Liggins v. Duncanville TX

52 F.4th 953
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedNovember 7, 2022
Docket22-10100
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 52 F.4th 953 (Liggins v. Duncanville TX) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Liggins v. Duncanville TX, 52 F.4th 953 (5th Cir. 2022).

Opinion

Case: 22-10100 Document: 00516536532 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/07/2022

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED No. 22-10100 November 7, 2022 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Lou Liggins,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Duncanville, Texas; Nathan Roach,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:20-CV-654

Before Clement, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges. Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge: Four years ago, Lou Liggins was having a “severe mental health episode” and voicing “suicidal ideations.” So, his mother called the police. When the Chief of Police arrived, he ordered his officers to enter the Liggins’s home and, in the mix-up, Liggins was shot. Because the Chief’s decision to intervene wasn’t based on a deliberate indifference to any risk to Liggins’s rights, we AFFIRM. Case: 22-10100 Document: 00516536532 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/07/2022

No. 22-10100

I On March 20, 2018, a Duncanville police officer shot Lou Liggins in the stomach. Earlier that day, Liggins “stopped taking [his] medications” and started having “a severe mental health episode.” After he “express[ed] suicidal ideations,” Liggins’s mother called his health care providers. They “advised [her] to call 911.” So, she did. Shortly after, Duncanville Chief of Police Robert Brown arrived on the scene. There, he learned from Liggins’s mother that her son, although “unarmed,” was having a mental breakdown inside the home. Chief Brown then “assur[ed]” Liggins’s mother that a “negotiating team” would be brought in and that the police “would not shoot Lou.” Sometime later, and without negotiators, Chief Brown ordered his officers to enter the Liggins’s home. Once inside, an officer shot Liggins after he reached for a cell phone. Liggins was rushed to the hospital and, after “emergency surgery,” survived. Now, Liggins is suing the City of Duncanville for Chief Brown’s decision, namely “order[ing] officers . . . into the house.” Liggins argues Chief Brown was a “policymaker” who—with a “callous disregard for individuals suffering from mental health episodes”—caused the “deprivation” of Liggins’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court wasn’t convinced for two reasons. One, Chief Brown couldn’t be a policymaker, per Monell v. Department of Social Services, because he didn’t have “final authority to establish municipal policy.” 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Two, Liggins couldn’t show that, when Chief Brown gave the order, he was deliberately indifferent to the possible violation of Liggins’s constitutional rights. Instead, Liggins relied exclusively on “conclusory” allegations. Following a dismissal, Liggins appealed. Before us, he maintains that he adequately pled facts to support Chief Brown’s policymaker status and, in turn, Monell liability for the City of Duncanville. He also asks that we

2 Case: 22-10100 Document: 00516536532 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/07/2022

reconsider our application of the “relation back” doctrine to his “John Doe pleadings.” II We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P., 970 F.3d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On review, we take all “well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Calogero, 970 F.3d at 580 (citation omitted). A To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of a federally protected right, including constitutional protections, “pursuant to an official municipal policy.” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Per Monell, the plaintiff must target a “policy”—known by or created by a “policymaker”—that was the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s harm. Id. at 541–42 (citations omitted). Because the other two requirements are dispositive in this case, we don’t address the “policymaker” element any further. For the “moving force” element, a plaintiff must “show[] either that the policy itself was unconstitutional” or that it “was adopted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact” that a specific constitutional violation would follow. Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotations omitted). Under the deliberate indifference framework, a party must prove there’s a “causal link” between the policy and their harm, and that the defendant had the “requisite degree

3 Case: 22-10100 Document: 00516536532 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/07/2022

of culpability.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Culpability, in this context, is a complete disregard of “the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional . . . right [would] follow the decision.” Id. at 411. That’s a “high standard.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542. A “showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.” Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). As for the policy requirement, a party may point to a formal declaration, an informal custom, or, sometimes, a “single decision.” Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000). But, the “single decision” exception is “extremely narrow” and only applies in “rare circumstances.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (citation omitted); Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214 n.51 (5th Cir. 2019). To warrant application, the constitutional harm in question must’ve been the “plainly obvious” consequence of the actor’s single decision. See Brown, 219 F.3d at 461. In practice, that means the decision must’ve been made despite a very “high degree of predictability concerning the consequences of the challenged decision.” Id. at 460 (emphasis added). That’s a “stringent standard[]” which requires “unmistakable culpability and clearly connected causation.” Id. at 461. Here, Liggins argues that Chief Brown’s single decision—ordering his officers to enter the Liggins’s home—was the “moving force” behind Liggins’s injuries. Liggins admits Chief Brown’s order wasn’t patently unconstitutional, so instead he contends that it was adopted with a deliberate indifference to Liggins’s rights. But, Liggins’s claim doesn’t pass muster for two reasons: predictability and culpability. First, it wasn’t “highly predictable” that a Fourth Amendment violation would result from Chief Brown’s order. The single decision exception—especially when tied to deliberate indifference—applies in rare

4 Case: 22-10100 Document: 00516536532 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/07/2022

and narrow scenarios. See Valle, 613 F.3d at 542. We have only entertained the theory in a few cases, including Brown, 219 F.3d 450.

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Bluebook (online)
52 F.4th 953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liggins-v-duncanville-tx-ca5-2022.