Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-24-00875-CV
Lilian Goria BOWLES, Appellant
v.
Simon David BOWLES, Appellee
From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-CI-11389 Honorable Christine Vasquez Hortick, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 3, 2026
AFFIRMED
Lilian Goria Bowles appeals from a final decree of divorce dissolving her marriage to
Simon David Bowles. In three issues, Lilian argues the trial court erred by: (1) characterizing
certain property—a limited liability company—as Simon’s separate property; (2) failing to file
additional findings of fact; and (3) overruling her objection to Simon’s amended pleadings. In a
cross-point, Simon argues the trial court erred by finding a valid marriage existed between the 04-24-00875-CV
parties. In a supplemental brief, Simon argues the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the parties did not satisfy the Texas Family Code’s residency requirements. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On June 21, 2022, Simon filed a divorce petition in Bexar County, Texas, seeking to
dissolve his marriage to Lilian. Lilian answered Simon’s petition and counter-petitioned for
divorce. On February 14, 2023, the trial court signed an order appointing a receiver to take charge
and possession of a business named Flea Away, LLC, which manufactures and sells all-natural
flea, tick, and mosquito repellant for dogs and cats.
On May 31, 2024, the trial court held a bench trial. At trial, the evidence showed that Simon
and Lilian attempted to marry on July 8, 2012. However, on that date, Simon and his first wife
were still married. Simon and his first wife were not divorced until November 27, 2012. The
divorce decree from Simon’s first marriage awarded Flea Away to Simon as his sole and separate
property.
The evidence further showed Flea Away started doing business in 2012 and operated as a
sole proprietorship for more than a decade. On June 15, 2022, Flea Away ceased operating as a
sole proprietorship and started operating as Flea Away, LLC, a limited liability company. An
expert determined the fair market value of a one-hundred percent membership interest in Flea
Away, LLC was $2,925,000.00 as of January 31, 2024.
Lilian testified that she had worked at Flea Away throughout her marriage to Simon. Lilian
believed she was a part-owner of Flea Away, LLC. Lilian claimed she acquired an ownership
interest in the business the day she started working there. Lilian also claimed that documents
executed in 2022 showed that she had an ownership interest in the business, but no such documents
were admitted into evidence at trial.
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Lilian acknowledged that a sole proprietorship named Flea Away existed in 2012, but she
insisted it was not the same as the current business, Flea Away, LLC. When asked to describe how
the business had changed, Lilian stated that since the formation of Flea Away, LLC the business
had added two additional products and received FDA approval. Lilian acknowledged that the only
business still in existence was Flea Away, LLC, which was under the control of a receiver.
The receiver, Andrew Kroll, testified that he had served as the receiver of Flea Away, LLC
for about a year. By the time of trial, the business offered only one product, the Flea Away tablet.
According to Kroll, Flea Away, LLC, was a simple business; it did not have any inventory, fixed
assets, or long-term contracts. Kroll added: “It’s balance sheet is its bank account, basically.”
The trial court granted Simon’s first amended petition for divorce and signed a final decree
of divorce, which confirmed as Simon’s sole and separate property “the business entity known as
Flea Away, LLC (formerly known as d/b/a/ Flea Away)” along with various assets belonging to
the business entity. The trial court ordered Simon to pay Lilian “as an equalization payment,” the
sum of $438,750.00, which represented fifteen percent of the value of Flea Away, LLC.
Additionally, the trial court ordered Simon to pay Lilian (1) $100,000.00 on her waste/fraud claim
and (2) $110,272.00 as reimbursement for a loan Lilian obtained while the divorce was pending.
The trial court also awarded Lilian three vehicles and a house located in San Diego, California. As
to debts, Simon and Lilian were each ordered to pay fifty percent of the balance due, including
principal, interest, taxes, insurance and escrow, on the mortgage note on the San Diego house.
Lilian filed a notice of appeal, requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, and filed
a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law in a timely manner. In her initial brief,
Lilian complained about the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We
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abated the appeal to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court
then issued. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court stated, in relevant part:
At the time of the divorce, SIMON DAVID BOWLES owned an entity known as Flea Away, LLC, which had an estimated fair market value of $2,925,000.00 and owned the following assets, which are not part of the community estate:
a. The 2019 Ford F-450 Dually motor vehicle . . .
b. The 2021 Alliance Valor 43v13 5th wheel motor vehicle . . .
c. The 2019 Harley Davidson Ultra Limited motorcycle . . .
d. The 20010 Wells Cargo Trailer . . .
e. All assets held by the receiver in this action, including all sums currently on deposit with receiver held in the name of Flea Away, LLC. ....
The Court finds that SIMON DAVID BOWLES established by clear and convincing evidence that Flea Away, LLC is his separate property because, before the marriage, SIMON DAVID BOWLES operated a sole proprietorship called Flea Away which had a similar name and was in a similar line of work and which was awarded to Simon David Bowles as his sole and separate property in his prior divorce granted by the State of California on November 27, 2012.
Thereafter, Lilian filed an amended appellant’s brief and a reply brief. Simon filed an
appellee’s brief. Both parties also filed supplemental briefs.
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
As a preliminary matter, we address the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, which the
parties did not challenge in the trial court. However, because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived, it can be raised for the first time on appeal. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12,
20 (Tex. 2024); Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008).
In his appellate briefing, Simon argues the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
render a final decree of divorce because neither he nor Lilian satisfied the residency requirements
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set forth in section 6.301 of the Texas Family Code. In his pleadings, Simon represented that prior
to filing his divorce petition, he was a domiciliary of Texas for the preceding six-month period and
a resident of this county for the preceding ninety-day period.
Section 6.301 provides that a divorce suit cannot be maintained in Texas unless at the time
the suit is filed either the petitioner or the respondent has been a domiciliary of the state for the
preceding six-month period and a resident of the county in which the suit is filed for the preceding
90-day period. TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.301. While section 6.301’s residency requirements have been
characterized as “mandatory” and “akin to jurisdictional,” they are not actually jurisdictional. In
re Green, 385 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.); Oak v. Oak, 814 S.W.2d
834, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (“The residency requirements of
[section 6.301’s predecessor statute] are not jurisdictional, but, rather, prescribe the qualifications
that must be met before a court may grant a divorce.”). Because section 6.301’s residency
requirements are not jurisdictional, any alleged failure to satisfy them did not deprive the trial court
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY
In her first issue, Lilian argues the trial court abused its discretion by characterizing Flea
Away, LLC as Simon’s separate property. We construe her brief as making three categories of
complaints about the characterization of this property, which we address below.
Rebuttal of Community Property Presumption
At the outset, Lilian argues that Simon failed to meet his burden to rebut the community
property presumption because Simon’s testimony was the only evidence supporting his claim that
the business was separate property.
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“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to
be community property.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(a); Landry v. Landry, 731 S.W.3d 630, 633
(Tex. 2026). However, property owned by a spouse before marriage is that spouse’s separate
property. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001. “[W]hen the right to property accrues prior to marriage, the
property is separate.” Weed v. Frost Bank, 565 S.W.3d 397, 402 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018,
pet. denied).
“Parties claiming certain property as their separate property have the burden of rebutting
the presumption of community property.” Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011).
“To do so, they must trace and clearly identify the property in question as separate by clear and
convincing evidence.” Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(b). Clear and convincing evidence is the
degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegation sought to be established. TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.
“Whether property is separate or community is determined by its character at inception.”
Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001). Upon such a determination, the character of
the property is not altered by its sale, exchange or substitution. In re Marriage of Grisham, No.
10-09-00429-CV, 2010 WL 4570266, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 20, 2010, pet. denied).
Mutations and changes in the form of property do not affect its character as separate property so
long as it can be traced and identified. Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 402 (citing Tarver v. Tarver, 394
S.W.2d 780, 783-86 (Tex. 1965)); see also Smith v. Bailey, 1 S.W. 627, 628 (1886) (“[T]he wife’s
separate property may undergo mutations and changes, yet retain its separate character; but the
proof to trace and identify it in its changed condition must be clear and satisfactory.”). Ordinarily,
a spouse claiming separate property must support the claim with documentary evidence; mere
testimony that property is separate is generally insufficient to overcome the community
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presumption. In re Marriage of Santopadre, No. 05-07-00027-CV, 2008 WL 3844517, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2008, no pet.).
Our review of the record shows that Simon’s testimony was supported by documentary
evidence corroborating the separate nature of the business. In his testimony, Simon stated that Flea
Away was a sole proprietorship, which he owned prior to his marriage to Lilian. To corroborate
this testimony, Simon presented a certified copy of the divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between Simon and his first wife. Issued on November 27, 2012, this divorce decree awarded
Simon “as his sole and separate property the business known as ‘Flea Away’ together with any
and all obligations, liabilities, taxes or debts associated therewith.” Simon further testified that he
and Lilian ran Flea Away as a married couple for more than a decade. However, Flea Away was
no longer operating as a sole proprietorship. Since June 15, 2022, the business had been operating
as Flea Away, LLC, a limited liability company. Documents related to the formation of the limited
liability company were admitted into evidence. These documents indicate that, on or about June
15, 2022, articles of organization for Flea Away, LLC were filed with the Texas Secretary of State;
an original temporary member was appointed for Flea Away, LLC; and all rights, title, and interest
in Flea Away, LLC were transferred from the temporary member to Simon Bowles. Additionally,
bank statements from before and after the formation of the limited liability company were admitted
into evidence. The bank statements include Bank of America statements from January 1, 2020, to
December 31, 2021, which list the account holder as “Simon D Bowles Sole Prop, DBA Flea
Away.” Most of these statements reflect deposits from “Chewy Inc.,” which was established as
one of the business’s distributors. The bank statements also include JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
statements from June 28, 2022, to March 31, 2023, which list the account holder as “Flea Away
LLC.” Most of these statements also reflect deposits from “Chewy Inc.”
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We conclude that Simon’s testimony about the separate nature of Flea Away, LLC was
supported by sufficient documentary evidence corroborating the separate nature of the property.
On this record, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the community
property presumption was rebutted for Flea Away, LLC. See Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798,
802-03 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (holding community property
presumption was rebutted when partnership interest was awarded to husband in previous divorce
and remained the same interest until the time of divorce).
Mutations/Changes in Form
The general rule is that the character of separate property is not altered by the sale,
exchange, or substitution of the property. Grisham, 2010 WL 4570266, at *2. “Property
established to be separate remains separate property regardless of the fact that it may undergo any
number of mutations and changes in form.” Id. In Grisham, the evidence showed the husband had
owned two businesses prior to his marriage. Id. At trial, the husband testified that he had
transferred the stock and assets of these companies to a third company without receiving
compensation for the transaction. Id. Because the husband was able to trace these assets back to
his separate property, the character of the two companies was not altered, and they remained the
husband’s separate property. Id. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the two
companies were the husband’s separate property. Id.
Lilian argues the trial court was precluded from finding that Flea Away underwent a
mutation and change in form. The main case Lilian cites in support of this argument is Allen v.
Allen, 704 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ). In Allen, the evidence showed that
prior to marrying her husband, the wife owned and operated a beauty salon as a sole proprietorship.
Id. at 604. About eight months after the parties were married, the business was incorporated. Id.
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The corporation required an initial capitalization of $1,000.00, which came from the community
estate. Id. After the incorporation, the wife retained all of the business’s physical assets in her
name and rented them back to the corporation. Id. The trial court concluded that the business was
community property, and the wife appealed this characterization. Id. After analyzing all the
evidence, the court of appeals held that the wife failed to meet her burden to prove that the
corporation was her separate property because she did not clearly trace her contribution of separate
property to the corporation. Id. The court of appeals relied on the $1,000.00 of community funds
used to capitalize the corporation, the wife’s failure to contribute any tangible assets to the
corporation, and the fact that the corporation rented all its equipment from the wife. Id. Even
though it was clear that the corporation took over the activities of the sole proprietorship, the court
of appeals concluded that the only thing the wife contributed to the corporation was the sole
proprietorship’s goodwill, and without evidence of the value of the goodwill, it was impossible for
the court to trace the portion of the corporation created with the wife’s separate property. Id. at
605.
The present case is factually distinguishable from Allen. Here, the evidence showed that,
despite a change in form from a sole proprietorship to a limited liability company, the business
itself remained intact, continuing to provide the same product to the same distributors. At trial,
Lilian and Simon testified that certain physical assets—two vehicles, a motorcycle, and a trailer—
belonged to the business. Upon forming the limited liability company, Simon did not take
possession of the business’s physical assets, nor did he rent them back to the limited liability
company. Instead, these assets remained with the limited liability company. Additionally, unlike
Allen, Simon did not take funds from the community estate and use them as capital to create the
limited liability company.
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Lilian further argues this case cannot involve a mutation to property because a sole
proprietorship does not have a separate legal existence distinct from the operator of the business,
and the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship belong to the operator directly. See Bush v.
Bush, 336 S.W.3d 722, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Although Lilian
correctly identifies some of the characteristics of a sole proprietorship, we reject her argument that
Flea Away’s initial structure as a sole proprietorship prevented it from undergoing a change in
form.
Although Lilian testified that Flea Away, LLC was not the same as the sole proprietorship
because the business had expanded and its product had obtained FDA approval, the trial court was
entitled to disbelieve this testimony. See Weaver v. Preddy, No. 04-18-00026-CV, 2018 WL
6331063, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 5, 2018, no pet.) (recognizing trial court’s role as
sole judge of witness credibility in bench trial).
Based on the evidence presented, we conclude the trial court have reasonably determined
that the change from a sole proprietorship to a limited liability company was merely a change in
form that did not alter the separate character of the business.
Sufficiency of the Evidence—Separate Property Findings
In reviewing an alleged characterization error, we employ a two-pronged approach. Mora
v. Mora, No. 04-12-00638-CV, 2014 WL 769441, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2014,
no pet.). We initially determine if the trial court’s separate property finding was supported by clear
and convincing evidence, and if it is not, we then determine if the characterization error caused the
trial court to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. Id. Under this
approach, the complaining party must first establish error by challenging the legal or factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the separate property characterization, and then demonstrate
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harm by showing that because of the mischaracterization, the overall division of the property was
an abuse of discretion. Id.
To prevail on a sufficiency complaint, Lilian was required to challenge the legal or factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s separate property findings. See id. However,
Lilian’s amended brief does not expressly challenge the trial court’s separate property findings,
and it does not state if she is challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. In her
amended brief, Lilian argues: “Without formal tracing or appropriate supporting documentation,
it was unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that Flea Away is [Simon’s separate property]
and the evidence was insufficient for the trial court, as the factfinder, to conclude that Simon
overcame the community property presumption” as to Flea Away, LLC. Lilian adds that the
mischaracterization of the business harmed her by adversely affecting the overall division of the
community estate. We construe Lilian’s complaint as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s separate property findings.
“A trial court abuses its discretion when it characterizes property as separate without
legally sufficient evidence to do so.” Landry, 731 S.W.3d at 633. When reviewing the legal
sufficiency of the evidence under the clear and convincing standard of proof, we review all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. Id. A core function of the
factfinder under any standard of proof—including clear and convincing evidence—is to resolve
conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts. Id.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings and
deferring to the trial court’s role in resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing the evidence, and
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drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, we hold that the trial court could
have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Flea Away, LLC was Simon’s separate
property. See Fannin v. Fereday, No. 01-13-00951-CV, 2015 WL 4463694, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient for trial court to form firm belief or
conviction that limited liability company was husband’s separate property). Therefore, the trial
court’s findings are supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because we conclude the trial court
did not err in characterizing Flea Away, LLC as Simon’s separate property, we need not determine
if Lilian was harmed by the characterization. See Mora, 2014 WL 769441, at *3.
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
After we abated the appeal, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In
response, Lilian timely filed a request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 298. The trial court did not file any additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
In her amended brief, Lilian complains about the trial court’s failure to make additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law assigning “a specific value . . . to particular assets,
liabilities, and reimbursement claims.” For support, Lilian cites to section 6.711(a) of the Texas
Family Code, which requires the trial court, on proper request, to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with as to the “value of all assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets on which
disputed evidence has been presented.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.711(a) (emphasis added). 1 Lilian
1 Section 6.711(a) states:
In a suit for dissolution of a marriage in which the court has rendered a judgment dividing the estate of the parties, on request by a party, the court shall state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the characterization and value of all assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets on which disputed evidence has been presented.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.711(a).
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contends that without the additional valuation findings, she is unable to demonstrate the magnitude
of the harm she suffered from the trial court’s division of the community estate.
Rule 38.1(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant’s brief to
contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made along with appropriate citations to
the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant’s failure to provide substantive analysis of an
issue in her brief waives the complaint. Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57,
75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). An appellant’s failure to include appropriate citations
to the record waives any error. In re R.L.L., No. 04-18-00240-CV, 2018 WL 6069866, at *5 n.5
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 21, 2018, pet. denied); see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (providing
appellant’s brief must contain appropriate citations to the record). “It is not the duty of the appellate
court to search the record without guidance from an appellant to determine whether her complaints
are valid.” In re R.L.L., 2018 WL 6069866, at *5 n.5.
In her appellate briefing, Lilian does not identify the assets, liabilities, and reimbursement
claims that form the basis of her complaint. Nor does she provide citations to the parts of the
reporter’s record where disputed valuation evidence was presented. Accordingly, we must
conclude that Lilian’s complaint about the trial court’s failure to file additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for our review. See id.; TEX. R.
APP. P. 38.1(i).
AMENDED PLEADINGS
Lilian argues the trial court erred by permitting Simon to proceed to trial on his first
amended petition.
A party is generally permitted to amend his pleadings without obtaining leave at any time
prior to seven days before trial, unless the amended pleadings operate as a surprise to the opposing
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party. TEX. R. CIV. P. 63. A trial court has no discretion to refuse an amendment unless (1) the
opposing party presents evidence of surprise or prejudice; or (2) the amendment asserts a new
cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its face, and the opposing party objects to the
amendment. Wadhwa v. Wadhwa, 720 S.W.3d 169, 179–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2025, no pet.); Meuth v. City of Seguin, No. 04-18-00205-CV, 2019 WL 3208830, at *4 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio July 17, 2019, no pet.). “The burden of showing prejudice or surprise rests on
the party resisting the amendment.” State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.
1994). We review trial court’s decision to allow or deny a pleading amendment for an abuse of
discretion. See id.
Here, Simon filed his first amended petition on May 23, 2024, which was more than seven
days before trial. Simon filed his second amended petition on May 30, 2024, which was the day
before trial. During a pre-trial hearing, Lilian complained that Simon’s first and second amended
petitions were improper because, among other things, they contained a request for confirmation of
separate property. In response, the trial court stated, “I’ll make it easy. Anything that was pled
yesterday is out. . . . [Simon] is not going to be able to seek that. It’s outside the seven-day window.
Anything that was . . . amended on 5/23, [Simon] can pursue that.” Lilian then pointed out that
Simon’s original petition, which had been his live pleading for almost two years, omitted a request
to confirm separate property. In response, the trial court stated that Simon’s first amended petition
was permissible because the amendment was made prior to seven days before trial. At this point,
Lilian did not present any evidence of surprise or prejudice; instead, she simply stated, “Yes,
Judge.”
The record shows that after the trial court struck Simon’s second amended petition and
allowed him to proceed on his first amended petition, Lilian did not present any evidence of
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surprise or prejudice. Furthermore, Simon’s amendment seeking confirmation of separate property
was not prejudicial on its face because it did not add a new cause of action. The characterization
of property as community or separate is related to the overall division of property in a divorce
proceeding. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 3.003; 7.001; O’Connor v. O’Connor, No. 03-23-00407-CV,
2025 WL 2147786, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 30, 2025, no pet.) (“We review a trial court’s
property division—including its characterization of property as separate or community—for an
abuse of discretion.”); Allen, 704 S.W.2d at 603 (“The starting point in the division of the marital
estate is the characterization of the parties’ property as community or separate.”); see also
Wadhwa, 720 S.W.3d at 181 (“We cannot conclude that Natalie’s narrowing of her request for the
right to designate the children’s primary residence in her sixth amended petition if joint managing
conservators were appointed, as compared to her joint-managing conservatorship request in her
fifth amended petition, is a new claim or cause of action.”). For these reasons, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by permitting Simon to proceed to trial on his first amended petition.
APPELLEE’S CROSS-POINT
In a cross-point, Simon argues the trial court erred by determining that he and Lilian had a
valid marriage. The trial court granted Lilian’s motion for summary judgment and determined that
a valid marriage existed between Simon and Lilian as of November 28, 2012, which was the day
after Simon was divorced from his former wife. The final decree of divorce recites that a valid
marriage existed between Simon and Lilian as of November 28, 2012. Simon now asks us to vacate
the decree of divorce in its entirety because he claims a valid marriage never existed.
“A party who seeks to alter the trial court’s judgment or other appealable order must file a
notice of appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c). “The appellate court may not grant a party who does not
file a notice of appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause.” Id. Simon
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did not file a notice of appeal, and we find no just cause. Accordingly, Simon’s cross-point presents
nothing for our review. See id.; Upsilon L.P. v. New Car Concepts, No. 04-12-00479-CV, 2013
WL 4686154, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (concluding appellees’
cross-points were not before the appellate court when they did not file a separate notice of appeal).
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s final decree of divorce is affirmed.
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
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