Life Management Center for MH/MR Services, D/B/A El Paso Psychiatric Center v. Cristina Cruz, M. D.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 11, 2003
• Docket: 08-03-00121-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

LIFE MANAGEMENT CENTER FOR MH/MR SERVICES, D/B/A EL PASO PSYCHIATRIC CENTER,                             Appellant, v. CRISTINA CRUZ, M.D.,                             Appellee.

'

No. 08-03-00121-CV Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 of El Paso County, Texas (TC#98-3886)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Life Management Center for MH/MR Services, (the Center) doing business as El Paso Psychiatric Center (EPPC), appeals the trial court=s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.  We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Cristina Cruz, M.D., had courtesy staff status at EPPC.  In August 1998, Life Management Center for MH/MR Services=s medical director, Bernardo Tarin-Godoy, suspended her, pending an investigation of possible patient abandonment.  The suspension was lifted the following month, and Cruz was placed on six months= probation.

Thereafter, Cruz brought this suit against Tarin, the Center, and two other Center officials.  She sought a declaratory judgment that her suspension and probation violated EPPC=s bylaws and various federal and state statutes and she requested that the references to the suspension and probation be removed from her record.

In addition to the declaratory judgment claim, Cruz pleaded three tort claims--defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In the defamation claim, she alleged that Tarin and the other Center officials slandered her by stating that she had abandoned a patient and that Tarin also slandered her by stating that she needed to be escorted out of EPPC when he suspended her.  In the invasion of privacy claim, she alleged that before her suspension, in April 1998, the Center and the other officials released her confidential personnel record to third parties.  In the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, she alleged that the defendants caused her severe emotional distress by stating that she had abandoned a patient, ordering her removed from EPPC, and releasing her confidential personnel record.

The Center filed a AMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,@ arguing that Cruz=s tort claims are barred by sovereign immunity.  The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004).

NO CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION OVER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM

Although the Center styled its motion as a AMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction@ rather than as a plea to the jurisdiction, the motion was in effect a plea to the jurisdiction.  See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm=n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 866-67 (Tex. 2001) (treating a AMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on Sovereign Immunity@ as a plea to the jurisdiction).  A plea to the jurisdiction is used to contest the trial court=s subject matter jurisdiction.  Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).  Sovereign immunity defeats a trial court=s subject matter jurisdiction, and thus may properly be asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.  Tex. Dep=t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 637 (Tex. 1999).

When a trial court sustains a plea to the jurisdiction, the entire cause should be dismissed.  City of Hedwig Village Planning & Zoning Comm=n v. Howeth Invs., 73 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. PG&E Tex. Pipeline, L.P., 35 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism=d w.o.j.), disavowed on other grounds, City of Houston v. Northwood Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 74 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Choctaw Props., L.L.C., 17 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex. App.--Waco 2000, no pet.).  Accordingly, when the court has jurisdiction over any claim against a governmental entity, the trial court should deny that entity=s plea to the jurisdiction, and the appellate court should affirm the denial.  City of Hedwig Village Planning & Zoning Comm=n, 73 S.W.3d at 393; Harris County Flood Control Dist., 35 S.W.3d at 773; Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist., 17 S.W.3d at 262; Blum v. Restland of Dallas, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1997, pet. denied); Tex. Dep=t of Pub. Safety v. Rivera, No. 13-01-00293-CV, 2002 WL 720706, at *7 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi April 25, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Tex. Dep=t of Parks & Wildlife v. Steinhagen, No. 09-99-00568-CV, 2001 WL 47667, at *1 (Tex. App.--Beaumont Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

This result is not altered by the fact that governmental entities are statutorily authorized to bring interlocutory appeals from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004).  The policy reason behind this statute is that a governmental entity should not have to expend resources in trying a case on the merits if it is immune from suit.  Harris County Flood Control Dist., 35 S.W.3d at 773-74.  This policy does not support allowing an interlocutory appeal when the governmental entity asserts immunity from less than all of the claims asserted by the plaintiff against the entity.  Id. at 774; Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist., 17 S.W.3d at 262.  In this situation, an interlocutory appeal only serves to increase the cost of litigation and to delay final disposition of the entire cause.  Harris County Flood Control Dist., 35 S.W.3d at 774.

In this case, LMC has not challenged the trial court=s jurisdiction over Cruz=s declaratory judgment action.  Therefore, the trial court properly denied its plea to the jurisdiction.

NO PROOF THAT LMC IS A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY

There is an additional reason why we must uphold the trial court=s denial of LMC=s plea.  There is no proof that LMC is a governmental entity that is entitled to sovereign immunity.

To establish its entitlement to sovereign immunity, LMC relies on Marroquin v. Life Management Center for MH/MR Services, 927 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1996, writ dism=d w.o.j.).  In Marroquin, the plaintiff appealed a summary judgment granted in LMC=s favor.  927 S.W.2d at 229.  We stated that ALMC is a governmental unit as defined by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 101.001 . . . .@  Id.  But we also stated, ABoth parties agree that LMC is a unit of government entitled to assert the doctrine of sovereign immunity.@  Id. at 230.  Thus, LMC=s status as a governmental unit was not an issue in that case.  In this case, unlike in Marroquin, the plaintiff does not agree that LMC is a governmental unit that is entitled to sovereign immunity.  Therefore, Marroquin is not controlling.

The record reflects, and the parties agree, that the trial court reviewed the file while determining LMC=s motion to dismiss.  The file includes the evidence attached to Tarin=s motion for summary judgment, Cruz=s response to that motion, and Cruz=s objections to the summary judgment evidence.  In their appellate briefs, the parties cite to Tarin=s summary judgment evidence and to Cruz=s response and objections.  Therefore, we will look to that evidence to determine whether LMC is a governmental unit that is entitled to sovereign immunity.  See Tex. Dep=t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001) (considering evidence attached to a motion for summary judgment in determining a plea to the jurisdiction).

Tarin=s summary judgment evidence included his own affidavit and an affidavit by Jonathan Lucas.  Tarin=s affidavit states that he is Athe Medical Director of Life Management Center for MH/MR Services (hereinafter >LMC=)@ and that ALMC was operating or in charge of the El Paso Psychiatric Center@ when the events giving rise to this suit occurred.  (Emphasis added.)

Lucas=s affidavit states:

I am the Interim Chief Executive Officer of Life Management Center for MH/MR Services.  Life Management Center is a governmental entity.  It was created by an interlocal agreement between and among other governmental entities.  A true and correct copy of the interlocal agreement establishing Life Management Center is attached to this instrument.   (Emphasis added.)

The attached interlocal agreement between the City of El Paso, the County of El Paso, and ALife Management Center@ notes that the City and County previously established the El Paso Center for Mental Health and Mental Retardation, which later changed its name to ALife Management Center.@  The agreement provides, pursuant to statutory authority, that A[t]he City and the County hereby mutually establish a community mental health and mental retardation center, which will provide mental health and mental retardation services, to be known as Life Management Center.@

The statutory authority for establishing a community mental health and mental retardation center is currently found in Chapter 534 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, which provides that such a center is a governmental unit as defined by the Texas Tort Claims Act.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 101.002 (Vernon 1997); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. ' 534.001(c)(1) (Vernon 2003).

The record thus contains uncontroverted evidence that EPPC was operated by ALife Management Center for MH/MR Services@ and that ALife Management Center@ is a governmental unit that is entitled to sovereign immunity.  But there is no evidence that ALife Management Center for MH/MR Services@ and ALife Management Center@ are one and the same.  Thus, because there is no evidence that LMC is a governmental unit that is entitled to sovereign immunity, the trial court did not err in denying its plea to the jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Life Management Center for MH/MR Services=s issue on appeal is overruled, and the trial court=s order denying its plea to the jurisdiction is affirmed.

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice

December 11, 2003

Before Panel No. 3

Barajas, C.J., Larsen, and Chew, JJ.