Lier v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

D. Arizona

Lier v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

DecidedAugust 5, 2025

Docket2:25-cv-00396

StatusUnknown

This text of Lier v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Lier v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lier v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2025).

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Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Dana Kay Lier, No. CV-25-00396-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation to an award of attorneys’ fees 16 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 20). 17 “A litigant is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA if: ‘(1) he is the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 18 substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and costs are reasonable.’ Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 19 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).” 20 21 Michele M. v. Saul, No. 19-CV-00272-JLB, 2020 WL 5203375, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 22 2020). The Court will discuss each prong in turn. 23 Here, the parties’ discussion regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees under the 24 EAJA is: “This stipulation constitutes a compromise settlement of Plaintiff’s request for 25 EAJA fees and does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of Defendant under 26 the EAJA or otherwise.” (Doc. 20 at 2). In other words, the parties do not discuss the 27 EAJA entitlement prongs. 28 Regarding prong one, this Court remanded this case to the social security 1 administration for further proceedings. (Doc. 16). Accordingly, the Court finds that 2 Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 3 Regarding prong two, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 4 Pursuant to the EAJA, we are required to award [Plaintiff] fees and other expenses incurred in connection with his civil action unless we find that the 5 position of the United States was “substantially justified” or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 6 The test for determining whether the Secretary’s position was substantially 7 justified under the EAJA is whether the position had a reasonable basis in both law and fact—that is, whether it was justified “to a degree that could 8 satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); see also Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987). The 9 burden is on the Secretary to prove that his position was substantially justified. Id. 10 11 Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 The Government’s stipulation to pay fees, while simultaneously not admitting it 13 owes the fees, is an ambiguous legal position. This case was remanded by stipulation of 14 the parties (Docs. 15–17), and this Court has never evaluated either party’s positions. 15 Nonetheless, applying the test articulated in Russell, the Court finds that the Government 16 has failed to carry its burden to prove that its position was substantially justified or that 17 special circumstances make an award unjust. Russell, 930 F.2d at 1445; see also Michele 18 M., 2020 WL 5203375, at *1. 19 Finally, the parties have stipulated that the requested fees are reasonable, and the 20 Court agrees. 21 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to EAJA fees. Therefore, 22 IT IS ORDERED granting the stipulation (Doc. 20) such that fees and expenses in 23 the amount of $3,349.47 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and costs in the amount of $0 24 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 are awarded subject to the terms of the Stipulation. 1 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, after receiving this Order, the Commissioner: 26 (1) determines upon effectuation of this Order that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is

27 1 This award is without prejudice to Plaintiff’s counsel seeking attorneys’ fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), subject to the offset 28 provisions of the EAJA. subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program, and (2) agrees to waive the || requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, then the fees awarded herein will be paid to 3|| Plaintiffs attorney (consistent with the client’s agreement at Doc. 20-3 at 1). However, if 4|| there is a debt owed under the Treasury Offset Program, the Commissioner cannot agree 5 || to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining Equal Access 6|| to Justice Act fees after offset will be paid to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiffs attorney. 7 Dated this 5th day of August, 2025. 8 7 '

ll _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Dana Kay Lier, No. CV-25-00396-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation to an award of attorneys’ fees 16 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 20). 17 “A litigant is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA if: ‘(1) he is the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 18 substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and costs are reasonable.’ Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 19 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).” 20 21 Michele M. v. Saul, No. 19-CV-00272-JLB, 2020 WL 5203375, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 22 2020). The Court will discuss each prong in turn. 23 Here, the parties’ discussion regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees under the 24 EAJA is: “This stipulation constitutes a compromise settlement of Plaintiff’s request for 25 EAJA fees and does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of Defendant under 26 the EAJA or otherwise.” (Doc. 20 at 2). In other words, the parties do not discuss the 27 EAJA entitlement prongs. 28 Regarding prong one, this Court remanded this case to the social security 1 administration for further proceedings. (Doc. 16). Accordingly, the Court finds that 2 Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 3 Regarding prong two, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 4 Pursuant to the EAJA, we are required to award [Plaintiff] fees and other expenses incurred in connection with his civil action unless we find that the 5 position of the United States was “substantially justified” or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 6 The test for determining whether the Secretary’s position was substantially 7 justified under the EAJA is whether the position had a reasonable basis in both law and fact—that is, whether it was justified “to a degree that could 8 satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); see also Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987). The 9 burden is on the Secretary to prove that his position was substantially justified. Id. 10 11 Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 The Government’s stipulation to pay fees, while simultaneously not admitting it 13 owes the fees, is an ambiguous legal position. This case was remanded by stipulation of 14 the parties (Docs. 15–17), and this Court has never evaluated either party’s positions. 15 Nonetheless, applying the test articulated in Russell, the Court finds that the Government 16 has failed to carry its burden to prove that its position was substantially justified or that 17 special circumstances make an award unjust. Russell, 930 F.2d at 1445; see also Michele 18 M., 2020 WL 5203375, at *1. 19 Finally, the parties have stipulated that the requested fees are reasonable, and the 20 Court agrees. 21 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to EAJA fees. Therefore, 22 IT IS ORDERED granting the stipulation (Doc. 20) such that fees and expenses in 23 the amount of $3,349.47 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and costs in the amount of $0 24 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 are awarded subject to the terms of the Stipulation. 1 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, after receiving this Order, the Commissioner: 26 (1) determines upon effectuation of this Order that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is

27 1 This award is without prejudice to Plaintiff’s counsel seeking attorneys’ fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), subject to the offset 28 provisions of the EAJA. subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program, and (2) agrees to waive the || requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, then the fees awarded herein will be paid to 3|| Plaintiffs attorney (consistent with the client’s agreement at Doc. 20-3 at 1). However, if 4|| there is a debt owed under the Treasury Offset Program, the Commissioner cannot agree 5 || to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining Equal Access 6|| to Justice Act fees after offset will be paid to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiffs attorney. 7 Dated this 5th day of August, 2025. 8 7 '

ll _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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