Lillard v. Jacquez

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 1, 2025
Docket23-4133
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lillard v. Jacquez (Lillard v. Jacquez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lillard v. Jacquez, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 1 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LONNIE EUGENE LILLARD, No. 23-4133 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 3:23-cv-00026-IM v. MEMORANDUM* ISRAEL JACQUEZ,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Lonnie Eugene Lillard appeals pro se from the district

court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 challenging prison disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of good

conduct time. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291. Reviewing de novo,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). see Lane v. Salazar, 911 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2018), we affirm.

Lillard contends that his procedural due process rights were violated because

(1) he was not provided sufficient notice of the allegations against him, (2) the Unit

Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) counselor who reviewed the incident report was

significantly involved in, a witness to, or an investigator of the incident, and (3) the

Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) was biased against him and imposed

sanctions in a retaliatory manner. However, the record demonstrates that the

incident report adequately notified Lillard that the charges were based on emails he

sent on a specific date, see Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987)

(discussing notice necessary to satisfy due process), and the UDC counselor’s role

was limited to referring the incident report to the DHO for review, see 28 C.F.R.

§ 541.7(a)(3). Moreover, neither the content nor the method of imposing sanctions

shows bias by the DHO. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)

(unfavorable or adverse rulings alone are insufficient to show bias “unless they

display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible”). Lillard received all the process due under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 563-68 (1974), and the disciplinary violation is supported by some

evidence, Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985).

AFFIRMED.

2 23-4133

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wolff v. McDonnell
418 U.S. 539 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Liteky v. United States
510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Mark Lane v. Josias Salazar
911 F.3d 942 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Lillard v. Jacquez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lillard-v-jacquez-ca9-2025.