Lincoln City Employees Union v. City of Lincoln

317 N.W.2d 63, 210 Neb. 751, 1982 Neb. LEXIS 987
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 12, 1982
Docket43615
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 317 N.W.2d 63 (Lincoln City Employees Union v. City of Lincoln) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lincoln City Employees Union v. City of Lincoln, 317 N.W.2d 63, 210 Neb. 751, 1982 Neb. LEXIS 987 (Neb. 1982).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The appellee, Lincoln City Employees Union, National Association of Government Employees (hereafter NAGE), petitioned the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations (hereafter CIR) to conduct an election and to certify NAGE as the exclusive bargaining agent of certain employees of the City of Lincoln classified as “labor, labor supervision, and trades.”

The appellant City of Lincoln, Nebraska (hereafter City), interposed objections, more specifically (1) that a contract already existed between the City and the employees sought to be represented, and the contract constituted a bar to an election, and (2) that the proposed bargaining unit would consist of civilian employees and police officers since the existing police union was a local of International Brotherhood of Police Officers (hereafter IBPO), a division of NAGE. A few background facts are in order.

Prior to the time the petition was filed, the City’s employees were represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (hereafter AFSCME), IBPO, Amalgamated Transportation Union, and the International Association of Firefighters. In addition to these unions, the City also voluntarily recognized Lincoln City Employees Association (hereafter LCEA) as a labor organization representing employees not officially represented by the unions previously mentioned.

LCEA employees negotiated wages, hours, and fringe benefits with the City and also enjoyed checkoff privileges, bulletin board privileges, and the right to process grievances. In June 1978 the City and LCEA *753 reached a 2-year agreement which was to expire on August 31, 1980. The terms of the agreement covered wages, health insurance, retirement, and sick leave.

Subsequent to this agreement AFSCME, which served as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees described in the NAGE petition, was decertified in CIR case No. 261 on November 20,1978. With the decertification of AFSCME, LCEA sent the City personnel director a letter asking the City if LCEA could be recognized as the bargaining agent for the former AFSCME employees. The City notified LCEA that the former AFSCME employees would be eligible for membership in LCEA. The City agreed to “meet and confer” with LCEA on behalf of all employees not represented by one of the other officially recognized bargaining agents, as long as the arrangement was acceptable to the affected employees. The conditions of employment extended to LCEA members were also extended to former AFSCME members.

NAGE filed its petition for election on July 31, 1979. After determining that LCEA was a necessary party to the action, a hearing was held on September 27, 1979, to determine if a contract bar existed. On October 30, 1979, the CIR ruled that: “1. A contract bar does not exist as to those employees previously represented by AFSCME and decertified on November 20, 1978, by CIR Case No. 261. The evidence adduced by the petitioner does not support a finding that these employees were bound by the contract in question or that the City Employees Association actually had any authority to represent them. 2. There does exist a contract bar as to any employees sought to be represented by the petitioner who were represented by the City Employees Association and not represented by AFSCME on September 1, 1978.”

Thereafter, the City filed a motion to dismiss based on the answers to certain interrogatories the City had served on NAGE. The City’s basic contention was that the Lincoln Police Union was a local of IBPO which, in *754 turn, was a division of NAGE. The City argued that the direct or indirect affiliation of the police union with NAGE prevents NAGE from representing former AFSCME members since this might result in guard and nonguard employees being represented by the same union.

The CIR held a hearing on November 20, 1979, and entered its order on November 21,1979, overruling the City’s motion.

By joint stipulation of the parties, a representation election was held on February 22, 1980, which resulted in the election of NAGE as the exclusive bargaining representative. The City filed an objection to the election, stating that employees other than members of the bargaining unit acted as observers for NAGE. The CIR overruled the City’s motion. Thereafter, the City filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled. The City then filed a notice of appeal to this court. After the bill of exceptions and transcript were docketed in this court, the City filed another motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The CIR found that it was without jurisdiction and the City filed a supplemental praecipe to have the motion filed with this court.

The standard of review by the Supreme Court of orders and decisions of the CIR is generally restricted to considering whether the CIR’s order is supported by substantial evidence, whether the CIR acted within the scope of its statutory authority, and whether its action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. AFSCME Local 2088 v. County of Douglas, 208 Neb. 511, 304 N.W.2d 368 (1981).

There is substantial evidence in the record that a contract bar did not exist. The following testimony of Walter J. Mitchell, personnel director for the City, strongly supported the CIR decision. The following questions and answers were elicited at the September 27, 1979, hearing: “Q In your agreements which you reached with formal labor unions, that agreement flows to only certain employees of the City of Lincoln desig *755 nated in that contract. A That’s right. Q When this agreement was reached with City Employees Association in June of 1978, to whom did those benefits accruing under that agreement flow? A Everybody who wasn’t represented by one of the formal agreements that you’re talking about, other than the unclassified employees. Q Those benefits did not flow, at that time, to members of the AFSCME bargaining unit? A No, because — That’s right. The answer is no. Q At the time that these ordinances were passed which were introduced in September or October of 1978, the benefits agreed to with CEA also were not ratified as benefits for the AFSCME employees? A Not at that time. Q Since that time, since the ordinances were passed, there have been no negotiations between CEA and the City of Lincoln for the benefit of the former AFSCME bargaining group employees. A That’s right.”

It is not disputed that at the time LCEA was negotiating the June 1978 contract it was not representing any of the AFSCME members. An agreement was reached and the contract was ratified before AFSCME was decertified. At the time the contract was negotiated, it was never the intention of LCEA or the City that AFSCME members would be covered by the contract. Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that a contract bar exists. Therefore, the CIR order of October 30, 1979, is correct.

The City contends that the new Lincoln City Employees Union and the Lincoln Police Union are directly or indirectly affiliated with each other.

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317 N.W.2d 63, 210 Neb. 751, 1982 Neb. LEXIS 987, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lincoln-city-employees-union-v-city-of-lincoln-neb-1982.