Lila Thompson, et al. v. PACCAR Incorporated, et al.

D. Arizona

Lila Thompson, et al. v. PACCAR Incorporated, et al.

DecidedDecember 18, 2025

Docket2:25-cv-00093

StatusUnknown

This text of Lila Thompson, et al. v. PACCAR Incorporated, et al. (Lila Thompson, et al. v. PACCAR Incorporated, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lila Thompson, et al. v. PACCAR Incorporated, et al., (D. Ariz. 2025).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Lila Thompson, et al., No. CV-25-00093-PHX-KML

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 PACCAR Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Willis Jeval Thompson and others died in a car crash involving a Kenworth tractor 16 trailer designed and sold by defendant PACCAR Inc. (Doc. 1 at 3, 8.) Willis’s mother, Lila 17 Thompson, filed “this wrongful death [suit] for herself and on behalf of all statutory 18 beneficiaries of [Decedent] Thompson” against PACCAR alleging product liability 19 theories. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The complaint was filed in January 2025, the court issued a 20 scheduling order in May 2025, and the fact discovery period ends in January 2026. (Doc. 21 1, 27.) 22 On October 28, 2025, non-party Lateshia EagleTail filed a “Motion to Intervene and 23 Substitute Personal Representative as Party Plaintiff.” (Doc. 71.) EagleTail is Lila 24 Thompson’s daughter and Willis’s sister. That motion argues EagleTail was appointed “as 25 Personal Representative of the Estate of Willis Jeval Thompson pursuant to A.R.S. § 14- 26 3703(A).” (Doc. 71 at 1-2.) And according to EagleTail, under Arizona’s wrongful death 27 statute, A.R.S. § 12-612(A), “only the Personal Representative may bring and maintain a 28 wrongful death action for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries.” (Doc. 71 at 2.) 1 Therefore, EagleTail requests she be substituted “as the proper Party Plaintiff in place of 2 any unauthorized individuals.” (Doc. 71 at 4.) EagleTail also argues she should be allowed 3 to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Lila Thompson filed an opposition that argues 4 there is no requirement a wrongful death action be brought by the personal representative. 5 (Doc. 77 at 4.) According to Lila Thompson, EagleTail’s motion represents her “simply 6 trying to insert herself into a matter that does not involve her.”1 (Doc. 77 at 5.) 7 On December 3, 2025, EagleTail filed what appears to be a similar motion to the 8 one she filed in October, although this second motion is more difficult to understand. The 9 December motion is titled “Emergency Motion to Intervene and Substitute Personal 10 Representative as the Sole Lawful Plaintiff, to Vacate Void Filings Based on Fraudulent 11 Standing, and for Formal Recognition of Heirship, Standing, and Personal Representative 12 Authority Under A.R.S. §§ 12-612 & 14-3703.” (Doc. 89.) The filing complains again that 13 Lila Thompson is the named plaintiff on behalf of herself and other statutory beneficiaries. 14 (Doc. 89 at 2.) And EagleTail again asserts that under Arizona law, “[t]he Personal 15 Representative must control the wrongful-death action.” (Doc. 89 at 2.) 16 On December 15, 2025, EagleTail filed a third motion requesting, among other 17 things, “federal oversight, tolling, vacatur of void orders, formal recognition of lawful heir 18 and personal representative.” (Doc. 102.) That motion appears to present many of the same 19 arguments and seek the same type of relief as her earlier motions but is also premised on 20 Willis’s ex-wife having been improperly named as a plaintiff in this case. She is not, and 21 her name appears nowhere in the complaint. (See Doc. 1.) 22 EagleTail’s three motions are premised on an incorrect understanding of Arizona 23 law. Arizona law “requires that an action for wrongful death be brought by a designated 24 plaintiff (the decedent’s ‘surviving husband or wife, child, parent or guardian, or personal 25 representative’), for and on behalf of a statutory beneficiary (the decedent’s ‘surviving

26 1 There was a related suit in state court against different defendants than the present suit. (Doc. 77-1 at 9.) The full state court record is not available but it appears Lila Thompson 27 and Tondra Doss were both plaintiffs, Thompson in her capacity as mother of Willis and Doss in her capacity as the mother of Willis’s child. (Doc. 77-1 at 9, 13.) EagleTail filed 28 multiple motions in the state proceeding attempting to be substituted as the named plaintiff. The state court denied those requests. 1 husband or wife, children or parents, or if none of these survive, on behalf of the decedent’s 2 estate’).” Benedict v. Total Transit Inc., 499 P.3d 339, 344–45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). That 3 language means the personal representative of an estate can bring suit but, when statutory 4 beneficiaries are alive, the claim must be brought on behalf of those statutory beneficiaries. 5 Edonna v. Heckman, 253 P.3d 627, 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“To be sure, had there been 6 no other surviving statutory beneficiaries, the personal representative of Edward’s estate 7 could have brought a wrongful death claim for the estate’s benefit.”). In other words, a 8 decedent’s estate “is not a proper beneficiary” if any statutory beneficiary is alive. Knauss 9 v. DND Neffson Co., 963 P.2d 271, 278–79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); see also Gonzales v. 10 Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 775 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“a decedent’s estate 11 may bring an action to recover damages only if the decedent is survived by neither spouse 12 nor children”). 13 As Willis’s mother, Lila Thompson is a proper plaintiff, and she is entitled to bring 14 this suit on behalf of herself and all other beneficiaries. Wilmot v. Wilmot, 58 P.3d 507, 511 15 (Ariz. 2002) (beneficiary who files suit is fiduciary for other beneficiaries “both in 16 conducting and settling the action and making distribution of proceeds to each of the other 17 beneficiaries at the conclusion”). And because Lila Thompson and Willis’s minor child are 18 alive, Willis’s estate is not a proper beneficiary. In these circumstances, EagleTail as 19 personal representative need not be the named plaintiff. And because the estate will not be 20 a proper beneficiary, EagleTail has no cognizable interest such that intervention as of right 21 is merited. Sweet v. Cardona, 121 F.4th 32, 48 (9th Cir. 2024) (intervention as of right 22 requires among other things “a significantly protectable interest relating to the subject of 23 the action”). 24 / 25 / 26 / 27 / 28 / 1 Based on Arizona law, EagleTail is not entitled to the relief she seeks and she must 2|| not file future motions seeking that relief. Any future motions will be summarily denied. 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED the Motions to Intervene (Doc. 71, 89, 102) are DENIED. 5 Dated this 18th day of December, 2025. 6

g LY dela MM. AA Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Lila Thompson, et al., No. CV-25-00093-PHX-KML

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 PACCAR Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Willis Jeval Thompson and others died in a car crash involving a Kenworth tractor 16 trailer designed and sold by defendant PACCAR Inc. (Doc. 1 at 3, 8.) Willis’s mother, Lila 17 Thompson, filed “this wrongful death [suit] for herself and on behalf of all statutory 18 beneficiaries of [Decedent] Thompson” against PACCAR alleging product liability 19 theories. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The complaint was filed in January 2025, the court issued a 20 scheduling order in May 2025, and the fact discovery period ends in January 2026. (Doc. 21 1, 27.) 22 On October 28, 2025, non-party Lateshia EagleTail filed a “Motion to Intervene and 23 Substitute Personal Representative as Party Plaintiff.” (Doc. 71.) EagleTail is Lila 24 Thompson’s daughter and Willis’s sister. That motion argues EagleTail was appointed “as 25 Personal Representative of the Estate of Willis Jeval Thompson pursuant to A.R.S. § 14- 26 3703(A).” (Doc. 71 at 1-2.) And according to EagleTail, under Arizona’s wrongful death 27 statute, A.R.S. § 12-612(A), “only the Personal Representative may bring and maintain a 28 wrongful death action for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries.” (Doc. 71 at 2.) 1 Therefore, EagleTail requests she be substituted “as the proper Party Plaintiff in place of 2 any unauthorized individuals.” (Doc. 71 at 4.) EagleTail also argues she should be allowed 3 to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Lila Thompson filed an opposition that argues 4 there is no requirement a wrongful death action be brought by the personal representative. 5 (Doc. 77 at 4.) According to Lila Thompson, EagleTail’s motion represents her “simply 6 trying to insert herself into a matter that does not involve her.”1 (Doc. 77 at 5.) 7 On December 3, 2025, EagleTail filed what appears to be a similar motion to the 8 one she filed in October, although this second motion is more difficult to understand. The 9 December motion is titled “Emergency Motion to Intervene and Substitute Personal 10 Representative as the Sole Lawful Plaintiff, to Vacate Void Filings Based on Fraudulent 11 Standing, and for Formal Recognition of Heirship, Standing, and Personal Representative 12 Authority Under A.R.S. §§ 12-612 & 14-3703.” (Doc. 89.) The filing complains again that 13 Lila Thompson is the named plaintiff on behalf of herself and other statutory beneficiaries. 14 (Doc. 89 at 2.) And EagleTail again asserts that under Arizona law, “[t]he Personal 15 Representative must control the wrongful-death action.” (Doc. 89 at 2.) 16 On December 15, 2025, EagleTail filed a third motion requesting, among other 17 things, “federal oversight, tolling, vacatur of void orders, formal recognition of lawful heir 18 and personal representative.” (Doc. 102.) That motion appears to present many of the same 19 arguments and seek the same type of relief as her earlier motions but is also premised on 20 Willis’s ex-wife having been improperly named as a plaintiff in this case. She is not, and 21 her name appears nowhere in the complaint. (See Doc. 1.) 22 EagleTail’s three motions are premised on an incorrect understanding of Arizona 23 law. Arizona law “requires that an action for wrongful death be brought by a designated 24 plaintiff (the decedent’s ‘surviving husband or wife, child, parent or guardian, or personal 25 representative’), for and on behalf of a statutory beneficiary (the decedent’s ‘surviving

26 1 There was a related suit in state court against different defendants than the present suit. (Doc. 77-1 at 9.) The full state court record is not available but it appears Lila Thompson 27 and Tondra Doss were both plaintiffs, Thompson in her capacity as mother of Willis and Doss in her capacity as the mother of Willis’s child. (Doc. 77-1 at 9, 13.) EagleTail filed 28 multiple motions in the state proceeding attempting to be substituted as the named plaintiff. The state court denied those requests. 1 husband or wife, children or parents, or if none of these survive, on behalf of the decedent’s 2 estate’).” Benedict v. Total Transit Inc., 499 P.3d 339, 344–45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). That 3 language means the personal representative of an estate can bring suit but, when statutory 4 beneficiaries are alive, the claim must be brought on behalf of those statutory beneficiaries. 5 Edonna v. Heckman, 253 P.3d 627, 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“To be sure, had there been 6 no other surviving statutory beneficiaries, the personal representative of Edward’s estate 7 could have brought a wrongful death claim for the estate’s benefit.”). In other words, a 8 decedent’s estate “is not a proper beneficiary” if any statutory beneficiary is alive. Knauss 9 v. DND Neffson Co., 963 P.2d 271, 278–79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); see also Gonzales v. 10 Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 775 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“a decedent’s estate 11 may bring an action to recover damages only if the decedent is survived by neither spouse 12 nor children”). 13 As Willis’s mother, Lila Thompson is a proper plaintiff, and she is entitled to bring 14 this suit on behalf of herself and all other beneficiaries. Wilmot v. Wilmot, 58 P.3d 507, 511 15 (Ariz. 2002) (beneficiary who files suit is fiduciary for other beneficiaries “both in 16 conducting and settling the action and making distribution of proceeds to each of the other 17 beneficiaries at the conclusion”). And because Lila Thompson and Willis’s minor child are 18 alive, Willis’s estate is not a proper beneficiary. In these circumstances, EagleTail as 19 personal representative need not be the named plaintiff. And because the estate will not be 20 a proper beneficiary, EagleTail has no cognizable interest such that intervention as of right 21 is merited. Sweet v. Cardona, 121 F.4th 32, 48 (9th Cir. 2024) (intervention as of right 22 requires among other things “a significantly protectable interest relating to the subject of 23 the action”). 24 / 25 / 26 / 27 / 28 / 1 Based on Arizona law, EagleTail is not entitled to the relief she seeks and she must 2|| not file future motions seeking that relief. Any future motions will be summarily denied. 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED the Motions to Intervene (Doc. 71, 89, 102) are DENIED. 5 Dated this 18th day of December, 2025. 6

g LY dela MM. AA Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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