1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10
ALPHONSO FOSTER, No. 2:26-cv-01604-WLH-AJR 13 Plaintiffs, ORDER DISMISSING 14 v. COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
16 Defendants.
18 19 I. 21 On February 17, 2026, Plaintiffs Lillian Joyce Foster (“Ms. Foster”) and her 22 son Alphonso Foster (“Mr. Foster”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se 23 and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the 24 “Complaint”) against the City of Los Angeles (“City”), the Los Angeles Police 25 Department (“LAPD”), and Does 1 through 50 (collectively, “Defendants”), arising 26 from events concerning nuisance-abatement proceedings, alleged gang-related 27 investigations, and the demolition of residential property. (Dkts. 1, 2, 8.) 28 2 Plaintiffs allege that beginning in approximately 2005, the City, LAPD, the 3 City Attorney’s Office, and unnamed municipal employees participated in a 4 coordinated and racially discriminatory campaign to falsely characterize property 5 located at 10330 Lou Dillon Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90002 (the “Lou Dillon 6 property”) as a gang headquarter and narcotics-manufacturing site in order to pursue 7 nuisance-abatement proceedings and ultimately demolish the property. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 8 9 1-6, 14-15.) According to Plaintiffs, from 2003 through 2008, the property 10 functioned as a family residence and site for lawful nonprofit and community 11 programming rather than criminal activity. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-21.) 12 Plaintiff Ms. Foster alleges that she owned the property at issue and suffered 13 property loss and related harm arising from its demolition. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff Mr. 14 Foster alleges that he suffered arrest, detention, reputational injury, and related harm 15 stemming from alleged law-enforcement actions involving the property and 16 associated criminal proceedings. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 17 Plaintiffs allege that on February 6, 2008, the Los Angeles City Attorney 18 initiated nuisance proceedings in Los Angeles County Superior Court, People v. 19 Lillian Joyce Foster, Case No. BC385107, alleging that the property constituted a 20 public nuisance based on purported gang-related activity. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs 21 allege that the City recorded a lis pendens against the property,1 but never prosecuted 22 the action to judgment. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that, notwithstanding the 23 pending nuisance action, the City demolished the property in or around September 24 2009 without adequate notice, a meaningful hearing, or just compensation, and 25
26 1 A lis pendens, or notice of pendency of action, is a recorded notice that an action affecting title to, or the right to possession of, real property is pending, thereby 27 providing constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers that any interest acquired in the property is subject to the outcome of the litigation. See Cal. 28 Code Civ. Proc. §§ 405.2, 405.24. 1 Department of Building and Safety (“LADBS”). (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 44.) 2 According to Plaintiffs, the City ultimately abandoned the nuisance action and 3 formally withdrew the lis pendens on August 17, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs 4 further allege that, despite later withdrawing the lis pendens, the City had previously 5 coerced Ms. Foster, who was elderly and unrepresented, into signing a “Stipulation 6 for Entry of Judgment, Order of Abatement and Permanent Injunction” on March 27, 7 2008. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Foster did not voluntarily execute the 8 9 stipulation but did so only after the City threatened with demolition of the property, 10 criminal prosecution, liens, and eviction if she refused to sign. (Id. at ¶ 28.) 11 Plaintiffs further allege that the stipulation required closure of the property, eviction 12 of family members, and demolition if certain conditions were not satisfied. (Id. at ¶ 13 29.) 14 Plaintiffs allege that City officials, LAPD officers, investigators, supervisors, 15 and unnamed informants fabricated or exaggerated allegations that the property was 16 connected to gang activity and PCP manufacturing despite allegedly contrary federal 17 criminal records and nonprofit documentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-24, 33-40.) According 18 to Plaintiffs, subsequent federal indictments and related proceedings established that 19 PCP manufacturing occurred elsewhere and not at the Lou Dillon property. (Id. at ¶¶ 20 33-37.) Plaintiffs allege that the City nevertheless relied on false narratives, 21 unverified informants, and intelligence generated through programs such as CLEAR, 22 PHSI, and the Watts Gang Task Force to support nuisance proceedings and 23 demolition efforts. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15, 48-51.) 24 Plaintiffs also allege that LAPD personnel and City officials retaliated against 25 Plaintiffs and community advocates for engaging in community advocacy and 26 criticism of gang injunctions and enforcement practices. (Id. at ¶ 57.) Plaintiffs 27 contend that municipal policymakers ratified the allegedly unconstitutional conduct 28 and that the City maintained policies, customs, and practices of racially 1 intelligence. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-51, 58-61.) 2 Finally, Plaintiffs allege that they did not discover the alleged falsity of 3 Defendants’ conduct until later litigation records, internal materials, and 4 whistleblower-related information became available and therefore contend that 5 delayed discovery and equitable tolling apply to their claims. (Id. at ¶ 47.) 6 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert six claims for relief: procedural 7 due process (Claim 1); substantive due process (Claim 2); First Amendment 8 9 retaliation (Claim 3); municipal liability under Monell v. N.Y. City. Dep’t of Soc. 10 Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Claim 4); (5) conspiracy to deprive civil rights under 42 11 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Claim 5); and (6) an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and 12 Fourteenth Amendments (Claim 6). (Id. at ¶¶ 52-67.) Plaintiffs seek unspecified 13 compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and 14 attorneys’ fees. (Id. at ¶¶ 68-71.) 15 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a trial court may dismiss a 19 claim sua sponte “where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land 20 Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole 21 Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (adopting the Ninth 22 Circuit’s position in Omar and noting that such a sua sponte dismissal “is practical 23 and fully consistent with plaintiff’s rights and the efficient use of judicial 24 resources”). The Court’s authority in this regard includes sua sponte dismissal of 25 claims against defendants who have not been served and defendants who have not 26 yet answered or appeared. See Abagnin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 27 742-43 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Reunion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 719 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 28 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (“[T]he fact that [certain] defendants have not appeared and 1 claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 2 given that a court may dismiss any complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim 3 for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”). 4 Moreover, when a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must 5 construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See 6 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). In 7 giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, the court may not, however, 8 9 supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pled. See Pena v. 10 Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1992). A court must give a pro se litigant 11 leave to amend the complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 12 complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed below, the Court has 14 screened the Complaint and determined that it must be DISMISSED with leave to 15 amend. 16 17 IV. 19 A. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims Appear Time-Barred. 20 Plaintiffs’ federal claims appear facially barred by the applicable statute of 21 limitations. Federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations governing 22 personal injury actions to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wallace v. 23 Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 24 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). In California, the applicable limitations period is 25 generally two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Canatella v. Van de Kamp, 26 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007). Although state law supplies the applicable 27 limitations period, federal law governs when a claim brought under Section 1983 28 accrues. See Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048; Olsen v. Idaho Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 1 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of the action. 2 See Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048. Moreover, dismissal as untimely is appropriate 3 “only when the running of the statute [of limitations] is apparent on the face of the 4 complaint.” U.S. ex rel. Air Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 5 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 6 Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010)). 7 Here, the allegations underlying Plaintiffs’ federal claims concern events that 8 9 occurred primarily between approximately 2007 and 2012. Plaintiffs allege that 10 nuisance-abatement proceedings concerning the Lou Dillon property commenced in 11 2008, the City recorded a lis pendens against the property, Ms. Foster was coerced 12 into executing a stipulation, the property was demolished in or around September 13 2009, demolition-and-abatement-related liens were then imposed, and the City 14 ultimately withdrew the lis pendens in 2012. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 24, 26-32, 44.) Plaintiffs 15 further allege that during the same general period, Defendants falsely identified Mr. 16 Foster as a gang member, subjected him to unlawful arrest and detention, retaliated 17 against him, and violated his constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-43, 47-61.) 18 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs did not commence this action until February 17, 2026, 19 approximately 14 to 19 years after the events giving rise to their claims allegedly 20 occurred. (Dkt. 1.) 21 Plaintiffs invoke the delayed discovery rule and appear to rely on principles of 22 equitable tolling, alleging that they did not discover the alleged falsity of Defendants’ 23 conduct until later litigation, internal materials, and whistleblower-related 24 information became available. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Although federal law governs the 25 accrual of Section 1983 claims, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the federal 26 discovery rule and California’s delayed discovery rule are functionally identical. 27 Under both, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or through the 28 exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury giving rise to the 1 1991) (the federal and California standards for when a statute of limitations period 2 begins to run “are apparently identical, the period for each commencing when the 3 plaintiff discovered or could have discovered the fraud with the exercise of 4 reasonable diligence”); O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th 5 Cir. 2002) (“Under both federal and California law, the discovery rule provides that a 6 limitations period does not commence until a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably could 7 have discovered, his claim.”). A plaintiff relying on delayed discovery must plead 8 9 specific facts showing “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to 10 have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo- 11 Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 808 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to invoke the delayed discovery 13 rule. Plaintiffs do not allege when they discovered the allegedly concealed facts, 14 what those facts were with specificity, why those facts could not have been 15 discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence, or how Defendants’ 16 alleged concealment prevented Plaintiffs from timely filing this action. See Fox, 35 17 Cal. 4th at 808-09. Rather, Plaintiffs allege only that they later obtained evidence 18 through subsequent litigation, internal materials, and whistleblower-related 19 information that purportedly demonstrated the falsity of Defendants’ conduct. (Dkt. 20 1 at ¶ 47.) These allegations concern the later discovery of evidence supporting 21 Plaintiffs’ claims, not the discovery of the injuries themselves. The delayed 22 discovery rule, however, postpones accrual only until the plaintiff discovers, or 23 reasonably should have discovered, the injury giving rise to the claim. See 24 Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048; O’Connor, 311 F.3d at 1147. The later discovery of 25 additional evidence supporting an already-known injury does not delay accrual 26 where the plaintiff was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of the injury 27 when it occurred. 28 This deficiency is particularly significant because the Complaint appears to 1 underlying their claims when the alleged events occurred. Specifically, Plaintiffs 2 necessarily knew when the nuisance-abatement proceedings were initiated, when the 3 lis pendens was recorded against the property, when Ms. Foster allegedly executed 4 the challenged stipulation, when the property was demolished, when demolition- 5 related liens were imposed, and when Mr. Foster was allegedly arrested, detained, 6 and subjected to the alleged constitutional violations. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 24, 27-32, 43-44.) 7 Although Plaintiffs now allege that later litigation and newly discovered materials 8 9 revealed additional evidence that Defendants’ actions were alleged unlawful, 10 Plaintiffs do not allege facts showing that they were unaware of the underlying 11 injuries at the time those events occurred. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Indeed, the Complaint shows 12 that Plaintiffs knew of the very events when they occurred that they now contend 13 violated their constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiffs’ subsequent discovery of 14 evidence allegedly corroborating those claims does not plausibly establish delayed 15 accrual or otherwise render their claims timely. Accordingly, based on the 16 allegations as currently pled, Plaintiffs’ claims appear facially untimely. 17 B. The LAPD Is Not A Proper Defendant. 18 Plaintiffs name the LAPD as a defendant. (Dkt. 1 at 1-2.) Under California 19 law, municipal police departments generally are not separate legal entities subject to 20 suit under Section 1983. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (9th 21 Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“Municipal police departments and bureaus are generally 22 not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Vance v. Cnty. 23 of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“The County is a proper 24 defendant in a § 1983 claim, an agency of the County is not.”). Rather, the LAPD is 25 a department of the City of Los Angeles and lacks a separate legal entity apart from 26 the City. 27 Accordingly, the LAPD is not a proper defendant in this action, and Plaintiffs’ 28 claims against the LAPD must be dismissed. As discussed further below, to the 1 against the City of Los Angeles and must satisfy the requirements for municipal 2 liability under Monell. 3 C. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Personal Participation. 4 To establish a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 5 show either the defendant’s direct, personal participation in the constitutional 6 violation, or some sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and 7 the alleged violation. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Starr v. Baca, 8 9 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011). A defendant is liable under Section 1983 10 only if “culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Hines v. 11 Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205). 12 Here, although the Complaint identifies the City, the LAPD, and several 13 individuals, including Officer Garcia, Officer Moreno, Sergeant Dummars, and 14 various Doe defendants, Plaintiffs frequently attribute the alleged constitutional 15 violations to “Defendants,” “City actors,” “LAPPD Internal Affairs and City 16 Attorney personnel,” “task-force members,” “final policymakers,” or other 17 unidentified law enforcement personnel without alleging facts demonstrating which 18 defendant personally committed which constitutional violation. (See e.g., Dkt. 1 at 19 ¶¶ 11, 14-15, 31, 38-40, 45-61.) While Plaintiffs occasionally reference specific 20 individuals, the Complaint does not clearly explain how each such individual 21 personally participated in each of the constitutional claims asserted. Instead, 22 Plaintiffs frequently rely on generalized allegations that collectively attribute 23 wrongdoing to multiple defendants. 24 For example, Plaintiffs broadly allege that Defendants fabricated gang-related 25 intelligence, initiated unlawful nuisance-abatement proceedings, retaliated against 26 Plaintiffs, coerced Ms. Foster in executing the stipulation, demolished the Lou Dillon 27 property without due process, and otherwise deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional 28 rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-29, 32, 44-61.) However, the Complaint does not identify which 1 disseminated that information, who purportedly coerced Ms. Foster into signing the 2 stipulation, which defendant denied Plaintiffs notice or a meaningful opportunity to 3 be heard before the demolition, who authorized or carried out the demolition of the 4 property, or who approved or imposed the demolition- and abatement-related liens. 5 (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29, 44-45, 51.) Similarly, as for Mr. Foster’s allegations, the Complaint 6 does not identify which individual defendants personally participated in the alleged 7 unlawful arrest, detention, retaliation, or other constitutional deprivations. (Id. at ¶¶ 8 9 33-43, 57.) 10 Although Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, it 11 nevertheless requires sufficient factual allegations to “give [each] defendant fair 12 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Bell Atl. 13 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiffs’ repeated references to 14 “Defendants” and other collective groups, without identifying the specific conduct 15 attributable to each defendant, are insufficient to satisfy this pleading standard or to 16 state a plausible claim for relief under Section 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 17 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege personal participation in the 18 alleged constitutional violations. If Plaintiffs elect to amend, they must identify each 19 defendant against whom a claim is asserted and allege facts demonstrating what the 20 defendant personally did or failed to do, when the alleged conduct occurred, and how 21 that conduct caused the constitutional injury allegedly suffered by each Plaintiff. 22 Allegations referring collectively to “Defendants,” “City actors,” “final 23 policymakers,” or other generalized groups, without identifying the specific actions 24 attributable to each defendant, are insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983. 25 D. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Procedural Due Process Claim (Claim One). 26 Plaintiffs’ first claim alleges that Defendants violated their procedural due 27 process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Plaintiff of their 28 property without constitutionally adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be 1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 2 government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process 3 of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a procedural due process claim under 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally 5 protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 6 protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). The essential 7 requirement of due process is that the government provide “notice and an 8 9 opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” before the 10 government deprives an individual of a protected interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 11 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). At the same time, due process “is flexible and calls for such 12 procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. at 334 (quoting 13 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 14 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (“Due process . . . is a flexible concept that varies with the 15 particular situation.”). 16 Here, the Complaint adequately alleges that Ms. Foster possessed a protected 17 property interest in the Lou Dillon property and that the City ultimately deprived her 18 of that interest through nuisance-abatement proceedings and the demolition of the 19 property. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 24-31, 44, 52-53.) However, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege 20 that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate. To the contrary, the 21 Complaint itself alleges that the City filed nuisance-abatement actions in the Los 22 Angeles County Superior Court, recorded a lis pendens against the property, and that 23 Ms. Foster executed a “Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, Order of Abatement and 24 Permanent Injunction” resolving that action. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-29.) These allegations 25 indicate that Plaintiffs received access to judicial process before the demolition of the 26 property occurred. 27 Although Plaintiffs make the conclusory allegation that they were deprived of 28 property and liberty “without constitutionally adequate notice, hearing, or 1 hearing” to contest the City’s allegations, (Id. at ¶ 32), the Complaint does not allege 2 facts explaining why the procedures that were provided failed to satisfy the 3 requirements of due process. Plaintiffs do not identify what notice they allegedly 4 failed to receive or what hearing or other procedure was denied. Instead, Plaintiffs 5 simply conclude that the process afforded was constitutionally deficient without 6 alleging supporting facts. Such “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 7 action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to state a plausible 8 9 claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 10 863 (9th Cir. 2017). 11 Plaintiffs further allege that Ms. Foster was coerced into signing the stipulation 12 only because Defendants threatened demolition of property, criminal prosecution, 13 liens, and eviction. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 27-29.) Even accepting those allegations as true, 14 the Complaint does not allege facts explaining why the alleged coercion rendered the 15 judicial proceedings constitutionally inadequate or why Plaintiffs could not challenge 16 the stipulation or the nuisance-abatement proceedings through available judicial 17 procedures. Nor does the Complaint identify which defendant allegedly made the 18 threats or personally prevented Plaintiffs from pursuing those procedures before the 19 property was demolished. Plaintiffs’ allegations, as currently pled, amount to a 20 disagreement with the outcome of the nuisance-abatement proceedings, not a 21 plausible allegation that they were denied the process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 22 Amendment. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that they were deprived of a 24 protected property interest without constitutionally adequate procedural due process. 25 If Plaintiffs elect to amend, Plaintiffs must allege facts identifying the procedures 26 they actually received, explain why those procedures were constitutionally 27 inadequate under the circumstances, and identify each defendant who personally 28 participated in the alleged denial of due process. 1 Plaintiffs’ second claim alleges that Defendants violated their substantive due 2 process rights by engaging in conduct that was “arbitrary, oppressive, and 3 conscience-shocking.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 54-55.) The Due Process Clause of the 4 Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from certain arbitrary government action 5 regardless of the fairness of the procedures employed. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. 6 Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (“[T]he touchstone of [substantive] due process 7 is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, whether the 8 9 fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness”) (internal quotation marks 10 and citations omitted). To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must 11 allege that a state actor deprived him “of life, liberty, or property in such a way that 12 ‘shocks the conscience’ or ‘interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered 13 liberty.’” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United 14 States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). 15 As a threshold matter, however, a substantive due process claim is unavailable 16 where “a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 17 protection against a particular sort of government behavior.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 18 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). In such circumstances, the 19 claim “must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not 20 under the rubric of substantive due process.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843 (internal 21 quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.2 (1997). In 22 other words, substantive due process generally does not provide an independent basis 23 for relief when the challenged conduct is governed by a more specific constitutional 24 guarantee. 25 Here, the allegations supporting Claim Two are identical to those supporting 26 Plaintiffs’ procedural due process (Claim One), retaliation (Claim Three), and 27 takings claim (Claim Six). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants deprived 28 them of property through nuisance-abatement proceedings and demolition of the Lou 1 fabricated gang-related information, and otherwise violated their constitutional 2 rights. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 15-40, 55-56.) Plaintiffs’ allegations on the adequacy of the 3 procedures employed before demolition are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment 4 procedural due process, their allegations of retaliation are governed by the First 5 Amendment, and their allegations that the demolition resulted in an unconstitutional 6 taking are governed by the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Because these more 7 specific constitutional provisions directly address the government’s conduct alleged 8 9 in the Complaint, substantive due process does not provide an independent 10 constitutional theory. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842-43. 11 Moreover, even assuming substantive due process were an available theory, 12 Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged conduct rising to the level of a substantive due 13 process violation. Although Plaintiffs characterize Defendants’ conduct as 14 “arbitrary, oppressive and conscience-shocking,” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 54), those 15 characterizations are largely conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations 16 showing the type of extreme governmental misconduct required to satisfy the 17 demanding “shocks the conscience” standard. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47. 18 Instead, the Complaint mainly alleges that Defendants relied on allegedly false gang- 19 related information, initiated nuisance-abatement proceedings, recorded a lis 20 pendens, obtained Ms. Foster’s execution of a stipulated judgment, and ultimately 21 demolished the Lou Dillon property. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 15-40.) While Plaintiffs dispute 22 the legality, factual basis, and motivation underlying those governmental actions, 23 such allegations, without more, do not plausibly establish the type of arbitrary 24 executive conduct “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock 25 the contemporary conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8. 26 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violation of substantive due 27 process. Because the Complaint challenges government conduct that is governed by 28 more specific constitutional provisions and, in any event, fails to allege conscience- 1 state a claim for relief and should be dismissed. 2 F. Plaintiffs Fail To State A First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Claim 3 Three). 4 Plaintiffs’ third claim alleges that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for 5 engaging in protected advocacy concerning gang injunctions, policing practices, and 6 community organizing activities. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 56-57.) 7 To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983, a 8 9 plaintiff must allege facts showing that: “(1) he was engaged in a constitutionally 10 protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a person of ordinary 11 firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity and (3) the protected 12 activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.” Capp v. 13 Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019); see also O’Brien v. Welty, 14 818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016). To ultimately “prevail on such a claim, a 15 plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the government defendant’s 16 retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s subsequent injury.” See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 17 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Here, liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs engaged in 19 protected advocacy concerning gang injunctions, law enforcement practices, and 20 community organizing activities. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 38-40, 57.) Plaintiff further alleges 21 that, in retaliation for those activities, Defendants pursued nuisance-abatement 22 proceedings against the Lou Dillon property, falsely associated Mr. Foster with gang 23 activity, recorded a lis pendens against the property, coerced Ms. Foster into signing 24 a stipulation, demolished the property, and subjected Plaintiffs to adverse 25 governmental action. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-44, 57.) 26 Even liberally construing the Complaint, however, Plaintiffs fail to allege 27 sufficient facts to support a viable First Amendment retaliation claim. Although 28 Plaintiffs conclude that Defendants acted with retaliatory motive, the Complaint does 1 defendant became aware of those activities, what facts support an inference that any 2 defendant harbored retaliatory animus, or how Plaintiffs’ protected advocacy was a 3 substantial or motivating factor behind each alleged government misconduct. 4 Instead, Plaintiffs rely primarily on the conclusory assertion that the challenged 5 governmental actions were retaliatory, without factual allegations plausibly 6 connecting those actions to any protected advocacy. Such conclusory allegations, 7 without supporting factual matter, are insufficient to state a plausible First 8 9 Amendment retaliation claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (a plaintiff must allege 10 more than “labels and conclusions”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (courts need not accept 11 conclusory allegations unsupported by factual enhancement). 12 Moreover, the Complaint does not clearly distinguish which protected 13 activities were undertaken by Ms. Foster and which were undertaken by Mr. Foster, 14 nor does it explain how the challenged governmental actions were causally 15 connected to the protected activity of each Plaintiff. Likewise, the Complaint does 16 not allege facts demonstrating which defendant was responsible for each allegedly 17 retaliatory act or how each defendant’s conduct was substantially motivated by 18 Plaintiffs’ protected expression. Without factual allegations connecting a particular 19 defendant’s actions to a particular Plaintiff’s protected activity, the Court cannot 20 reasonably infer that any named defendant acted with a retaliatory motive. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. If 22 Plaintiffs elect to amend, they must identify the specific protected speech or 23 expressive activity, identify the defendant or defendants who allegedly retaliated 24 against each Plaintiff, describe the adverse action each defendant allegedly took, and 25 allege facts plausibly demonstrating that the protected activity was a substantial or 26 motivating factor behind each challenged action. 27 G. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Fifth Amendment Takings Claim (Claim Six). 28 Plaintiffs’ sixth claim alleges that Defendants violated the Takings Clause of 1 compensation. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 64-65.) The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 2 made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that 3 “private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 4 U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 392 (2017). 5 Although the Takings Clause requires compensation when the government takes 6 private property for public use, not every governmental interference with property 7 constitutes a compensable taking. In particular, the government’s exercise of its 8 9 police powers, including nuisance abatement and demolition of dangerous or 10 unlawful property, is generally not a taking for “public use” within the meaning of 11 the Fifth Amendment. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (“The 12 government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has 13 already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the 14 power of eminent domain.”); AmeriSource Corp. v. U.S., 525 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. 15 Cir. 2008) (“The government’s exercise of the police power is not a compensable 16 taking.”); Acadia Tech., Inc. v. U.S., 458 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“When 17 property has been . . . subjected to in rem forfeiture proceedings, such deprivations 18 are not ‘takings’ which the owner is entitled to compensation.”). 19 Here, Plaintiffs allege that the City demolished the Lou Dillon property 20 pursuant to nuisance-abatement proceedings arising from alleged gang activity and 21 other purported nuisance conditions at the property. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 24-32, 44.) 22 Plaintiffs further allege that the nuisance allegations were false, fabricated, and 23 discriminatorily enforced. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-23, 33-40.) Liberally construed, Plaintiffs 24 challenge the legality of the City’s decision to initiate nuisance-abatement 25 proceedings and demolish the Lou Dillon property, rather than alleging that the City 26 appropriated the property for public use without paying just compensation. 27 Even accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, the Complaint does not 28 plausibly allege a compensable taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 1 public use through the government’s power of eminent domain. Rather, Plaintiffs 2 allege that Defendants demolished the property pursuant to nuisance-abatement 3 proceedings undertaken under the City’s asserted police powers. Whether 4 Defendants properly exercised those powers is a separate question from whether the 5 demolition constituted a compensable taking. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452; 6 AmeriSource, 525 F.3d at 1153. If Defendants acted outside the scope of their 7 lawful authority, relied on fabricated evidence, or otherwise unlawfully pursued 8 9 nuisance-abatement proceedings, those allegations may implicate other constitutional 10 theories addressed elsewhere in this Order, but they do not transform the alleged 11 demolition into a taking for public use requiring just compensation under the Fifth 12 Amendment. 13 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible Takings Clause claim. If 14 Plaintiffs elect to amend, they must allege facts demonstrating that the challenged 15 governmental action constituted a taking of private property for public use requiring 16 just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, rather than an allegedly unlawful 17 exercise of the government’s police powers. 18 H. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Municipal Liability Under Monell 19 (Claim Four). 20 Plaintiffs assert a claim for municipal liability against the City under Monell, 21 alleging that the City maintained customs, policies, and practices of discriminatory 22 nuisance-abatement enforcement, reliance on false gang intelligence, and retaliatory 23 targeting of residents and activists. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 45-51, 58-61.) Even if Plaintiffs 24 have adequately alleged one or more underlying constitutional violations, the 25 Complaint independently fails to state a claim for municipal liability. 26 A municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because it 27 employs an alleged tortfeasor. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); 28 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). This means that the City of Los 1 constitutional rights. Instead, the City of Los Angeles may be held liable only if the 2 alleged wrongdoing was committed pursuant to a municipal policy, custom, or 3 usage. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’r of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 4 402-04 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also Horton by Horton v. City of Santa 5 Monica, 915 F.3d 592, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[M]unicipalities may be liable under 6 § 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to . . . a pervasive practice or custom.”). 7 In all events, the identified policy or custom must be the “moving force” behind the 8 9 alleged constitutional violation. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 400, 404. 10 A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under Monell must 11 allege facts showing that: (1) the constitutional violation was the result of a 12 governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom; (2) the individual who 13 committed the constitutional violation was an official with final policy-making 14 authority; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority ratified the 15 unconstitutional act. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 16 1992). 17 Here, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege municipal liability. Although the 18 Complaint repeatedly references municipal “policies,” “customs,” “patterns,” and 19 “ratification,” those allegations consist largely of legal conclusions unsupported by 20 sufficient factual specificity. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 45-51, 58-61.) Plaintiffs repeatedly assert 21 that the City maintained unconstitutional practices involving nuisance-abatement 22 proceedings, gang databases, intelligence gathering, and racially discriminatory 23 enforcement. (Id.) However, the Complaint does not identify any formal municipal 24 policy authorizing the alleged constitutional violations, describe the contents of such 25 a policy, or allege facts showing how any official policy directed or caused the 26 challenged conduct. 27 Nor do Plaintiffs plausibly allege a longstanding municipal custom or practice. 28 A municipal custom must be “so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a 1 sporadic incidents.” See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); Gordon 2 v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiffs mainly rely on 3 the circumstances surrounding their own property and their interactions with City 4 officials. Such allegations concerning a single course of events involving a single 5 property do not plausibly establish the existence of a longstanding municipal custom 6 or practice. 7 The Complaint likewise fails to support liability based on the actions of a final 8 9 policymaker. Plaintiffs do not identify any official with final policymaking authority 10 who directed or approved the challenged conduct, nor do they allege facts showing 11 knowing ratification. Although Plaintiffs repeatedly use of the term “ratification,” 12 they do not allege facts showing that any final policymaker had actual knowledge of 13 the alleged constitutional violations and made a deliberate choice to approve them. 14 Conclusory allegations of ratification are insufficient. See Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346- 15 47 (explaining that municipal ratification requires “an official with final policy- 16 making authority [to] ratif[y] a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and 17 the basis for it.”); see also Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) 18 (same). 19 Finally, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that any municipal policy, custom, or 20 decision by a final policymaker was the “moving force” behind the alleged 21 constitutional injuries. Although Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that City policies 22 caused the challenged conduct, they do not identify any specific policy or custom 23 that caused each alleged constitutional violation or plausibly explain how any such 24 policy or custom resulted in Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Instead, Plaintiffs rely 25 largely on conclusory assertions of municipal liability, which are insufficient to 26 assert a Monell claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 27 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for municipal liability under 28 Monell. If Plaintiffs elect to amend, they must identify the specific municipal policy, 1 caused the constitutional violations, allege facts demonstrating the existence of that 2 policy, custom, or decision, and plausibly explain how it was the moving force 3 behind each alleged constitutional injury. 4 I. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Claim Five). 5 Plaintiffs also assert a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging 6 that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights by 7 fabricating gang-related information, pursuing discriminatory nuisance-abatement 8 9 proceedings, and engaging in racially discriminatory enforcement practices. (Dkt. 1 10 at ¶¶ 22, 37, 39, 46, 48, 62-63.) Section 1985 “is derived from the thirteenth 11 amendment and covers all deprivations of equal protection of the laws and equal 12 privileges and immunities under the laws, regardless of its source.” Gillespie v. 13 Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980). Subsection three of the statute, the only 14 potentially applicable provision here, prohibits conspiracies “for the purpose of 15 depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal 16 protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a claim under Section 17 1985(3), a plaintiff must show “(1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class 18 of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 19 under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, 20 and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege 21 of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 641 (citing Griffin v. 22 Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)); see also Mustafa v. Clark Cnty. Sch. 23 Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998). 24 A Section 1985(3) claim “must allege facts to support the allegation that 25 defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual 26 specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. Furthermore, “there 27 must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory 28 animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also RK 1 under Section 1985(3) must show “that they are members of a class that the 2 government has determined ‘requires and warrant[s] special federal assistance in 3 protecting their civil rights’” (quoting Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 4 1536 (9th Cir. 1992))). The plaintiff must show that “each participant [in the 5 conspiracy] . . . at least share[s] the common objective of the conspiracy.” United 6 Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 Here, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege a Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim. 8 9 Although Plaintiffs assert that Defendants coordinated their actions and collectively 10 targeted Plaintiffs, the Complaint contains only conclusory allegations of conspiracy. 11 Specifically, Plaintiffs do not allege facts showing how or when any agreement was 12 formed, which defendants entered into the alleged conspiracy, what common 13 objective they agreed to accomplish, or what specific acts each alleged conspirator 14 undertook in furtherance of that agreement. Nor do Plaintiffs identify which 15 defendant allegedly fabricated the gang-related information, initiated or directed the 16 nuisance-abatement proceedings, or otherwise participated in the purported 17 conspiracy. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the Court to infer the existence of a conspiracy 18 merely because multiple governmental actors allegedly participated in related events. 19 Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege an agreement under 20 Section 1985(3). See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. 21 Plaintiffs likewise fail to plausibly allege that the purported conspiracy was 22 motivated by the requisite class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Plaintiffs 23 allege that Defendants falsely associated Mr. Foster with gang activity, selectively 24 enforced nuisance-abatement laws, and targeted Plaintiffs because of their race. 25 (See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 22, 37, 39, 46, 48, 62-63.) However, those allegations are 26 largely conclusory. The Complaint does not allege specific facts showing that any 27 identified defendant acted because of Plaintiffs’ race, such as discriminatory 28 statements, disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals outside Plaintiffs’ 1 reasonably infer racial animus. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ actions 2 were racially motivated without alleging sufficient supporting facts. Such 3 conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim under Section 4 1985(3). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 5 Moreover, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an underlying deprivation of a 6 constitutional right sufficient to support a claim under Section 1985(3). As discussed 7 above, the Complaint fails to state viable claims for procedural due process, 8 9 substantive due process, First Amendment retaliation, or an unconstitutional taking. 10 Because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation 11 predicated on the same allegations, their Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim likewise 12 fails. See Caldeira v. Cnty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 13 absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy 14 claim predicated on the same allegations.”). 15 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). If 16 Plaintiffs elect to amend, they must allege specific facts demonstrating the existence 17 of an agreement among identifiable defendants, identify the defendants who 18 allegedly entered into the agreement, describe when and how the agreement was 19 formed, identify the acts each defendant undertook in furtherance of the alleged 20 conspiracy, explain which constitutional right the conspiracy allegedly sought to 21 deprive Plaintiffs of, and allege facts plausibly demonstrating that the alleged 22 conspiracy was motivated by class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 23 24 V. 26 The Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. On or before August 10, 27 2026, Plaintiffs shall file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that attempts to 28 remedy the defects identified above. If Plaintiffs choose to file a FAC, it should bear 1 || the docket number assigned to this case (2:26-cv-01604-WLH-AJR), be labeled 2 || “First Amended Complaint,” and be complete and of itself without reference in any 3 || manner to the original Complaint or any other document (except any document that 4 || Plaintiffs choose to attach to the FAC as an exhibit). Plaintiffs are encouraged to 5 || state their claims in simple language and provide only a brief statement of supporting 6 || facts, omitting facts that are not relevant. Should Plaintiffs decide to file a FAC, the 7 || are encouraged to utilize the Pro Se 15 form complaint attached to this Order. 8 Plaintiffs are explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a FAC or 9 || correct the deficiencies described above may result in a recommendation that 10 || this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or obey 11 || Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiffs are 12 || further advised that if they no longer wish to pursue this action, they may voluntarily 13 || dismiss the action by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of 14 || Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiffs’ 15 |} convenience. 16 18 19 || DATED: July 10, 2026 20 \oek (Ll, ts HONYA. JOEL RICHLIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 |) Attachments: 24 || CV-09, Notice of Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a) or (c) 35 Pro Se 15, Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner). 26 27 28 24