Lincks v. Keenan
Opinion
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his fifth amended complaint against Joan Keenan, claiming that the court should not have dismissed it as to Keenan when it had earlier granted a default against her.1 However, the court dismissed the com[185] plaint for failure to state a cause of action. Because the entry of a default constitutes an admission of only the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, see Days Inns Acquisition Corp. v. Hutchinson, 707 So.2d 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), a complaint which fails to state a cause of action cannot form the basis of a judgment against the defendant. See GAC Corp. v. Beach, 308 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d’DCA 1975). The court did not err in dismissing the complaint against Keenan for failure to state a cause of action, even though it had previously granted a motion for default as to Keenan.2
Affirmed.
Footnotes
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21 So. 3d 184 (Lincks v. Keenan) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.