Lighthipe v. City of Orange

68 A. 120, 75 N.J.L. 365, 1907 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 123
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedJune 10, 1907
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 68 A. 120 (Lighthipe v. City of Orange) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lighthipe v. City of Orange, 68 A. 120, 75 N.J.L. 365, 1907 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 123 (N.J. 1907).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Pitney, J.

This writ brings under review certain resolutions adopted by the common council of the city of Orange, [366]*366November 12th, 1906, awarding contracts to the CrockerWheeler Company and to the Western Electric Company, for the construction and installation of the necessary steam engines, electric generators, switchboards, are lights, poles, wires and equipment for a system of public electric street lighting.

The prosecutor is a resident of the city and a large property owner and taxpayer. He has therefore a legitimate interest in the proceedings under review. We do not think he is barred by laches. His application for the writ was made on December 6th, and up to that time no money had been expended either by the city or by the companies, or either of them, towards the execution of the contracts, the only previous disbursements being such as were necessary to enable the companies to make estimates and submit their bids, and these were incurred before the contracts were awarded.

It is admitted that the city has no legal authority to enter into these contracts other than such as may be derived from an act of the legislature approved April 10th, 1906. Pamph. L., p. 157. The revised charter of the city (Pamph. L. 1869, p. 182, § 15, subsec. 18), empowers the common council by ordinance to provide and maintain lamps and gas fixtures and to light the streets and public grounds;. but it is conceded that this did not by implication confer authority to erect and maintain an electric plant, for reasons pointed out by this court in Howell v. Millville, 31 Vroom, 95.

The act of 1906 just referred to has the following title: “An act to authorize cities of this state having a plant, appliances or machinery designed or used for furnishing a public water-supply, to utilize, use and develop any power which may be derived therefrom and to develop additional power to furnish electrical energy for lighting or other public use, and to provide the funds necessary for this purpose.” Its first section empowers “The board or body having charge of the public lighting and public water-supply in any city of this state to utilize and irse any property which is now or has formerly or may hereafter be used by such city for the purpose of supplying water for .public use, for the purpose, also, of generating [367]*367electrical energy to supply such city with light or for other public use, and for this purpose such board shall have power and authority to purchase, or condemn, lands or interests in lands or necessary water rights and purchase material and construct, reconstruct, erect, maintain and use such property and works and such other and additional works, plant, property and machinery as may be required to develop the required light or power.” The remaining sections contain provisions for raising the money to defray the cost of construction and the expense of maintenance and operation.

Under the provision of our constitution which requires the object of an act to be expressed in its title, it is properly conceded that the authority conferred by the first section of this act cannot be extended beyond the limitation imposed by the title. Hendrickson v. Fries, 16 Vroom 555, 563; Cooper v. Springer, 36 Id. 594.

The reasons assigned by the prosecutor for setting aside the resolutions in question, and the contracts that have been made thereunder, rest'in part upon the insistment that the act of 1906 is unconstitutional because it is a special law for regulating the internal affairs of cities, and because its object is not set forth in its title; and in part upon the insistment that in fact the city had not, at the time of the passage of the resolutions or at ihe time of the making of the contracts, any plant, appliances or machinery designed or used for furnishing a public water-supply from which any power could be derived for the development of electrical energy to operate the proposed municipal lighting plant; and that the lighting plant is not intended to be operated in whole or in part by any power derived from the plant, appliances or machinery used or designed for furnishing a public water-supply for the city. Eor the determination of these questions of fact we are referred to certain depositions that 'were taken for use upon the application for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, and which by consent of counsel are to be used with the same effect as if taken by leave of the court after the allowance of the writ.

It is, however, suggested rather than argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that this court, in reviewing the [368]*368proceedings of a municipal corporation, has no authority to inquire into matters of fact for the purpose of contradicting recitals that appear upon the minutes or other records of those proceedings, aside from the power that is conferred by section 11 of the Certiorari act. Pamph,. L. 1903, p. 346; Pamph. L. 1906, p. 658. With this suggestion we do not agree. The section referred to provides for the determination of questions of fact in the review of taxes, assessments or other order or proceeding touching any local or public improvement, or to review the proceedings of any special statutory tribunal. The ordinary review of municipal ordinances and other proceedings, which this court has long exercised as a part of its constitutional jurisdiction, can in many instances not be pursued without making inquiry into questions of fact. Such inquiry is essential to the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of the court, and is not, we think, dependent for its existence upon the Certiorari act alone.

There was much controversy upon the argument with respect to the scope and purpose of the act of April 10th, 1906. Construing it, as we must, in subordination to the limitation imposed by its title, the next important principle to be kept in mind is that the act must be so construed, if possible, as to render it constitutional, not so as to render it a special law for the regulation of the internal affairs of cities. The title shows that it was not the design of the legislature to authorize all cities to exercise the powers conferred. Resort is had to classification, and to this end qualifications are imposed in order to differentiate the cities to which the act applies from those to which it does not apply. It is to be presumed that these qualifications were intended to be such as would form a substantial and constitutional basis for setting the designated class of cities apart for separate treatment, and thus relieve the act from being properly deemed special legislation. The ground of distinction, as pointed out in the title, is the possession, by those cities to which it is intended to apply, of some “plant, appliances or machinery” designed or used for a certain public purpose, and from which mechanical power may be derived for another public purpose, i. e., for furnishing electrical [369]*369energy for lighting or other public use. The existing plant, appliances or machinery are to be such as are designed or used for furnishing a public -water-supply. Manifestly, it was not the legislative intent that a city should be authorized to abandon the water-supply or to impair the efficiency of the plant for that purpose, in order to use the plant for developing electrical energy.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
68 A. 120, 75 N.J.L. 365, 1907 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lighthipe-v-city-of-orange-nj-1907.