Limeburner v. Murphy
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT HANCOCK, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-09-26
f< M L~-HA N- :;J.-/1_lJOrO
JUSTIN LIMEBURNER and TINA LIMEBURNER
Plaintiffs
v.
ERIC S. MURPHY, SR. d/b/a ERIC S. MURPHY TRUST and d/b/a MURPHY HOME LOANS, ERIC S. MURPHY, JR., d/b/a MURPHY HOME LOANS
Defendants
DECISION and ORDER
Defendants Eric. S. Murphy, Sr. and the Eric S. Murphy Trust filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Justin Limeburner and Tina Limeburner. This motion is filed pursuant to Rule l2(b)(6) alleging that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Amended Complaint was filed following a conference of counsel and the court at which the Court encouraged the filing of the amended complaint to state with more particularity the facts that would form the basis for a viable legal claim. The intention was to avoid unnecessary discovery, which would be expensive to the parties and time consuming to all. This prompted the
filing of an 'amended complaint' which prompted a further filing of the Motion to Dismiss.
The Law Court provided updated guidance on the standards to be met by notice pleading in the case of Town of Stonington v. Galilean Gospel, 1999 ME 2, ~14, 722 A.2d 1269, 1272. In that case the Court advised
U(M)odern notice pl~ading practice requires "a short and plain statement of the claim" to provide fair notice of the cause of action, M.R. Civ. P.
8(a)(1), but use of any particular "magic" words are not required to state a particular claim. We construe the "pleadings in favor of the pleader and in the interests of substantial justice." Chiappetta v.
LeBlond, 505 A.2d 783, 785 (Me.1986); M.R. Civ. P.
8(f). "The function of the complaint is to provide fair notice of a claim.' . . . It must sufficiently apprise defendants of the nature of the action against them." Bolton v. Caine, 584 A.2d 615, 617 (Me.
1990) (quoting Rubin v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665, 669 n.4 (Me. 1984)).
In that context a Motion to Dismiss is to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff to determine whether it sets for elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle Plaintiff to relief. It must appear beyond a doubt that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief to justify granting the Motion. Saunders v. Tisher 2006 ME 94, ~8, 902 A.2d 830, 832.
Defendant Murphy, Sr.'s Motion focuses on Counts 1 through 4 and 6 through 9 as they relate to the Murphy Sr. Defendants.
Discussion
The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint
construing the pleading in favor of the pleader \
(Plaintiffs) and guided by the mandate that the purpose of the complaint is to provide fair notice of a claim. Defendant Murphy, Sr.'s arguments define the issue at this stage of the proceeding. While it is true that a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) can be converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rule 56 M.R.Civ.P) if matters outside the pleadings are presented, no such matters were presented here other than argument that does not convert the 12(b)(b) Motion.
Defendants Murphy, Sr., argue (B) that no factual allegations are made against the Murphy, Sr. Defendants. That point is correct, but not dispositive at this stage. Plaintiff has elected to group the Defendant's together with broad stroke allegations. While it will be important as a matter of proof at trial (and potentially summary
judgment) what facts are identified with Defendants Murphy, Sr., at this pleading stage it is sufficient that the broad stroke allegations allege a theory of recovery and Defendants Murphy, Sr., have notice of that theory.
Defendant Murphy, Sr., argue (C) that Plaintiffs are not consumers and the transaction was a commercial
transaction outside the scope of the Maine Consumer Credit \ \
Code (i.e. MCCC 9-A M.R.S. §1-102 et seq.). Whether or not there is a factual dispute on those points, or it is undisputed, is for another time. At this stage, Plaintiffs have alleged in Count 1, a claim upon which they may be entitled to recover and the Motion to Dismiss Count 1 is denied.
As to Count 2, Defendants Murphy, Sr., argue facts.
Plaintiffs have alleged they are consumers and have been damaged by Defendants (all Defendants) violating the Maine Truth in Lending Act (MTILA- 9-A §8-206-A). It is for another proceeding to establish facts through admissible evidence (either contested at trial or uncontested at a motion for summary judgment). Consistent with notice pleadings, Plaintiffs have alleged a claim upon which they
can recover and notice of the claim has been adequately given. The Motion to Dismiss Count 2 is denied.
With regard to Count 3 (Defendants' argument E), Plaintiffs relying on their allegation that they were 'consumers' allege a violation of the Consumer Credit Code with regard to Consumer Credit Transactions Made To Acquire
Real'Estate or Secured By First-Lien Mortgages (9-A M.R.S.
\
§9-101 et seq.). Again, we are dealing with 'allegations' which Defendants Murphy, Sr., contest. In terms of pleadings, Plaintiffs have pled a claim upon which relief can be granted if the facts are demonstrated to exist. That latter point is properly challenged later in the process. The Motion to Dismiss Count 3 is denied.
Count 4 of Plaintiffs' complaint (Defendants'
argument F) alleges a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (5 M.R.S. §208-A et seq.) Whether or not the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint at Count 4 qualify as unfair trade practices is a factual question (State v. Weinschenk 2005 ME 28, ~8, 868 a.2d 200, 204) and not for decision as a factual matter at this stage of the proceeding. Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted under the theory presented and the Motion to Dismiss Count 4 is denied.
with respect to Count 6, Breach of Contract, Defendants suggest even if the claims alleged are taken as true (Defendants' argument G), the lack of privity defeats the claim. Contested facts are not to be argued at this stage, as indicated above. The issu~ is not whether one agrees with the allegations but whether they state a claim, notice of which has been given to the Defendants Murphy, Sr. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have alleged by this count a breach of contract by uDefendants u (all) with reference to a loan financing agreement. The Motion to Dismiss Count 6 is denied.
Concerning Count 7 (Defendants argument H) regarding fraudulent/negligent misrepresentations, the Court is satisfied that Rule 9 (b) M.R.Civ.P. has been complied with and Defendants Murphy, Sr. have notice of the theory Plaintiffs are relying on to recover damages. The Motion to Dismiss Count 7 is denied.
Count 8 alleged a theory of recovery based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This
Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Count 8. The Law Court in 2002 advised as follows: "(W)e have declined to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing except in circumstances governed by specific provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. See First NH Banks Granite State v. Scarborough, 615 A.2d 248, 250-51 (Me. 1992)." Haines v. Great N. Paper, Inc., 2002 ME 157, P15 (Me. 2002) As in Haines, there is no allegation that the Commercial Code is involved in this matter
Exemplary/Punitive Damages
In Counts 2,3,4 and 7, Plaintiffs prayer for relief claims 'exemplary' damages. Since 1985, the law in Maine has been that exemplary/punitive damages must be alleged in the context of malice, express or implied. Absent those allegations, the defendant is not put on notice that such damages are at issue. Simply to use the word 'exemplary' is insufficient to properly allege punitive damages and raise that issue. Defendants Murphy, Sr.'s Motion to Dismiss with respect to 'exemplary' damages is granted as to counts 2,3,4, and 7. Plaintiffs do allege malice in Count 9, but that count is only directed at Defendants Murphy, Jr.
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