 200/15-10 (West 2022) (requiring annual
submission of an affidavit stating whether there has been any change in use in the property). The
Logan County tax assessor’s office recognized the University’s tax-exempt status until the 2023
tax year.
¶9 In early 2023, the assessor’s office had several conversations with the University
concerning the tax-exempt status of its properties. Subsequently, the assessor notified the
University that, despite the language of section 9 of the Charter, “she believes the [University] is
no longer tax-exempt because [it] no longer provides educational activities or services.” The
assessor’s office did not send the University an exemption certificate form in 2022 or 2023.
Following its communications with the county assessor’s office, the University filed its completed
annual exemption certificate on August 21, 2023.
¶ 10 In September 2023, the assessor sent the University notices of tax assessments on
its 21 properties. It is the county treasurer’s intention “to collect the real estate property taxes for
-3- tax year 2023.”
¶ 11 Count I of the complaint sought a declaration that the University “is and forever
remains” tax-exempt pursuant to section 9 of the Charter and section 7 of the Amended Charter.
Count II sought an injunction “forever prohibiting” the County defendants from assessing,
imposing, or collecting property taxes on the University’s real estate and further prohibiting IDOR
from directing the Logan County assessor’s office to do so.
¶ 12 B. Motions to Dismiss and Responses
¶ 13 IDOR filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)) asserting that (1) it failed to state a
cause of action (id. § 2-615) and (2) the University failed to exhaust its administrative remedies
(id. § 2-619). On the first point, IDOR argued that the complaint failed to allege any controversy
between it and the University. IDOR argued “there has been no allegation that the [University] has
discussed its exemption status with [IDOR]” or that it was “taking or even threatening to take any
action to remove the [University’s] exemption.” Moreover, according to the motion, the allegation
that IDOR could “at some future time consider and rule on the [University’s] exemption under
Section 15-25” was conclusory and insufficient to create an actual controversy between the
University and IDOR.
¶ 14 On the second point, the motion to dismiss argued that the University had made no
allegation that IDOR had denied, or even considered, the University’s exemption or that the
University had filed any papers under sections 15-25 or 8-35 of the Property Tax Code (Tax Code)
(35 ILCS 200/8-35, 15-25 (West 2022)). Further, the motion argued that the University had failed
to allege it had filed an application under section 16-70 as a “person who is assessed on property
claimed to be exempt from taxation.” Id. § 16-70. According to IDOR, without having taken or
-4- pleaded these administrative steps, the University failed to implicate IDOR and failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies, requiring the complaint to be dismissed.
¶ 15 The County defendants joined in IDOR’s motion solely on the basis of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
¶ 16 The University’s response to the motions argued that it was not required to exhaust
its administrative remedies because the local assessor lacked the authority to assess its property,
which was tax-exempt pursuant to the Charter without reference to the Tax Code. Additionally,
the University argued that the assessor could not assess exempt property absent a determination
by IDOR that the exemption had been revoked, which IDOR had not done.
¶ 17 C. Order of Dismissal
¶ 18 On May 20, 2024, the circuit court issued its written decision granting defendants’
motions to dismiss. On the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court noted that
“the Illinois General Assembly had granted the University a complete and perpetual tax exemption
for all property belonging or appertaining to [the University] for any and all purposes” and that
this grant constituted “a contractual right which may not be impaired by the State.” It further found
that the University had “failed to allege that it has filed the required application under Section
16-70 with the County Board of Review to determine the tax-exempt status” and that it had “failed
to make any allegation that it has filed with the Logan County Board of Review any application
regarding the assessment of taxes on its property that it claims exempt.” According to the court
order, the University “has not taken the steps for this administrative review [under section 16-70]
and exhaust[ed] the administrative remedies.”
¶ 19 The circuit court further determined that, as to IDOR, the complaint was
insufficient at law. “The allegation that [IDOR] could at some future time consider and rule on the
-5- [University’s] exemption under Section 15-25 is conclusory and not enough to create an actual
controversy between the [University] and [IDOR].” The court dismissed IDOR pursuant to section
2-615, “as the pleading is insufficient at law.”
¶ 20 D. Motion to Reconsider
¶ 21 The University filed a timely motion to reconsider the circuit court’s May 20 order,
arguing that the court misapplied the law. According to the University’s motion, it was not required
to exhaust administrative remedies because its “tax exemption has not been removed or terminated
in the first place and because the Tax Code “does not apply to Plaintiff’s charter tax exemption.”
It further pointed out that the court’s dismissal order did not explain how the assessor’s belief
“confers upon her the authority to ‘deny’ [the University’s] tax exemption” and did not address
how the University could have “lost its charter tax exemption.” The University argued that the
court’s focus on the cessation of teaching shows that it was viewing its exemption as “a ‘use’ type
of exemption” like those issued under the Illinois 1870 or 1970 Constitutions, ignoring “the
broader type of charter exemption granted prior to 1870.”
¶ 22 The University further argued that, even if the Tax Code applied to its charter tax
exemption, the circuit court’s order had failed to “take into account that the first obligation lies
with IDOR to remove [its] tax-exempt status pursuant to Section 15-25 of the Code *** and only
then would [the University] be required to file an application for an exemption.” Thus, the
University asserted, it was not required to utilize administrative remedies. Indeed, it claimed that
it was IDOR that was required to act under section 15-25. However, IDOR never terminated or
removed the University’s tax-exempt status and did not direct the county assessor to do so.
¶ 23 In support of its motion to reconsider, the University offered several exhibits not
previously before the circuit court. These included copies of defendants’ answers to interrogatories
-6- and the affidavit of Tiffany A. Worth, the University’s vice president for finance and
administration. The affidavit included copies of correspondence between the assessor and the
University as well as between the assessor and IDOR. No objection was made to receipt of these
materials.
¶ 24 Defendants reiterated that the University was required to submit its position to the
board of review for administrative determination and that section 16-70 established a process for
“any person who is assessed on property claimed to be exempt from taxation.” Id. According to
defendants, once the board renders its decision as to the continuing validity of the exemption, the
University can file for judicial review. Defendants contended that the University “again attempts
to confuse the issue in its motion to reconsider by arguing the merits of its exempt status without
ever having undergone the administrative hearing process.”
¶ 25 E. Order on Reconsideration
¶ 26 The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider, finding that it had not misapplied
the law. According to the court, there was a “charter, a contract, if you will, between the State and
the university or college.” However, “the Court also believed that when the university/college
executive committee approved the termination of the teaching at the college, which effectively
ended, as even noted in the original complaint, effective May 13th, 2022, it ceased educational
purposes at the college.” The court explained, “this was a contract, but a contract is two sided. The
State granted the benefits of being an exemption as long as the school was operating as a teaching,
educational entity.” It continued: “Here, we have no teaching institution still available, and that
was the reasoning and the *** rationale of the Court for denying *** the injunctive relief.”
¶ 27 According to the circuit court:
“The Court does believe that section [16-70] of the code does apply here. There
-7- was not an exemption that was carved out for chartered exemptions. The property
is one that I believe should go through the process as outlined in section 16-70, that
the board of review should hear and determine. And that would be the process
that—the administrative processes that need to be used in order for the question of
whether or not that exemption still applies to this property should be utilized, not a
request for an injunction as was put forth here.”
¶ 28 This appeal followed.
¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, the University argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing IDOR as
party. It further argues that the local assessor had no authority to assess property rendered exempt,
not by statute but pursuant to the Charter, so the University was not required to exhaust its
administrative remedies before seeking to prevent the taxation of its property. We address each
contention in turn.
¶ 31 A. Sufficiency of Claims Against IDOR
¶ 32 The University first argues the circuit court erred in dismissing its complaint against
IDOR for failure to state a sufficient cause of action. Because this issue was raised in IDOR’s
section 2-615 motion, we review the dismissal de novo. Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 530-31
(2007). A section 2-615(a) motion accepts all well-pleaded facts while questioning whether the
pleadings sufficiently state a cause of action. Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL
App (4th) 120139, ¶ 52; Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 320 (2008). Moreover, a
section 2-615 motion considers “only the facts on the face of the pleadings.” Reynolds, 2013 IL
App (4th) 120139, ¶ 52. “In other words, the defendant in such a motion is saying, ‘So what? The
facts the plaintiff has pleaded do not state a cause of action against me.’ ” Winters v. Wangler, 386
-8- Ill. App. 3d 788, 792 (2008). A circuit court should dismiss a cause of action under section 2-615
“only when it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that will entitle a plaintiff to
recovery.” Id. at 793 (citing Hadley v. Ryan, 345 Ill. App. 3d 297, 300 (2003)).
¶ 33 Section 2-701(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a circuit court may,
“in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having the force of final
judgments,” including “the construction of any *** contract or other written instrument, and a
declaration of the rights of the parties interested.” 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2022). The
declaratory judgment statute is “liberally construed and should not be restricted by unduly
technical interpretations” (First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165, 174
(1995)), though its application must still comport with the general rule that “[c]ourts cannot pass
judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render advisory opinions, or give legal advice as
to future events” (Shipp v. County of Kankakee, 345 Ill. App. 3d 250, 255 (2003)).
¶ 34 In Illinois Gaming Machine Operators Ass’n v. City of Waukegan, 2025 IL App
(2d) 230431, ¶ 114, the court stated: “Declaratory relief is proper only if there is an actual legal
controversy between the parties, i.e., if there is ‘a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and
definitive determination of the parties’ rights, the resolution of which will aid in the termination
of the controversy or some part thereof.’ ” See Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago,
66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977). If the controversy is theoretical, rather than actual, then the claim is
premature. Adkins Energy, LLC v. Delta-T Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 373, 376 (2004).
¶ 35 However, if the parties’ rights are fixed, i.e., if “the controversy has progressed so
far that there is nothing left for [them] to do except file suit for damages or other consequential
relief,” then the claim has been brought too late; there may be a claim for damages, but a
declaratory judgment is no longer proper. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Illinois Gaming
-9- Machine Operators Ass’n, 2025 IL App (2d) 230431, ¶ 114. This is because the purpose of a
declaratory judgment is to allow the parties to a dispute to “learn the consequences of their
action[s] before acting.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363,
372-73 (2003). There must be “at least some future conduct that the declaration sought will guide.”
Illinois Gaming Machine Operators Ass’n, 2025 IL App (2d) 230431, ¶ 114.
¶ 36 The declaratory judgment procedure allows a “court to take hold of a controversy
one step sooner than normally—that is, after the dispute has arisen, but before steps are taken
which give rise to claims for damages or other relief. The parties to the dispute can then learn the
consequences of their action before acting.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buege v. Lee, 56
Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1978). It is well settled that the declaratory judgment procedure “was
designed to settle and fix rights before there has been an irrevocable change in the position of the
parties that will jeopardize their respective claims of right.” First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A.,
166 Ill. 2d at 174. The remedy affords “security and relief against uncertainty so as to avoid
potential litigation.” Id.
¶ 37 The complaint alleged the following respecting IDOR in paragraph 10:
“The Illinois Department of Revenue (‘IDOR’) is named as a Defendant in
this case. Pursuant to Section 15-25 of the Illinois Property Tax Code, IDOR has
the authority to determine whether any property has been unlawfully exempted
from taxation, or is no longer entitled to exemption, under the Code. *** IDOR also
has the authority to direct the chief county assessment officer to assess the property
and return it to the assessment rolls for the next assessment year.”
IDOR is not mentioned after paragraph 10.
¶ 38 According to the circuit court, the complaint failed to allege that there was any
- 10 - controversy between the University and IDOR.
“The allegation that the Department could at some future time consider and rule on
the Plaintiff’s exemption under Section 15-25 is conclusory and not enough to
create an actual controversy between the Plaintiff and the Illinois Department of
Revenue. By not proceeding with the administrative process the Illinois
Department of Revenue never had an opportunity to weigh in on this case.”
The court noted that IDOR had taken no action and issued no official revocation of the exemption.
¶ 39 Here, no one disputes that there is a real and present controversy between the
University and the local assessor due to the latter’s attempt to reverse the exemption. The only
question is whether IDOR should be excused from litigating that concrete issue. Regardless of how
involved IDOR has been in that process to date, it is also not a stranger to it. Indeed, under the
administrative process all defendants argue the University was bound to exercise, IDOR is the
highest authority. IDOR and the local assessor are coordinate branches of government that share
authority over the assessment and taxation process; a ruling effective as to one but not the other
leaves a conspicuous gap in settling the concrete issues presented concerning the continuing
validity of the University’s exemption. Otherwise, IDOR would be free to declare the University’s
property exemption no longer valid and order the local assessor to assess its property, thus placing
the parties in the same scenario presently before us. Thus, it is manifest that IDOR’s presence in
the litigation is not only proper, but it may be required for full resolution of the University’s
concrete dispute.
¶ 40 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing IDOR. Because we
have reversed on this point, we need not address the additional issues raised in the University’s
motion to reconsider or consider the additional evidentiary material submitted in connection with
- 11 - that motion.
¶ 41 B. Exhaustion of Remedies
¶ 42 The University next argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that it had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. According to the University, it was not required to
exhaust its administrative remedies because the local assessor lacked the authority to assess the
exempt property. The University asserts that its exemption is based on a legislative charter dating
back to 1865, which made all University property “forever free and exempt from taxation for any
and all purposes whatever.”
¶ 43 Because the instant question on appeal was raised below in defendants’ section
2-619 motion, we review the dismissal de novo. Smith v. Hobart, 2021 IL App (4th) 190756, ¶ 13.
A section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but raises defects, defenses,
or other affirmative matter appearing on the face of the complaint or established by external
submissions that defeat the claim. Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Basta, 2022 IL
App (2d) 210234, ¶ 32; 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022). Under section 2-619, the movant
essentially says “yes, but”; i.e., “Yes, the complaint was legally sufficient, but an affirmative
matter exists that defeats the claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reynolds, 2013 IL App
(4th) 120139, ¶ 31.
¶ 44 1. The Doctrine and Its Exceptions
¶ 45 The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine holds that a party aggrieved by
an administrative decision cannot seek judicial review without first pursuing all available
administrative remedies. Johnson v. Department of Corrections, 368 Ill. App. 3d 147, 150 (2006).
This requirement allows the administrative agency the opportunity to consider the facts of the case
before it, use its expertise, and allow the aggrieved party to obtain relief without the need for
- 12 - judicial review. Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 320-21 (2004).
¶ 46 There are, however, exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. Brandt Construction Co.
v. Ludwig, 376 Ill. App. 3d 94, 104 (2007) (citing Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n,
132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989)). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where (1) an
ordinance, statute, or regulation is attacked on its face or in its terms as unconstitutional on its face;
(2) seeking administrative review would be inadequate or futile; (3) irreparable harm will result
from the delay incident to further pursuit of administrative remedies; or (4) an administrative
agency has no power to proceed because it lacks jurisdiction. Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309.
¶ 47 Here, the University argues that it need not have exhausted its administrative
remedies because the local assessor lacked the authority to assess its exempt property. An
administrative agency only has the authorization given to it by the legislature via statute. County
of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 553 (1999). Thus, to the extent
an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts without jurisdiction. Id.
¶ 48 Accordingly, we now turn to the University’s tax exemption and whether the
University’s action to protect it is subject to the need to exhaust its administrative remedies.
¶ 49 2. The University’s Tax Exemption
¶ 50 The 1848 Illinois Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows concerning the
taxation of property: “The property of the state and counties, both real and personal, and such other
property as the general assembly may deem necessary for school, religious, and charitable
purposes, may be exempted from taxation.” Ill. Const. 1848, art. IX, § 3.
¶ 51 Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the legislature included the following
provision as part of the University’s 1865 Charter: “All property, [of] whatever kind and
description belonging or appertaining to the corporate body created by this act, shall be and forever
- 13 - remain free and exempt from taxation for any and all purposes whatever.” 1865 Ill. Laws 48 (§ 9).
The Charter has been amended by the University several times over the years following the process
specified by the legislature. See 805 ILCS 125/2, 3, 4 (West 2022). The original provision
concerning the nontaxable nature of the University’s property, however, has remained unchanged
since 1865. See 1865 Ill. Laws 48 (§ 9). The history of charter-granted tax exemptions is explained
in People ex rel. County Collector of Cook County v. Northwestern University, 51 Ill. 2d 131, 135
(1972):
“Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1870, a large number of
corporate charters had been granted by the legislature to private educational
institutions. There were more than 80 such charters which contained some
provision for tax exemption. Only a relatively small number of these institutions
have survived. Whether the demise of the others was due to the inadequacy of the
inducement offered by way of tax exemption or to other causes is unimportant in
connection with the determination of this case. The purpose of the tax exemptions
was, of course, to bring about the donation of money or property to the institutions.
With the adoption of the constitution of 1870 the situation changed
dramatically. That constitution prohibited the legislature from granting to any
corporation any special privilege (art. IV. sec. 22), and with respect to exemption
from taxation provided that such ‘property as may be used exclusively for ***
school *** purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall be
only by general law.’ (Art. IX, sec. 3.) And by general law the legislature exempted
only that property of schools which was used exclusively for school purposes, and
not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.
- 14 - Educational institutions established subsequent to 1870 therefore do not
enjoy the same kind of tax exemption that is enjoyed by Northwestern University.”
¶ 52 Several cases have followed Northwestern University’s analysis in addressing
charter exemptions created prior to the 1870 constitution. See, e.g., People v. Young Men’s
Christian Academy of Chicago, 365 Ill. 118, 124 (1936) (YMCA of Chicago) (“Since appellee’s
amended charter was granted in 1867 its provisions must be construed in connection with the
provisions of the constitution of 1848 rather than those of the 1870 constitution.”); People ex rel.
Gill v. Lake Forest University, 367 Ill. 103, 110-11 (1937) (similarly worded charter exemption
granted under 1848 constitution applied to the university’s real estate whether or not occupied by
the university or used for curricular activities).
¶ 53 In YMCA of Chicago, a tax was levied on the YMCA’s personal property because
the assessor determined it was not being used for a charitable undertaking. The YMCA, however,
operated under a legislative charter granted in 1861 that designated its property as “ ‘forever
exempt from taxation.’ ” YMCA of Chicago, 365 Ill. at 119. After reviewing the Northwestern
University case and noting that the charter provisions “must be construed in connection with the
provisions of the constitution of 1848,” the court concluded that the property was “forever exempt
from taxation.” Id. at 124-25. Similarly, in Chicago Home for Girls v. Carr, 300 Ill. 478, 485-86
(1921), the court held that a provision in a special charter under the 1848 constitution exempting
property of the corporation from taxation and authorizing it to hold real estate “ ‘for the use of or
for the purposes of said corporation’ ” included both property acquired for the use of the
corporation, and property it leased for revenue to be used in carrying out its objectives.
¶ 54 Here, the University’s property tax exemption originates not from the Tax Code,
but from the University’s pre-1870 Charter, which was issued at a time when the legislature could
- 15 - grant full exemptions from property taxation. See Lake Forest University, 367 Ill. at 105. The
University’s exemption likewise does not owe its continuing existence to the Tax Code or the
discretion of taxing authorities.
¶ 55 In support of its contention that the tax exemption applies to all of its properties
without regard to their use, the University relies on these words from the Charter: “free and exempt
from taxation for any and all purposes whatever.” (Emphasis added.) We do not agree with the
University’s construction of this phrase. Under the “last antecedent doctrine,” relative or
qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding
them and not to more remote words, phrases, or clauses, unless the contrary intention is apparent.
In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 467 (2008). Here, application of the last antecedent doctrine leads to
the conclusion that the words “any and all purposes whatever” refers to the antecedent word,
“taxation.” In other words, the property tax exemption was intended to extend to any property tax
that would be imposed for any purpose. So, for example, the exemption applies to the general
property tax, but it would also apply to a property tax intended to fund a school, sanitary district,
library, etc. The phrase in question refers to the purpose of the tax, not the purpose of the
landowner’s use of its property.
¶ 56 However, we believe that the University’s ultimate interpretation of the Charter is
correct without need to resort to the “any and all purposes whatever” language. The Charter
explicitly extends the exemption to the University’s property without any qualification as to the
use to which the property is being put. As a result of this plain language, the University’s
exemption differs dramatically from the use-based statutory exemption created by section 15-35
of the current Tax Code, which states that “all property of schools, not sold or leased or otherwise
used with a view to profit, is exempt.” (Emphasis added.). 35 ILCS 200/15-35 (West 2022). We
- 16 - further note that section 15-65, which governs charitable exemptions, is likewise conditioned on
the property being “actually and exclusively used for charitable or beneficent purposes, and not
leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.” (Emphases added.) Id. § 15-65.
¶ 57 The legislative grant in the original Charter conferred a complete and perpetual tax
exemption for all property “belonging or appertaining to” the University, and that exemption
cannot be impaired by the State. See Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill. 256, 260-61 (1878); Spring Hill
Cemetery of Danville v. Ryan, 20 Ill. 2d 608, 613 (1960). Having concluded that the University’s
exemption was not use-based and further that it arose from the Charter and not the Tax Code, we
now look at the local assessor’s authority to assess the exempt property.
¶ 58 3. Local Assessor’s Authority to Assess the University’s Exempt Property
¶ 59 Illinois law is clear that “public officials have no taxing power except that which is
delegated to them by the legislature.” Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill.
2d 281, 295 (2010). The Tax Code authorizes a local assessor to assess only nonexempt property.
See Carle Foundation v. Department of Revenue, 2023 IL App (4th) 200121, ¶ 188. Specifically,
section 9-70 states, in part, “[l]ocal assessment officers shall assess all other property not exempted
from taxation.” (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/9-70 (West 2022); see Millennium Park Joint
Venture, LLC, 241 Ill. 2d at 296-97. Similarly, a local assessor has no sua sponte authority to
unravel the previously awarded exemptions. Carle Foundation, 2023 IL App (4th) 200121, ¶ 188.
¶ 60 a. Change in Use
¶ 61 The County defendants argue that the local assessor had the authority to assess the
University’s property because its use changed when classes were terminated in May 2022. In
support, the County defendants rely on the language of section 9-185 of the Tax Code, which
states, in part, that a property owner must “notify the chief county assessment officer within 30
- 17 - days” of any “change in use or a change in a leasehold estate,” and that the “[f]ailure to give the
notification, resulting in the assessing official continuing to list the property as exempt in
subsequent years, shall cause the property to be considered omitted property for the purpose of
this Code.” 35 ILCS 200/9-185 (West 2022). They further rely on section 15-10(a) of the Tax
Code, which provides that “[a]ll property granted an exemption by the Department pursuant to the
requirements of Section 15-5 *** is exempt from taxation” and that, to maintain its exempt status,
a property owner must “must file with the chief county assessment officer *** an affidavit stating
whether there has been any change in the ownership or use of the property.” Id. § 15-10(a).
¶ 62 The supreme court has instructed: “Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must
be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous.” Slepicka
v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 14 (citing Chicago Teachers Union,
Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15). Moreover, “[i]n determining
the meaning of a statute, a court will not read language in isolation, but must consider it in the
context of the entire statute.” Id. (citing In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d 332, 343 (2003)).
¶ 63 Read in its entirety, section 9-185’s language shows that its application is limited
to a use-based exemption from taxation that arises under the Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/9-185 (West
2022). Specifically, section 9-185 references “a use exempt from taxation under this Code to a use
not so exempt.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Similarly, section 15-10 further references all property
“granted an exemption by the Department” under section 15-5. But the instant exemption arises
not under any provision of the Tax Code but from the University’s Charter. Defendants are arguing
that the University should be required to exhaust an administrative process that cannot validate its
exemption because it does not even speak to the validity of a charter-based exemption; the Tax
Code does not even use the word “charter.”
- 18 - ¶ 64 As the circuit court correctly recognized, the Charter making the University’s
property tax exempt creates a contractual property right. See University v. People, 99 U.S. 309,
322 (1878) (recognizing Northwestern University’s contractual right in its charter from the State
of Illinois); Ruggles, 91 Ill. at 260-61. However, the court felt that the University has failed to meet
its part of the contractual bargain by discontinuing its educational activities. This is a dramatic
conclusion that would affect more than the University’s tax exemption; it could conceivably affect
the University’s very existence. After all, the Charter established the University “for the promotion
of general and professional education and theological instruction,” and if it has, or will, fail its
intended purpose, a fair question might be raised as to whether it may continue to exist under its
current charter. If not, this would secondarily affect the taxability of its properties, but surely the
primary question of the University’s continued existence would be of even greater consequence.
¶ 65 Furthermore, as noted by the University, if there is a question of whether the
University has failed to meet its chartered purpose, statute provides the appropriate remedy. The
Illinois Attorney General is authorized to pursue judicial dissolution of a not-for-profit corporation
if it has exceeded its authority under law. 805 ILCS 105/112.50(a)(2) (West 2022). Neither the
local assessor nor IDOR has been granted such authority. The most recent version of the
University’s charter contains a specific provision governing how it might be wound down after
dissolution. We mention this existential issue not to suggest how it might be decided but simply to
illustrate that such a weighty matter cannot be subject to determination by a local assessor or by
the administrative process administered by IDOR.
¶ 66 It is well settled that an exception to the administrative exhaustion doctrine exists
where an administrative agency has no power to proceed because it lacks jurisdiction to declare
the University’s exemption to be at an end. Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309. For the reasons stated
- 19 - above, the local assessor lacked the authority to assess the University’s property, and IDOR’s
administrative process for reviewing more modern, use-based exemptions does not apply to the
University’s pre-1870 charter exemption. Because the assessor lacked authority, its assessment
was improper, and the properties remain exempt. As a result, we find there was no need for the
University to exhaust any administrative remedies before bringing suit to establish the impropriety
of the assessor’s negation of its exemption.
¶ 67 b. Defendants’ Remaining Arguments
¶ 68 Defendants’ remaining arguments all center on a party’s obligations regarding
exempt property under the Tax Code. Because we have already determined that the University’s
exemption was not a creation of the Tax Code, we reject these arguments.
¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing IDOR as a
defendant and granting the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss for failing to exhaust its
administrative remedies. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on the
merits of the University’s complaint in conformity with this order.
¶ 71 Reversed and remanded.
- 20 - Lincoln University v. Logan County, 2025 IL App (4th) 241012
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan County, No. 23-CH-7; the Hon. William G. Workman, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James T. Jackson and Kathleen W. Pletsch, of Samuels, Miller, for Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, LLP, of Decatur, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Matthew J. Cate and Schuyler E. Frashier, of Barber, Segatto, for Hoffee, Wilke & Cate, LLP, of Springfield, for appellees Logan Appellee: County, Logan County Board of Review, Jennifer Bryant, and Penny Thomas.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Christina T. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellee.
- 21 -