Lincoln Amsterdam House, Inc. v. Baxter

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lincoln Amsterdam House, Inc. v. Baxter

249 A.D.2d 146, 671 N.Y.S.2d 244, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4349

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 21, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 249 A.D.2d 146 (Lincoln Amsterdam House, Inc. v. Baxter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lincoln Amsterdam House, Inc. v. Baxter, 249 A.D.2d 146, 671 N.Y.S.2d 244, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4349 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.), entered October 30, 1996, against defendants in the total sum of $59,418 representing Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) surcharges, attorneys’ fees and disbursements, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This Court has previously held that defendants were required to certify their income for the purpose of determining whether they were responsible for payment of a surcharge imposed pursuant to section 3-03 (a) of HPD’s Rules and Regulations (28 RCNY 3-03 [a]), and that said HPD surcharge was not “rent” and therefore not preempted by section 236 of the National Housing Act (82 US Stat 498, as amended; 12 USC § 1715z-l) (224 AD2d 207, lv denied and dismissed 89 NY2d 856). The amount of the surcharge was properly determined by the Special Referee, after a hearing, based upon the “fair market rent” set by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to section 236 of the National Housing Act. There was no dispute as to the “fair market rent” applicable in determining the extent of defendants’ surcharge obligation (supra).

Contrary to defendant’s argument, section 3-03 (d) (4) of HPD’s Rules and Regulations (28 RCNY 3-03 [d] [4]) does not limit plaintiff housing company’s available remedies to commencement of summary dispossess proceedings upon a cooperator’s failure to pay surcharges.

Finally, we have previously held that defendants were liable for plaintiffs attorneys’ fees (224 AD2d 207, supra), and we now find that the amount awarded after an extensive hearing, at which complete, detailed substantiation was produced, was fair and reasonable.

We have reviewed defendants’ other contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur — Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Tom and Andrias, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.), entered October 30, 1996, against defendants in the total sum of $59,418 representing Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) surcharges, attorneys’ fees and disbursements, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This Court has previously held that defendants were required to certify their income for the purpose of determining whether they were responsible for payment of a surcharge imposed pursuant to section 3-03 (a) of HPD’s Rules and Regulations (28 RCNY 3-03 [a]), and that said HPD surcharge was not “rent” and therefore not preempted by section 236 of the National Housing Act (82 US Stat 498, as amended; 12 USC § 1715z-l) (224 AD2d 207, lv denied and dismissed 89 NY2d 856). The amount of the surcharge was properly determined by the Special Referee, after a hearing, based upon the “fair market rent” set by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to section 236 of the National Housing Act. There was no dispute as to the “fair market rent” applicable in determining the extent of defendants’ surcharge obligation (supra).

Contrary to defendant’s argument, section 3-03 (d) (4) of HPD’s Rules and Regulations (28 RCNY 3-03 [d] [4]) does not limit plaintiff housing company’s available remedies to commencement of summary dispossess proceedings upon a cooperator’s failure to pay surcharges.

Finally, we have previously held that defendants were liable for plaintiffs attorneys’ fees (224 AD2d 207, supra), and we now find that the amount awarded after an extensive hearing, at which complete, detailed substantiation was produced, was fair and reasonable.

We have reviewed defendants’ other contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur — Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Tom and Andrias, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

249 A.D.2d 146, 671 N.Y.S.2d 244, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lincoln-amsterdam-house-inc-v-baxter-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack