Limpin v. Unknown Names of Federal Employees of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00956
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 MELCHOR KARL T. LIMPIN, Case No.: 25-cv-00956-WQH-MSB

Plaintiff, 10 ORDER v. 11 12 UNKNOWN NAMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES OF 13 SOCIAL SECURITY 14 ADMINISTRATION, in their personal capacities, 15 Defendants. 16 HAYES, Judge: 17 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 18 On April 21, 2025, Plaintiff Melchor Karl T. Limpin (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro 19 se, initiated this action by filing a Complaint against Defendants Unknown Names of 20 Federal Employees of Social Security Administration (the “Unnamed Defendants”). (ECF 21 No. 1.) The same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) 22 II. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, other than 24 a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 25 26

27 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 28 1 CivLR 4.5. An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee only if the 2 party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 3 See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in forma pauperis 4 is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965). 5 In his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Plaintiff states that he is not presently 6 employed, receives $1,504.00 in total monthly income from Social Security Disability 7 Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits, and possesses no assets. (See ECF No. 2 at 1–2.) Based on 8 these representations, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to afford the filing fee and 9 therefore grants the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2). 10 III. INITIAL SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT 11 A. Legal Standard 12 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer screening 13 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 14 an IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, 15 or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 16 502 (9th Cir. 2017). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous 17 or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 18 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 19 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 20 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 21 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 22 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 23 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a 24 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 25 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 26

27 Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 2 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 3 suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a 4 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 5 and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 7 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 8 B. Allegations in the Complaint 9 On March 28, 2023, Chief Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Kevin W. Messer 10 issued a decision in favor of Plaintiff, finding that the Social Security Administration (the 11 “SSA”) owed him $4,832.10 in past due SSDI benefits. (Compl. ¶ 3 (citing ECF No. 1-2 12 at 3–8).) 13 On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff visited an SSA field office in San Diego, California, 14 where he met with an individual identified as “Mr. Will.” Id. Plaintiff presented Mr. Will 15 with the ALJ’s decision and respectfully requested payment of the past due benefits. Id. 16 On August 8, 2023, the SSA sent Plaintiff a “letter of dismissal” which stated: “‘We 17 have dismissed your request for reconsideration dated November 17, 2021, because an 18 initial determination has not been made in your case.’” Id. ¶ 4 (citing ECF No. 1-2 at 10). 19 The issuance of this letter constituted “an act of deceit, oppression, malice” and the 20 Unnamed Defendants “acted under color of SSA regulation to deprive [Plaintiff] under the 21 Fifth Amendment” and to avoid paying the $4,832.10 owed to him. Id. 22 “Plaintiff kept going back to the SSA field office in downtown San Diego, CA 23 seeking help for payment and providing copies of the decision by the ALJ.” Id. ¶ 5. Still, 24 on January 9, 2024, Plaintiff received a letter from the SSA which stated: 25 While reviewing your record, we found past due benefit of $4,152.50 in unpaid benefits have been released in July of 2020. When your benefits were 26 reinstated we did not correctly account for your duplicate payment made in 27 February 2012. As a result, we paid you $1,110 more benefit payments than you were due. 28 1 Id. (citing ECF No. 1-2 at 12). This letter “made [P]laintiff feel like an illiterate or imbecile 2 because the SSA employees involved can simply offset the $1,110 from the $4,832.10 3 owed.” Id. 4 On January 18, 2024, “Plaintiff filed a waiver of overpayment” requesting the SSA 5 offset any overpayment Plaintiff owed the SSA from the $4,832.10 owed to Plaintiff. Id. 6 ¶ 6. 7 On March 1, 2024, the SSA issued another letter asserting that Plaintiff still owed 8 $1,110.00 due to the SSA’s alleged overpayment of benefits, despite Plaintiff’s submission 9 of the waiver. Id. ¶ 7 (citing ECF No. 1-2 at 28). Under SSA regulations, a decision on a 10 waiver request must be rendered before the agency may initiate collection of any 11 overpayment. Id. 12 On March 25, 2024, Plaintiff, feeling distraught over the potential collection of the 13 alleged overpayment from his direct deposit—which would have rendered him unable to 14 afford rent and homeless—called the SSA’s national helpline at 1-800-772-1213. Id. He 15 spoke with a representative named Sylvia, who offered assistance and arranged a 16 $31-per-month repayment plan. Id. This interaction led to the issuance of another SSA 17 letter dated April 3, 2024 documenting this repayment plan. Id. (citing ECF No. 1-2 at 28– 18 30). 19 Plaintiff returned to the SSA field office on multiple occasions—specifically on May 20 28, 2024, November 6, 2024, December 5, 2024, January 6, 2025, January 29, 2025, 21 February 20, 2025, and April 4, 2025—to request an update regarding the $4,832.10 in past 22 due benefits owed to him. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. During one of these visits, an SSA employee 23 informed Plaintiff that if he returned at least three times on a monthly basis, a 24 “manager-to-manager” email would be sent to the SSA’s payment processing center. Id. 25 ¶ 9. 26 On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff received a letter from the SSA’s payment processing 27 center which stated: “‘After reviewing your record, we found that past due benefits in the 28 amount of $4,152.50 were released in July of 2020 and paid in August of 2020. There are 1 no unpaid benefits due at this time.’” Id. ¶ 10 (citing ECF No. 1-2 at 34). “This letter again 2 is an act of deceit, oppression or malice or in conscious disregard not to make a payment 3 of $4,832.10 to [P]laintiff.” Id. 4 Plaintiff seeks a “Bivens-remedy” in the amount of $115,970.40—representing the 5 $4,832.10 allegedly owed, multiplied by 24 months of nonpayment—and demands a jury 6 trial for punitive damages under California Civil Code § 3294 against the Unnamed 7 Defendants for alleged acts of deceit, oppression, or malice, carried out in conscious 8 disregard of their obligation to issue payment. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 9 C. Discussion 10 Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against the Unnamed Defendants: (1) violation 11 of his Fifth Amendment due process rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 12 Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and (2) deceit, oppression, 13 and malice under California Civil Code § 3294. 14 a. Bivens Action 15 Plaintiff’s first cause of action is brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 16 Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which recognizes a cause of 17 action for constitutional violations committed by federal officials acting in their individual 18 capacities. Plaintiff alleges that the Unnamed Defendants, employees of the SSA, violated 19 his Fifth Amendment due process rights by issuing letters falsely stating that no benefits 20 were owed to him and thereafter withholding his SSDI benefits. (Compl. ¶ 10.) 21 However, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Bivens action based on the denial or delay of 22 SSDI benefits. See Butler v. Apfel, 144 F.3d 622, 624 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Bivens 23 remedies are unavailable for claims arising from the denial of SSDI benefits); see also 24 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423–24 (1987) (declining to extend Bivens to due 25 process claims involving the improper denial of disability benefits by federal officials); 26 Ahlin v. Soc. Sec. Off., No. CIVF07-287AWI SMS, 2007 WL 1302427, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 27 May 3, 2007) (“Bivens actions, i.e. suits against federal actors in their individual capacities 28 1 for violations of constitutional rights … cannot be pursued based on the denial of social 2 security benefits.”). 3 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Bivens claim for failure to state a claim 4 upon which relief can be granted. 5 b. California Civil Code § 3294 (Deceit, Oppression, or Malice) 6 Plaintiff’s second cause of action is asserted under California Civil Code § 3294 7 (“§ 3294”), alleging that the Unnamed Defendants acted with deceit, malice, or oppression 8 in denying him past due SSDI benefits. (See Compl. ¶ 11.) However, § 3294 does not create 9 an independent cause of action; it merely “sets forth the circumstances in which exemplary, 10 or punitive, damages are allowable under California law.” Harris v. New Rez, LLC, No. 11 221CV01604KJMCKDPS, 2022 WL 184000, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022), report and 12 recommendation adopted sub nom. Harris v. Shellpoint Debt Collecting Co., No. 13 221CV01604DADCKDPS, 2022 WL 16836576 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2022) (internal citation 14 omitted); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). 15 Here, Plaintiff appears to impermissibly rely on § 3294 to assert a stand-alone claim 16 for punitive damages. In the absence of a viable underlying cause of action “for the breach 17 of an obligation not rising from contract,” a claim for punitive damages under § 3294 18 cannot be sustained. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). 19 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. 20 c. Leave to Amend 21 Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys. 22 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Accordingly, when a court determines that a 23 pro se complaint fails to state a claim, it must grant the litigant leave to amend unless “it is 24 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 25 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted); Lira v. 26 Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, if amendment of the pleading 27 would be futile, leave to amend may be denied. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 28 1 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of … leave to 2 amend.”). 3 In this case, even if the Complaint is construed liberally and Plaintiff is given the 4 benefit of all doubts, no amendment would allow him to bring either a Bivens claim or a 5 stand-alone claim pursuant to § 3294 against any individual that caused the SSA to deny 6 Plaintiff’s application for SSDI benefits. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 7 Complaint without prejudice and without leave to amend. 8 The Court notes that jurisdiction over social security cases is generally governed by 9 § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, which authorizes judicial review only of a “final 10 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing[.]” 42 U.S.C. 11 § 405(g). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge an alleged underpayment of SSDI 12 benefits, he must adhere to the following four-step process: 13 First, the claimant must seek an initial determination as to his eligibility. Second, the claimant must seek reconsideration of the initial determination. 14 Third, the claimant must request a hearing, which is conducted by an ALJ. 15 Fourth, the claimant must seek review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. See 20 CFR § 416.1400. If a claimant has proceeded through all four 16 steps on the merits, all agree, § 405(g) entitles him to judicial review in federal 17 district court. 18 Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 475–76 (2019); see also Montoya v. Colvin, No. 2:16-cv- 19 00454-RFB-NJK, 2016 WL 890922, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2016) (noting that plaintiffs 20 must exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to properly invoke 21 judicial review). 22 Plaintiff’s current action has been dismissed and leave to amend the Complaint has 23 been denied. If Plaintiff intends to pursue a claim for past due SSDI benefits, he must 24 initiate a new action and file a complaint that (1) clearly articulates the basis for the claim, 25 (2) names the appropriate defendant—typically the Commissioner of Social Security—, 26 and (3) demonstrates compliance with the procedural requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. 27 § 405(g). 28 / / / 1 CONCLUSION 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 3 is granted. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed without 5 || prejudice and without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 6 7 Dated: July 15, 2025 BME: Me Z. Maa 8 Hon. William Q. Hayes 9 United States District Court 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28