Limpert v. Day

218 N.E.2d 209, 7 Ohio Misc. 231, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 322, 1966 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 299
CourtCuyahoga County Probate Court
DecidedJune 28, 1966
DocketNos. 664636, 664632, 664633, 664629, 664631, 664630, 664635 and 664634
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 218 N.E.2d 209 (Limpert v. Day) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cuyahoga County Probate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Limpert v. Day, 218 N.E.2d 209, 7 Ohio Misc. 231, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 322, 1966 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 299 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1966).

Opinion

Merrick, P. J.

These cases are before this court on appeals perfected in accordance with provisions of Section 6117.09, Revised Code, granting right of appeal to this court from a spread of assessments by the Board of County Commissioners (hereafter referred to as Commissioners) in what has come to be known as the Westlake Sewer District. At the outset the court finds that the improvement is necessary and with the exception of one appellant is of benefit to the appellants and that the boundaries of the assessment districts are not fixed by any arbitrary, unreasonable or illegal action by the commissioners.

The court will direct its consideration to the claims that the assessments proposed exceed the benefits which would flow therefrom to the various parcels and that the same assessments are confiscatory and constitute a taking of private property without just compensation.

The above titled cases were consolidated and tried together. Later in this opinion, the assessment against each parce] will be considered separately and reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section 6117.16, Revised Code.

The city of Westlake is located in County Sewer District 3 9 and comprises about 11,000 acres of land. The plan created by the commissioners is to sewer the city in three zones. Zone 1 is to be sewered by trunk, sub-trunk and local sewers. Zones 2 and 3 are not being sewered at this time; but will receive street service wherever the interceptor sewers are available. Zone 3 will require a pumping station. The cost of the present proposed installation is estimated at $16,600,000 and assessments have been spread over 8,780 acres. 1,865 acres in Westlake are not included and have not been assessed.

For the purpose of the assessment, zones have been created. Zone 1-A comprises all area within 200 feet of a sewered thoroughfare and the spread is $4,789.95 per acre. Zone 1-B comprises all area beyond 200 feet in parcels less than 500 feet in [233]*233depth and the spread is $1,197.47 per acre. Zone 1-C comprises all area beyond 1-A in parcels more than 550 feet deep and is assessed at $2,280.14 per acre. Zone 2-A is assessed at $575.52 per acre. Zone 2-B is assessed at $143.00 per acre and Zone 2-0 is assessed at $430.69 per acre. It is unnecessary to examine Zone 3 as none of appellants ’ lands are in that zone.

The city of Westlake, following a survey, issued statements that it is contemplated that the city will be two-thirds developed by the year 1980 and estimates that if and when the sanitary sewers and the proposed Northwest Freeway are completed that the contemplated growth will add 280 new dwelling units per year.

In recent years, sewers, like highways have become of national concern. Now and for years raw sewage in the Westlake and surrounding areas has been finding its way into near-by Lake Erie. It is a matter of judicial notice that the lake is highly polluted to the extent that it has been a subject of local, state, national and international concern. Any method which reduces the pollution of Lake Erie will be of benefit to the health and welfare of millions of our citizens. The Ohio Water Pollution Control Board has ordered Westlake to install this sanitary sewer system and provide for disposal of raw sewage to the extent that it will accomplish complete abatement of the existing health hazards. These orders have been continued from time to time, awaiting the outcome of this and other litigation.

For a century in this country, the installation of streets, paving, sidewalks, water and sewer have been a burden to be assumed by the directly benefited property owner, usually contiguous to the proposed improvement. In recent years it has come to be an established fact that street improvements which were to be used by others than the abutting owners should be paid for at least in part by the general public. It would be untenable to contend that our super-highways, local and interstate, should be paid for by the abutting property owners. Now these highways are constructed and maintained by local, state and national government funds raised by taxing the general public.

The disposal of sewage in the area including Westlake is of general benefit in that it will decease the pollution of Lake Erie and creeks and rivers flowing into such lake. Surely, this is for [234]*234the betterment of the health and welfare of thousands and millions far away from the immediate problem of Westlake’s property owners. While this court has no jurisdiction to spread the assessments beyond the parcels represented by the cases on appeal, in equity and justice, the situation should be pointed up to all those benefited, directly or remotely.

There are 5,555 parcels of land in the Westlake sewer district covered by this assessment. While only 16 parcels are involved in this appeal, this very small group of objectors should not be burdened with any consideration being given to the fact that the overwhelming majority are satisfied with the assessments. Certainly there are some unusual situations and problems confronting the appellants in attempting to determine whether the assessments will bring the dollar benefits necessary to-justify any taxing of this type.

The fundamental principle underlying the imposition of special assessments on property for a' public improvement is that the property is specially benefited and should bear its proportionate cost thereof corresponding to such benefit. Walsh v. Barron, Treas., 61 Ohio St. 15; Domito v. Maumee, 140 Ohio St. 229. When a special assessment is materially in excess of the benefits conferred or substantially unequal thereto, no advantage accrues to the owner and the special assessment loses its justification. It thereupon invades the inviolability of private property and contravenes the provisions of Section 19, Article I of the Constitution. State, ex rel. Shafer, v. Otter, Surveyor, 106 Ohio St. 415; Baxter v. Van Houter, Auditor, 115 Ohio St. 288; Domito v. Village of Maumee, supra.

In examining the assessments it is readily apparent that the spread per acre was applied as a yardstick according to the classification in which the land had been placed without any regard to the length, breadth, type of terrain or other inherent factors which might otherwise affect the value of land. For example, a long narrow stretch of land was assessed on an acreage basis the same as a wide square stretch. It must be noted that the terrain and shape greatly affect land values. This will be discussed later in this opinion.

The term “benefit,” as regards validity of improvement assessments, does not mean simply an advance or increase in mar[235]*235ket value, but embraces actual increase in money value, and also potential or actual or added use and enjoyment of tbe property. Prentice v. City of Toledo, 11 C. C. (N. S.) 299; McMaken v. Hayes, 10 C. C. (N. S.) 38, affirmed in 78 Ohio St. 412; Rice v. Danville, 36 Ohio App. 503.

Tbe application of a foot-front rule or other rule based on tbe fact that tbe property abuts or is close to tbe proposed facility standing alone, is not in and of itself tbe correct or incorrect method of assessment. If it appears that tbe application of such rule results in substantial or at least a rough approximation to apportionment according to special benefits, or consti-tues as close an approximation thereto as could be attained by any other method of apportionment, it should be sustained.

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Bluebook (online)
218 N.E.2d 209, 7 Ohio Misc. 231, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 322, 1966 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/limpert-v-day-ohprobctcuyahog-1966.